The U.S.-Indonesia Security Relationship: The Next Steps

By John B. Haseman and Eduardo Lachica

Published by the United States–Indonesia Society
January 2009
The authors respectfully dedicate this work
in memory of the late Colonel George Benson, U.S. Army.

George dedicated more than 40 years of his life to the betterment of U.S.-Indonesia relations. From his younger years as a military attaché in Jakarta to his many years as a civilian advisor to government and business, George was a teacher without seeming to teach and a diplomat without portfolio nonpareil. A friend and mentor to many, George inspired and informed three generations of Americans and Indonesians with the depth of his knowledge on the complexities of Indonesia, his expertise in military and diplomatic affairs, and, above all, his unquestioned personal integrity. Nobody who has ever known him will ever forget his sterling character, his charm and wit, and his tireless efforts on behalf of Indonesian-American friendship and understanding.

Terima kasih, ‘Pak
Contents

Preface vii
Executive Summary ix
Introduction xiii
Glossary of Terms xix

Chapter 1 Indonesia and the United States: Shared National Security Interests 1

Chapter 2 The Indonesian Armed Forces 13

Chapter 3 Military Professionalization: Still a Work in Progress 35

Chapter 4 The Indonesian National Police: A Reform Success Story in the Making 55

Chapter 5 New Missions: Maritime Security, Resource Protection, Disaster Management 69

Chapter 6 The TNI and International Peacekeeping Operations: A Welcome Return 87

Chapter 7 Managing The Security Relationship: A Model for Interagency Teamwork 97

Chapter 8 Indonesia’s Other Security Partners: More Than Enough? 117

Summary of Observations and Recommendations 129

About the Authors 137
Preface

The United States-Indonesia Society (USINDO) is pleased to continue supporting and contributing to the United States-Indonesia security dialogue. As intended, this new study by John Haseman and Eduardo Lachica on “The U.S.-Indonesia Security Relationship: The Next Steps” comes at the right time. We commissioned it to be ready in early 2009 at the advent of a new U.S. presidential administration, when the issues are most amenable to discussion and progress. We wanted to provide a professional set of facts, issues, and recommendations on the relationship; inform the incoming administration, Congress, and the public on strengths and areas for improvement; and prepare the ground for informed debate. This study does exactly that.

In the past few years, the importance for both countries of a close security relationship between Indonesia and the United States has increased. A sensitive and understanding security relationship between Indonesia and the U.S. enhances U.S. security, broadly defined. Indonesia has the largest Muslim population of any country, and is now perhaps the world’s best example of a thriving Muslim democracy. It has taken strong measures to combat terrorism, promotes regional stability, and demonstrates successful economic growth in the Muslim world and among all developing countries. A strong relationship with the U.S. also has benefits for Indonesia, including modernization; help in emergencies or security issues; and the benefits of technical assistance, training, and equipment. Perhaps most important to many is the significance to both sides of the personal contacts and friendships established, which permit the values of each country to be mutually understood and nurture progress on key issues.

The study documents developments in the bilateral security relationship, including its challenges, and concludes with key observations and recommendations to inform U.S. policymakers. This fits well with plans in the coming months. To respond to the call by Indonesian President Yudhoyono at his November 2008 USINDO speech
for a U.S-Indonesia 21st century strategic partnership based on equality and mutual interest, USINDO intends to organize a process in Washington in the Spring that will consider several topics raised by President Yudhoyono, and others, that might be elements of such an overall U.S.-Indonesia partnership. The U.S.-Indonesia security relationship, and the recommendations of this study, will form a key part of that process. We hope that the benefits of the current relationship will be better understood and maintained, and the remaining issues in the relationship resolved.

The authors of the study are acknowledged experts in their fields and had complete latitude to pursue their investigations and develop their recommendations. The opinions and conclusions expressed by the authors are their own, however, and do not necessarily reflect the views of USINDO or its Board of Trustees.

Ambassador David N. Merrill

President

United States-Indonesia Society
Executive Summary

Despite constraints on both sides, the United States and Indonesia have been able to cooperate effectively in fighting terrorism and other transnational crimes and in building the groundwork for regional stability. Indonesia is important to the United States not only because of its strategic location at the crossroads of international commerce but also because of its capacity for promoting Islamic moderation and the power of its example as an emerging democracy in the developing world. The United States is equally important to Indonesia. Although Jakarta has entered into strategic partnerships with nearly a dozen other countries, at the end of the day the United States could be its most indispensable security partner.

The relationship has been mutually beneficial. The United States treats Indonesia as the de facto regional leader, providing it more foreign aid than it does either of its two treaty allies in the region, Thailand and the Philippines. Indonesia has done its part in the global war on terrorism, virtually neutralizing all of its homegrown terrorist networks. It has effectively sided with the U.S. in criticizing the military junta in Burma and calling for a more active and cohesive agenda for the ASEAN Regional Forum. It has returned to active participation in international peacekeeping with a mechanized infantry battalion deployed in southern Lebanon and a police contingent joining other United Nations forces in Darfur.

The lifting of U.S. sanctions against the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) in November 2005 has revived arm sales, training programs, sea exercises and other activities that make up a typical U.S. military relationship with a friendly country. This makes the U.S. Pacific Command a major beneficiary of the restored relationship. These exchanges strengthen professional contacts between the two militaries and improve the quality of interoperability in the event they have to act together. As many as 140 of these events had been planned for 2008 although the schedule
had to be shortened for a number of practical reasons including budget cuts forced on the TNI.

This is not an easy relationship to manage. The “country team” in Jakarta has to be resourceful and creative. To implement the Tri-Border Initiative, involving the installation of radar and Marine Police stations along the Makassar strait connecting the Sulawesi and Sulu seas, the team had to summon the help of a number of agencies including the Justice Department, the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Naval Warfare Systems Command. It obtained its funding from various pots of money with different authorizations and expiration dates. The initiative was worth the trouble; by providing surveillance on waterways plied by terrorists and other criminals it addressed not only U.S. and Indonesian concerns but those of Malaysia and the Philippines as well.

However, a lack of trust on both sides continues to be a factor limiting the attainment of a fully normal military relationship. The TNI continues to complain that the vetting of candidates for attendance at U.S. military schools discriminates against members of the Army Special Forces Command (Kopassus). A U.S. statute has effectively disbarred the entire unit and its personnel from receiving U.S. education and training because of the unit’s involvement in the violence that attended East Timor’s referendum vote for independence in 1999. The military relationship cannot be fully normalized until this law is rewritten or reinterpreted to punish individual wrongdoers and not whole units, which is contrary to U.S. legal practice.

Internal reforms, in fact, have made the TNI radically different from what it was under Suharto. It has withdrawn completely from politics for the first time in its existence and is under a considerable degree of civilian oversight. The current TNI leadership is above reproach, chosen by President Yudhoyono for their professionalism and respect for civilian authority. The TNI remains faithful to democratic governance even while rumors of military coups swirl around the capitals of other Southeast Asian nations. The TNI has yet to dissolve its system of territorial commands, which parallels the civilian regency and district governments in some respects, and it has yet to dismantle its business empire, but this is only because realistically it cannot undertake these measures by itself. These would require more public resources than the government can muster. The government is under little pressure from the public to act; there are more urgent concerns to attend to such as unemployment, energy prices, and food security. Expectations of reform have to be placed on a longer time frame keyed to further economic growth and improvements in standards of living.

The Indonesian national police (Polri) is reforming itself faster than the TNI as a result of strong leadership and a willingness to receive the advice and assistance of foreign donors. A joint State Department-Justice Department program has played a key role in strengthening its capacity for law enforcement and its commitment to public service. Polri’s assumption of most of the responsibility for internal security has
worsened tensions with the TNI’s territorial commands, particularly over access to off-budget funding. This problem may not be completely resolved until both institutions are fully funded from the national and local government budgets.

With the ending of separatist threats in Aceh and other provinces the TNI has turned its attention to non-traditional security missions that its doctrine calls “operations other than war.” The TNI has long been accustomed to this kind of humanitarian or civil work but the current economic conditions could elevate its importance even more. This study focuses on three of these missions—disaster preparation and response management, natural resources protection, and maritime security. The relevance of non-traditional security already has had an effect on how the defense department is spending its money. It is deferring further purchases of jet fighters and submarines for five or more years and putting its priority on additional airlift and sealift—assets useful for both traditional military missions as well as for disaster relief and other civil emergencies.

A further mission being undertaken by the TNI—although not really a new one—is to become a reliable contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions. The TNI’s participation cannot reach the level of that of top U.N. contributors like Pakistan and Bangladesh but it may soon be able to have as many as 1,500 soldiers and policemen serving overseas every year—a respectable achievement for a security force of its size.

The U.S. will find it to its own advantage to support these missions. The assignment of TNI and police personnel to a campaign against illegal logging will likely be cheered by the U.S. environmental community. The same applies to peacekeeping. The U.S. chipped in $2 million to transport the TNI’s vehicles to Lebanon, and is earmarking another $2.3 million for the training of Indonesian peacekeepers in 2009. It is good policy for the U.S. to encourage foreign participation in U.N. missions because these missions cost the U.S. less than half of what it would to send U.S. soldiers to similar missions.

It is incumbent on the Obama administration to build on the gains that already have been achieved and to bring this unique relationship to its full potential. This enterprise does not necessarily require a lot more money to be effective. Doubling military education benefits to the TNI would cost only another $1 million, and yet could be single most effective measure the U.S. can take to accelerate the pace of internal reforms in the Indonesian armed forces. Above all, the task needs more mission-dedicated, language-capable people able to work with their Indonesian counterparts in areas where economic and security concerns intersect. The Indonesian program should be a model of how the U.S. can work effectively with a non-allied country in pursuit of common regional and global interests.

The morally superior, hectoring tone in which the current U.S. policy addresses the issue of TNI reforms has been unhelpful and should be moderated. With Abu Ghraib
and other outrages on its own record, the United States cannot presume to hold the standard for proper military behavior. This relationship can work best only if it is one of respectful equals. The executive and legislative branches should consult regularly and with full transparency on U.S. policy toward Indonesia. There is no reason why it cannot be conducted in the spirit of constructive bipartisanship with the aim of helping Indonesia become a modernizing, irreversibly democratic and economically secure friend of America.
Introduction

Early in 2005 the authors produced a monograph that was to become in effect the prequel to this small book. Its purpose was evident from its title, “Toward a Stronger U.S.-Indonesia Security Relationship.”1 The time seemed right for its publication, as the election of a reform-minded, English-speaking, U.S.-educated Indonesian president had just preceded the re-election of a U.S. president waging a global war against terrorism. Even though congressional sanctions had in effect frozen U.S. military relations with Indonesia for nearly 15 years, the fact that the two countries were fighting a common battle against terrorists argued for rebuilding the relationship.

In that first study the authors took note of America’s restored standing in Indonesia as a result of its dramatic efforts to help rescue and assist survivors of the Boxing Day tsunami in Aceh. America’s popularity with the Indonesian populace in fact soared as a result of its leadership in the international effort to rescue and assist the disaster victims. Soldier-to-soldier rapport on the ground in Aceh by members of all branches of the two countries’ armed forces, working together to ameliorate the effects of this enormous tragedy, re-established camaraderie and a degree of interoperability as only military men, thrown together in uncomfortable conditions, can do.

The authors documented the counter-productive effect of the human rights-oriented U.S. sanctions then in effect, which denied Indonesian military personnel the experience of U.S. military education and person-to-person training exercises.2 The withheld U.S. assistance would not only have helped make the Indonesians better, more professional soldiers but would also have exposed them to American traditions of respect for individual rights, civilian control of the armed forces, and other civic virtues. Most of that monograph’s recommendations were implemented, including restoration of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, expansion of contacts between U.S. and Indonesian officers at every level, resumption of
bilateral and multilateral training opportunities, and renewed sales of weapons systems and spare parts.

Five months after publication of that monograph, at the instigation of incoming Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice the Bush administration formally lifted the sanctions against the Indonesian armed forces. That first work might have helped some, but what finally made the breakthrough possible was the intervention of fate and the Indonesian government’s success in peacefully settling the decades-long conflict with Aceh separatists, which was an encouraging sign of the newly elected government’s ability to control the armed forces.

Three years later, however, it can be said that, although the U.S.-Indonesia security relationship is stronger and more productive than it had been in pre-tsunami days, much is left to be done. Expectations that U.S. re-engagement would markedly accelerate the pace of military reforms have not been realized. Two major pieces of the reformasi puzzle remained unfinished or unresolved: the dismantlement of the military business empire and the disposition of the army territorial command system.

In the summer of 2008 the authors undertook another review of the U.S.-Indonesia security relationship, with the goal of making it part of a nonpartisan briefing on Asian policy for the incoming U.S. administration and Congress, regardless of which party would win the 2008 elections. It was highly encouraging that the presidential candidates of both parties promised continued engagement with America’s allies and security partners in Asia, including Indonesia. But, inevitably, there will be a new set of relationship managers in the executive branch and the Congress. They will have to learn from the experience of their predecessors, get smart quickly on current conditions and policy options, and, more fundamentally, comprehend the necessity of improving strategic and security relations with major Asian powers that go beyond current alliance ties.

This work is a close examination of the record of the last three years and, as its title suggests, a set of prescriptions for preserving and building upon the gains achieved so far. The authors have found little evidence to contradict the consensus in both countries that the Bush administration’s management of these affairs has been generally productive. It has been easy, therefore, to conclude that the programs already in place, including education and training, foreign military financing, and foreign military sales, should be extended, if not expanded, to the extent resources allow. The authors also base on common sense their recommendations to correct bureaucratic lapses that unnecessarily impair the relationship.

This study documents the progress of reforms in the armed forces and the police, the country’s main security-providing institutions, but it does not pretend to be a review of Indonesia’s security-sector reforms in their entirety. Such a review would require investigating the performance of other institutions including the intelligence
agencies, the customs and immigration services, and the civilian justice system, which are outside the scope of this research project.

The authors recommend upgrading the relationship to the extent it can be fully embraced by Indonesia, while allowing it the benefits of other security partnerships in keeping with its traditional “free and active” foreign policy. The ideal is to achieve a relationship of respectful equals.

There are few prescriptions here that can be construed as an American imposition on Indonesia. In fact, the central recommendation of this study is for the U.S. to adjust its programs to better support the Indonesian government’s strategic shift to address non-traditional security threats like transnational crime, natural disasters and the loss of vital national resources, while continuing to encourage higher professional standards for the armed forces and the police.

The authors go a step further than they did in their earlier work, by locating Indonesia’s security needs in the context of its relations with its immediate neighbors. The U.S.-supported tri-border initiative described herein is an example of how the U.S. is encouraging the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to go beyond talk-shop declarations and commit resources to handle common security threats. ASEAN has already begun to respond by agreeing to a U.S. proposal for a joint regional disaster mitigation exercise in 2009, but assessing how such demonstrations can affect the quality of regional cooperation is beyond the scope of this book.

This review is also intended to be a modest contribution to Indonesia’s debate over these same issues in the run-up to its own presidential election in July 2009. Already the subject of lively discussion is whether the next Indonesian administration can continue to prosecute military reforms, especially the dissolution of the military business empire, by October 2009 as mandated by a 2004 law.

The authors would be remiss if they did not acknowledge the Yudhoyono administration’s significant efforts to make Indonesia more open to constructive relations with the U.S. and other Western countries. But some vestiges of xenophobic and isolationist attitudes remain in the Indonesian body politic and continue to be a challenge to relationship managers.

Despite Indonesia’s incredible change since 1998 from autocracy to the most democratic country in Southeast Asia, its engagement with the U.S. continues to be a test of its political maturity. Indonesia has to balance its unease with foreign powers with its growing responsibilities as a regional leader and leading voice in the developing world. The U.S. is finding itself not as all-powerful and unchallenged in its judgments as it used to be, and must learn to deal with Indonesia and its other security partners from a position of equality, equanimity, and especially patience.

This study first reviews the national security interests the two countries have in common. It then describes the state of the Indonesian armed forces in Chapter 2. The
following chapter examines the TNI’s efforts at improving military professionalism, and Chapter 4 turns the spotlight on the Indonesian National Police.

The book then describes, in Chapters 5 and 6, how the TNI, like other peacetime militaries, is devoting more attention and resources to non-traditional security threats. These undertakings are purposely called “missions” to stress their urgency even in times of peace, and the requirement for close cooperation between the armed forces and civilian agencies for them to succeed. Three of these missions—maritime security, resource protection, and disaster risk management—are dealt with in Chapter 5. A fourth mission, international peacekeeping, is explained in Chapter 6. It is not really a “new” mission like the other three because, except for a temporary retreat from the field in the aftermath of the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, the Indonesian military has been an active contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions for more than 40 years.

Chapter 7 examines the challenges of “managing” the bilateral U.S.-Indonesia security relationship—the work of Pentagon and State Department policy-makers, the U.S. Pacific Command and the U.S. Embassy’s “Country Team”—that must of necessity be adapted to Indonesian capabilities and the availability of American resources. The study stresses the need for continuing close coordination and cooperation among the several civilian and military agencies with a stake in the program.

The U.S., of course, is not Indonesia’s only active security partner. Chapter 8 reports how Australia already offers Indonesia more than three times the amount of security assistance than the U.S. normally provides, and how Russia has rapidly surpassed the U.S. as Indonesia’s largest current arms supplier. But even though the U.S. has to share the field with other players, it is close to being the only indispensable partner of them all.

The study finds the bilateral security relationship to be generally improving, but in the future “more of the same” will not be good enough. The resourcefulness and creativity of the next team will be challenged in the areas of confidence building, program design, and resource generation.

The authors are grateful for the support of the United States-Indonesia Society (USINDO), a binational, non-government organization made up of private citizens from both countries. David Merrill and Don Eirich, USINDO’s president and congressional and defense relations officer, respectively, helped get the book through its production and presentation stages. The authors also owe much to Alphonse F. La Porta, USINDO’s former president, for his encouragement while the project was underway and for his unerring advice on the quality of the product. As members themselves of this organization dedicated to improving mutual friendship and understanding between the two countries, the authors have sought a kind of mid-Pacific perspective that can fairly balance the exchange of benefits between the two countries on the basis of their respective capacities.
The authors wish to express their appreciation for the assistance and advice of many individuals in Jakarta, the U.S. Pacific Command in Honolulu, the Indonesian Embassy in Washington D.C., the Indonesian Department of Defense, and the Indonesian armed forces headquarters in Jakarta. Among those deserving of special thanks are Ambassador Gene Christy and Lieutenant Colonel Jamie McAden at Pacific Command Headquarters; Colonel Kevin Richards, the able U.S. Defense Attaché in Jakarta and his staff; Lieutenant Colonel Ken Comer and Lieutenant Colonel James Robinson, the outgoing and incoming Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation in Jakarta; Gerald Heuett, Jr., the senior law adviser at the U.S. Embassy; Dr. Juwono Sudarsono, Indonesia’s Minister of Defense, and his staff; and Lieutenant General (retired) Agus Widjojo.

The authors also have benefited greatly by the wisdom of many individuals who were kind enough to share their knowledge and analyses with us. Many of their names are found in the text and in the endnotes at the end of each chapter in this book; others requested anonymity for a variety of reasons, which we have scrupulously respected.

We acknowledge with gratitude the knowledge and wisdom of usindo’s leaders and friends, and their assistance in the research, writing, and publication phases of this project. However, the findings and conclusions expressed in this book are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of our usindo colleagues or those of the many agencies of the U.S. government with which we consulted during our research. Finally, whatever errors in fact or judgment there may be in the book are those of the authors only.

Notes
1. The United States-Indonesia Society, Washington DC, August 2005 (Second Printing).
2. The sanctions did have the positive effect, while the country was still in the grip of Suharto’s authoritarian regime, of lending heart to the small community of human rights activists. But the usefulness of the sanctions began to wear off after the country turned democratic and the Indonesian military initiated a succession of internal reforms.
4. Foreign military financing (FMF) provides military equipment at reduced or no cost to the recipient country. Foreign military sales (FMS) refers to a program for direct country-to-country sales of defense items.
Glossary of Terms

In any manuscript dealing with military terminology, and in any publication dealing with Indonesia, the authors cannot avoid the use of a number of abbreviations and acronyms. This monograph is no exception. To avoid repetitive explanations of lengthy institutional names and terms, we use standard U.S. abbreviations and Indonesian acronyms. The first time such a name or term is used, it is fully spelled out along with its standard abbreviation or acronym. In subsequent mentions, only the abbreviation or acronym is used. The Glossary contains only abbreviations and acronyms that appear frequently in the text.

**ARF**: asean Regional Forum. The asean Regional Forum is a formal, official, multilateral dialogue among asean members and other interested countries on issues relating to the Asia Pacific region. The arf objectives are to foster dialogue and consultation, and promote confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the region. The focus is on security matters. Membership includes the 10 asean states plus Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, the Peoples Republic of China, the European Union, India, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Timor Leste, the U.S., and Sri Lanka.

**ASEAN**: Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The economic, social, and—increasingly—political and security group made up of the ten principal countries of Southeast Asia: Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

**Brimob**: Indonesia National Police Mobile Brigade.

**CARAT**: Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training, a major component of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps training programs with other military services in the Asia Pacific.

**CGSC**: Command and General Staff College. This is the key mid-career professional education course in the U.S. Army. There are parallel courses for the other services. The majority of students are in the rank of major, with a scattering of captains on the list for promotion to major.
**CTF:** Indonesia-Timor Leste Commission for Truth and Friendship, formed in 2005 to look into crimes and human rights violations that took place primarily before and after the August 1999 act of choice in which East Timorese voted overwhelmingly for separation from Indonesia. The CTF released its final report to the public in September 2008.

**DAO:** Defense Attaché Office. The Defense Attaché is the senior U.S. military member of the Embassy Country Team. His or her many responsibilities include representing the U.S. military community, the military services, and (in the case of Indonesia) the U.S. Pacific Command to the host country military community. In Jakarta the Defense Attaché is also the Army Attaché; the office also has a Navy Attaché, an Air Force Attaché, and a small staff of officers, warrant officers, and NCOs.

**EEZ:** Exclusive Economic Zone. As defined by the United Nations Law of the Sea, an Exclusive Economic Zone is a maritime zone over which a state has special rights over the exploration and use of marine resources. The Exclusive Economic Zone starts at the coastal baseline and extends 200 nautical miles out into the sea, perpendicular to the baseline. The exception is when the EEZs of two states overlap, in which case the two states must determine the boundary line through diplomatic negotiation.

**FMF:** Foreign Military Financing. A U.S. government program for financing, through grants or loans, the acquisition of U.S. military articles, services, and training.

**FMS:** Foreign Military Sales. A U.S. government program for managing government-to-government purchases of weapons and other defense articles, defense services, and military training.

**ICITAP:** International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program. The U.S. Department of Justice program that works with foreign governments to help them develop professional and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism.

**ICRC:** International Committee of the Red Cross.

**IDU:** Indonesia Defense University. This institute is in the development stage, and will be a major improvement in the Indonesian military education system.

**IMET:** International Military Education and Training Program, which provides funding for foreign officers to attend U.S. military school courses, training programs, seminars, and other opportunities for interface with U.S. institutions and personnel.

**INP:** Indonesia National Police. This is a convenient English-language abbreviation. In Bahasa Indonesia the most common acronym is Polri—Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (see below).

**JCET:** Joint Combined Exchange Training. JCET programs are training exercises designed to provide training opportunities for U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel to familiarize themselves with areas they one day may have to operate in, or foreign forces they may have to interoperate with, as well as providing training opportunities for the armed forces of the host countries.

**Kodam:** Komando Daerah Militer. The largest level of command in the Indonesian Army’s territorial forces, headed by a major general, with an area of responsibility for one or more provinces. There are 12 Kodams in the territorial system.

**Korem:** Komando Resor Militer. The next-lower territorial command below Kodam, usually encompassing a single province or, in more populous provinces it may encompass one or more regencies.
**Kopassus:** Komando Pasukan Khusus—Army Special Forces Command.

**Kormar:** Korps Marinir—the Indonesia Marine Corps.

**Kostrad:** Komando Strategis Cadangan Angkatan Darat—Army Strategic Reserve Command, the largest and best-armed major command in the Indonesian armed forces.

**NCO:** Non-Commissioned Officer. The NCO corps is comprised of soldiers in the ranks from corporal to sergeant major, who make up the majority of U.S. military strength.

**PME:** Professional Military Education. This field of military education comprises most courses, at all levels of rank and position, designed to improve the professional and leadership abilities of the officer and non-commissioned officer corps.

**NDU:** National Defense University. The highest-level institution in the U.S. professional military education system, located at Fort Leslie J. McNair in Washington, DC. Students are senior lieutenant colonels, colonels, and senior grade civil servants.

**ODC:** Office of Defense Cooperation, the U.S. military office in overseas diplomatic missions that is responsible for managing U.S. security assistance programs in the host country. In many countries, including Indonesia, the ODC is a subordinate component of the U.S. Defense Attache Office.

**PACAF:** U.S. Pacific Air Forces, the air force component of the U.S. Pacific Command. The headquarters is at Hickam Air Force Base, Honolulu, HI.

**PACFLT:** U.S. Pacific Fleet, the naval component of the U.S. Pacific Command. The headquarters is at Pearl Harbor Navy Base, Honolulu, HI.

**PACOM:** U.S. Pacific Command, the multi-service military command with an area of responsibility extending from the South Pacific islands to the border between India and Pakistan, covering all the countries in between.

**Polda:** Kepolisian Daerah, regional police. The subordinate province-level command structure for the Indonesian National Police.

**Polri:** Kepolisian Republik Indonesia. Indonesian National Police. See also INP, above.

**SESKO-AD:** The Indonesian Army Command and Staff School, at Bandung. The air force and navy have service-equivalent schools located in Lembang (near Bandung) and Cipulir (Jakarta), respectively.

**SESKO-TNI:** The Indonesian armed forces Command and Staff School, at the equivalent level of the U.S. National War College, is located in Bandung.

**SOF:** Special Operations Forces, a blanket term for the special forces of the three U.S. military services as well as for those of foreign counterpart organizations.

**TNI:** Tentara Nasional Indonesia. The Indonesian National Armed Forces.

**UNIFIL:** United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon. UNIFIL was originally created in 1978, but reaffirmed and enhanced after the summer 2006 crisis between Lebanon and Israel. Indonesia has deployed two successive battalion task forces for service with UNIFIL.
USARPAC: U.S. Army Pacific, the army component of PACOM. The headquarters is at Fort Shafter, in Honolulu, HI.

USINDO: United States-Indonesia Society, a non-partisan bi-national non-government organization that promotes better cooperation and understanding between the two countries in education, international trade, the environment, and other fields of mutual interest.
Since 2005 the U.S. has sought to rebuild a cooperative relationship with Indonesia’s security forces—the Indonesian National Police (INP) and the Indonesian armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia—TNI)—that had been seriously degraded by nearly 15 years of punitive U.S. congressional sanctions. The turnaround was made possible by the goodwill generated by America’s leading role in the relief of tsunami-devastated Aceh in December 2004. The subsequent political solution to the long-standing insurgency in Aceh led to the lifting of the sanctions and the renewal of military cooperation.

The U.S. has since resumed the training of Indonesian military personnel, reactivated contacts up to the highest level of military leadership, and broken new ground for cooperation in disaster relief, international peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, maritime security, and other areas. But full normalization of the relationship has yet to be achieved because of continued restrictions, capriciously applied, and the resulting tensions and frustrations on both sides of the policy-making divide. There is still much work to do for the incoming administration of President Barack Obama. “We have
yet fully to instill trust between our governments,” a senior U.S. diplomat remarked. “Without that trust there is too much potential for misunderstanding.”

Why does the U.S. have to go to this much trouble for a country with which it has no treaty obligations? Because geopolitics simply cries out for it. The importance of a strong U.S. security relationship with Indonesia is beyond question. Indonesia is one of three littoral states on which the U.S. depends for the safety of navigation in the Strait of Malacca. It is a key partner in Southeast Asia in combating terrorism, the trafficking of persons and drugs, and other transnational crimes. Indonesia has returned to the front stage in political leadership in ASEAN. It has also become a voice for moderation in the Middle East, independent from but effectively supportive of U.S. peace-seeking efforts.

The U.S. has to depend on bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the TNI to protect its national security interests. Its ability to engage the TNI is thus a leading indicator of the health of the relationship. The U.S. cannot afford to let it erode as a result of inattention or competing priorities. Indeed, some U.S. Asianists argue that closer relations between policy and opinion leaders—on several levels—is necessary to optimize the defense relationship and to make it more predictable and durable. Alphonse La Porta, a former U.S. diplomat and USINDO president, has proposed raising it to a “near-ally” status supported by increasing U.S. assistance for defense reform, bilateral “retreats” for key foreign affairs and defense legislators, and stepped-up funding for academic programs for both Indonesian and American scholars.

A near-alliance with the U.S., of course, has to be earned. But in some respects, even without the formalities, the U.S. is already treating Indonesia as well as, if not better than, its two formal Southeast Asian allies, the Philippines and Thailand. Indonesia, for instance, gets nearly three-fourths more U.S. economic and security assistance than the Philippines does. Indonesia has become the leading recipient of U.S. assistance in Southeast Asia, with the Philippines a distant second. Indonesia arguably deserves as much if not more because of its population and size alone. Even if the most Indonesia can offer is a well-functioning partnership across the spectrum of common concerns it would be worth every dollar of U.S. aid it receives.

This is an especially important time to review the potential of this relationship. Indonesia’s democratic government has a wide range of options for providing for its own security without the help of the U.S. Should Indonesia pursue some of the more radical alternatives there could be serious consequences to U.S. security interests and regional influence in the Asia-Pacific.

Indonesia has already taken firm steps to build a military relationship with Russia, China and other countries. It has widened its sources of arms and equipment in order to avoid being hurt again by arms embargoes such as the one the U.S. imposed in the 1990s that almost destroyed the TNI’s readiness posture, or other impositions affecting
its security. Thus Indonesia will likely decide the depth and breadth of its security cooperation with the U.S. according to how it weighs other options, including settling for a pacifist ASEAN-chartered security community. The numerous strategic partnerships Indonesia has entered into—with China, Russia, India, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and the United Kingdom among other countries—are clearly a hedge against the possibility of another breakdown in U.S. ties. The U.S. has no other choice: it must keep expanding the margins of this relationship, which has made possible strategic cooperation in a number of important fields even without treaty obligations. To be sure, being in an arena where it is just one of many power contenders is an unfamiliar and even discomfiting game for the U.S. to play. But the U.S. has resourceful policy-makers and has many other advantages to exploit, including the many national security interests it shares with Indonesia.

President Yudhoyono opened the door wider for a formal strategic partnership with the U.S. during his Washington, DC foreign policy address in November 2008. He praised the state of U.S.-Indonesia security relations and singled out for favorable comment the Indonesia-U.S. Strategic Dialogue and cooperation with the INP. His view of the potential for closer strategic cooperation is worth quoting in full:

“In this context, a US-Indonesia strategic partnership is also possible. Of course, we need to be clear about the basis and terms of such strategic partnership. It will not be [an] alliance, because we are constitutionally prohibited from entering into any alliances. But it will be a partnership brought about by a realignment of interests. A

---

**Figure 1: U.S. Economic and Security Assistance to Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand for Fiscal Year 2008 (in 1,000s of US dollars)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Assistance</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
<td>15,572</td>
<td>29,757</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>974(1)</td>
<td>1,457</td>
<td>1,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Support Fund (ESF)(2)</td>
<td>64,474</td>
<td>27,77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Assistance</td>
<td>70,953</td>
<td>27,321</td>
<td>2,500(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCLE(4)</td>
<td>794</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>151,973</td>
<td>87,102</td>
<td>3,691</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The totals above do not include funds drawn from other, non-country-specific U.S. assistance programs.

**NOTES:**

(1) The U.S. has requested an increase in Indonesia’s IMET program to $1.5 million for FY2009.
(2) ESF is used in many bilateral relationships as a form of security assistance.
(3) The $2.5 million in DA for Thailand is to support its counter-separatist campaign in its Muslim-majority south.
(4) INCLE, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, a State Department-Justice Department program to assist the anti-crime efforts of partner countries.
U.S.-Indonesia strategic partnership would have to be based on equal partnership and common interests. It has to bring about mutual and real benefit for our peoples. It has to be for the long-term, and has [to have] strong people-to-people content. It has to be part of a win-win strategic stability in the region. It has to be a force [for] peace, stability and cooperation for the international system. And it has to respect Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy, where there is always room for both sides to agree to disagree.”

National interests are the ultimate reference in gauging the depth and breadth of any bilateral relationship. Indonesia and the United States share a broad range of national security interests that combine to require a mutually beneficial bilateral security relationship.

**Fostering the Spread of Democracy**

“For the United States,” Condoleezza Rice has stated, “promoting democratic development must remain a top priority. Indeed, there is no realistic alternative that we can—or should—offer . . .”

Indonesia’s spectacular transformation from the autocracy of the Suharto years to the vibrant democracy of today is one of the most remarkable occurrences in recent history. The change began in May 1998, when—after more than 30 years of the Suharto autocracy—a combination of economic pressures, an angry populace, and political pressure from military leaders and his own cronies forced the former general to step down. Since then Indonesia has changed with incredible speed to become what most observers consider the most democratic nation in Southeast Asia.

The results of Indonesia’s 2004 parliamentary and presidential elections were particularly noteworthy, particularly when compared to those in the U.S., where participation by more than 60% of the electorate is considered a high turnout. As noted by The Asia Foundation’s Indonesia country director: “It is worth reemphasizing: In 2004, more Indonesians voted in more elections and for more different candidates—and more peacefully—than any other country’s citizens, anywhere in the world.” In fact, Indonesians actually complained that voter turnout “dropped” from the world’s highest in a free society (over 90 percent in the 1999 elections) to about 75 percent in 2004. A culture of democracy has not only taken root in Indonesia, but has also begun to flourish with a vigor not often seen in supposedly “mature” democracies.

This is a good time for the two countries to get to know each other better. Indonesia is important to the U.S. for many reasons, but it has still not gotten the attentions of many American policy-makers. As a distinguished U.S. scholar noted, “Indonesia may be the world’s fourth most populous country, third largest democracy and home to the world’s largest community of Muslims, but it is also the most important country Americans know virtually nothing about. They should take notice. Over the past
decade, Indonesia has undergone a remarkable political transformation that clearly refutes the proposition that democracy and Islam are incompatible."9

The U.S. has long had as a major national policy objective to foster the spread of democracy wherever possible in the world. There is no more fertile ground for this growth than Indonesia, a country whose current and future leaders can benefit greatly from U.S. assistance in developing the institutional foundations for democratic governance. It already has a bold and assertive parliament and the most unfettered media in Asia. In its ratings of countries on a scale from “free” to “not free,” The Heritage Foundation rates Indonesia as the one “free” country in Southeast Asia.10

But the country lacks a deep democratic tradition and needs help in forming and training cadres in the necessary disciplines. The deficit had been particularly severe in the security sector until the reformasi process began in 1998. The armed forces through the years came across as a highly elitist, control-obsessed, almost anti-democratic institution, proud of its historic feat of gaining the country’s independence from the Dutch, and pampered and spoiled by its favored position in the Suharto regime. But Suharto’s fall changed the game. Although it hurt their pride as well as their pocketbooks, the military leaders agreed to give up their allotment of parliamentary seats and other entitlements. Military personnel now must resign their commissions before taking other public offices. But they still distrust civilian politicians and resist submitting themselves fully to the supervision of a cabinet officer.

But this has not diminished their desire for reforms that can make them a fully professional and capable military. Here is where Indonesian needs and American resources can find a useful match, as General Peter Pace once suggested. “It is natural for two democracies to reach out to each other and depend on each other,” the then-Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff said in Jakarta after his 2007 meeting with President Yudhoyono.11 How U.S. security assistance bears on the reform process is described in other chapters of this study.

Maritime Security

Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelagic nation. With more than 17,000 islands spread over a geographic expanse greater than the continental United States, the country’s many seas and straits form the world’s greatest combination of strategic water routes. The country’s many islands also form a land bridge between Asia and Australia. All seaborne commerce between the Indian and Pacific Oceans must pass through Indonesian waters.12

The U.S. has a vital national security interest in the maintenance of free and secure routes through the Strait of Malacca, the Makassar Strait, the Sunda Strait, and the Ombai Strait, as well as through Indonesia’s internal seas. Secure sea lanes provide the lifeline for international shipping, including the strategically critical “maritime pipeline” of fuel from the Middle East to U.S. allies in Japan, the Republic of Korea,
and Taiwan, as well as for bulk cargos of natural resources from Australia to East and Southeast Asia. According to the Energy Information Administration, more than half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through the straits around and through Indonesia. This includes more than 80% of crude oil supplies for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.  

Those same sea lanes provide transit for U.S. naval vessels between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Strait of Malacca is the primary focus of international shipping, because it forms a natural funnel, and carries a huge volume of seaborne traffic. But the Strait of Malacca is crowded and shallow, so strategically there are other, less crowded and deeper, straits used by supertankers and other huge cargo vessels as well as American aircraft carriers and submarines. The key north-south route goes through the Sulu, Sulawesi, and Banda Seas and the Makassar and Ombai Straits.

Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have made important strides in cooperative patrols of the Malacca Strait. With financial and technical assistance from the U.S., Japan, and other countries, these many patrols have reduced the incidence of piracy in the important waterway, although a disturbing number of attacks against shipping still occur.

Also of great concern is the movement of extremists and terrorists across the waters between the southern Philippines, Malaysia, and the Indonesian islands of Sulawesi and Kalimantan. Many of the extremists who terrorized the Poso region of Central Sulawesi were trained in the southern Philippines, or received training from cadres who returned to Indonesia after undergoing training there. The multinational tri-border initiative (see Chapter 5) is an outstanding example of how U.S. government agencies can assist Indonesia and its nearest neighbors to improve security in their maritime commons.

Indonesia naturally has a national interest in insuring the safe and unhampered passage of international shipping through its straits and inner seas. It has an equally important national interest in safeguarding its huge maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ) against illegal fisheries poaching and other kinds of economic crimes. By one estimate Indonesia loses more than $16 billion in plundered resources each year.

There are more than a dozen Indonesian governmental agencies with a piece of the maritime security pie. These include the Indonesian Navy, the Maritime Police, the Department of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the Department of Transportation and many others. The creation of a Maritime Security Coordination Board has helped to minimize interagency rivalry but it will take strong leadership and more resources for these agencies to operate as a single cohesive team. Corruption within and outside the security agencies is undoubtedly a factor in the state's loss of revenues from natural resource exploitation. Nevertheless, there is a clear U.S. national interest in working with those agencies to improve their capacity to safeguard the national welfare while contributing to the global war against terrorism.
Regional Stability in Southeast Asia

The U.S. has a major national interest in the maintenance of regional stability and peace in Southeast Asia. It therefore has to have strong, cooperative and mutually reinforcing ties with the regional association, ASEAN. The Heritage Foundation described U.S. interests as follows: “Without a coherent, robust U.S. approach to the region as a whole, the grouping will develop its common interests in association with alternative benefactors—likely China. In such a scenario, the interests of the U.S. and its partners in the region will drift apart. The U.S. has too much at stake in the region to let this happen.”15 Whether the U.S. is doing enough to demonstrate its affinity to ASEAN is debatable. But the Bush administration did up the ante by appointing the first U.S. ambassador to ASEAN in 2008.

As one of the five founding members of ASEAN, Indonesia has historically been a leading voice in the region. During the tribulations of the late 1990s financial crash in the region and the political turbulence caused by a succession of short-lived presidencies in the early 2000s, Indonesia retreated from this role and ASEAN entered a period of less-than-effective leadership. Now, however, President Yudhoyono has emphasized Indonesian leadership in ASEAN as one of the cornerstones of the country’s foreign policy. Indonesia has demonstrated that leadership by unflinchingly criticizing the military junta in Burma, espousing a more democratic ASEAN Charter, and pushing for a more cohesive role and mission for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the creation of an ASEAN Security Community.

U.S. Ambassador Cameron Hume described Indonesia’s stance with these words: “On the world stage, Indonesia is a leader. The United States admires Indonesia’s democratic leadership. Indonesia’s success at developing democratic institutions shows the way for other nations. Indonesia is leading ASEAN in promoting democracy and human rights. As a tolerant, diverse nation, Indonesia has a legitimate role in helping other countries striving to reform and make a peaceful democratic transition.”16

Influence Democratic Change in the Middle East

Some international observers now see Indonesia’s foreign policy reaching beyond ASEAN and positioning the country for a more influential role in the Middle East. As two well-respected ones put it: “For decades, Indonesia’s main international recognition was as the ‘anchor’ of ASEAN, but now it has multiple international identities: the largest country in ASEAN; the largest Muslim majority country in the world; and the world’s third largest democracy . . . Indonesia’s key international relationships should be based on shared values of democracy and freedom…”17

Indonesia is the world’s most populous—and the most moderate—Muslim-majority nation. Indonesia’s democratic transformation is an example the U.S. can point to in its nation-building efforts in the Middle East, and as it responds to skepticism over
whether democracy and Islam can co-exist. Helping Indonesia strengthen its democratic system is not only a worthy goal for America’s democracy project, its success can give the project better footing elsewhere in the Muslim world. President Yudhoyono has deliberately projected Indonesia’s model of moderate, democratic Islam onto an increasingly active foreign policy—a decidedly positive development.\textsuperscript{18}

The United States and Indonesia, of course, do not always agree on matters of international security. But Indonesia’s support becomes even more valuable when it finds common cause with the United States on objectives such as fighting drug trafficking and counter-terrorism. In many particular issues the two countries support each other’s security interests even without being formal security treaty partners. Simply by being true to its own constitutionally mandated religious tolerance Indonesia is a vibrant example for the rest of the Islamic world.

\textbf{Support for International Peacekeeping Operations}

The United States and Indonesia have a shared interest in international peacekeeping, albeit from different perspectives. In 2006, after nearly a decade of absence from the field, Indonesia dispatched a mechanized infantry battalion task force for service with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The deployment coincided with Indonesia’s turn at a seat in the United Nations Security Council. The gesture was thus widely seen as a symbol of its desire to take a role in world affairs, and particularly in the Greater Middle East. The TNI welcomed the assignment as an opportunity to return to expeditionary soldiering and to revive a mission in which it had excelled in the past. Indonesia has since replaced that first mechanized infantry battalion with a second one, and is preparing to bulk up its UNIFIL presence with a Force Protection Company and one of its new Dutch-built frigates, the \textit{kri} Diponegoro—the Indonesian navy’s furthest and most ambitious overseas deployment so far. Indonesia also reinforced its presence in Lebanon with a contingent of military policemen. It has also sent another a group of servicemen to serve in the Congo alongside other peacekeepers from China, Nepal, South Africa and Uruguay, and deployed a contingent of police officers to the troubled region of Darfur in Sudan.

This is a welcome development for the United States, too. The U.S. remains the largest single financial contributor to U.N. peacekeeping and for good reason; every peacekeeping mission the U.N. deploys is one less the U.S. has to worry about. It saves U.S. tax dollars. A U.S. Government Accountability Office report estimates that a U.N. peacekeeping mission would cost less than half of what it would cost the United States were it to undertake the same mission.\textsuperscript{19} That the TNI’s return to peacekeeping will also have the effect of promoting professionalism is an added return on the investment. Congressional restrictions have long limited the ways the United States can directly support the TNI but surely no one will object if it does so in the
cause of international peace. The United States quietly picked up the $2 million bill for transporting the TNI’s armored vehicles to Lebanon. It has earmarked another $2.3 million for the training of Indonesian peacekeepers in 200.

The experience of other Asian countries, including Malaysia, Mongolia and Fiji, show that upgrading peacekeeping capabilities also contributes to improved force effectiveness across the board, an experience that Indonesian military leaders could usefully internalize.

Indonesia and the U.S. have compelling national interests to cooperate in order to assure success in each of these areas of concern—maritime security, regional security in Southeast Asia, furtherance of democratic change in the Middle East, and enhancing peacekeeping operations capabilities in trouble spots around the world. Full and unrestricted military relations between the two countries are essential to gaining mutual trust and mutual support in these areas of common concern.

The TNI was isolated for more than a decade because of its involvement in human rights abuses that appalled its security partners. Perhaps the national interests might have been better served had the U.S. continued to engage the TNI and helped it participate in the country’s democratic transformation, instead of imposing a blanket condemnation of the entire armed forces for the sins of a very small number of its personnel. The following chapters show how, despite that lapse, transformations are

---

**Figure 2: Indonesia Peacekeeping Operations Since 1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Mission</th>
<th>Dates of UN Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq-Kuwait (UNIKOM)</td>
<td>1991–2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia (UNTAC)</td>
<td>1992–1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia (UNOSOM I)</td>
<td>1992–1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR)</td>
<td>1992–1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia (UNOMIG)</td>
<td>1993–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (ASEAN sponsored)</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan (UNMOT)</td>
<td>1994–2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)</td>
<td>1998–1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)</td>
<td>1999–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia (UNMIL)</td>
<td>2003–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon (UNIFIL)</td>
<td>2006–present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:

(1) Indonesia’s 3 consecutive battalion task forces were the largest contingent.
(2) Indonesia provided the commander of the UN observer mission: then a colonel, now President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

taking place in Indonesia’s armed forces and police and how the U.S. engagement has already started to affect their patterns of behavior.

Notes
1. Interview, Jakarta, July 2, 2008.
4. Numerous news publications have reported on Indonesia’s efforts to expand the sources for its military hardware. See, inter alia: The Jakarta Post (“Putin, SBY Plan $1 Billion Defense Agreement,” September 4, 2007 and Diaz Hendropriyono, “Russia Helps RI Rebuild Defense Capability, November 30, 2007) reported the TNI’s plans to purchase 22 helicopters, 20 tanks and two submarines from Russia as part of a $1 billion, 15-year loan program. President Yudhoyono and Chinese President Hu Jintao signed a strategic partnership agreement on defense and security in April 2005 but how this accord will be implemented is still unclear. As regards China’s ability to wrest influence in Asia away from the U.S., see The East-West Center Senior Policy Seminar 2007: Mapping Change in the Asia-Pacific Region: Geopolitics, Economics, and Diplomacy, Honolulu: 2008, for an excellent review of Asia-Pacific political trends.
7. See, inter alia, Andrew MacIntyre and Douglas Ramage, Seeing Indonesia as a Normal Country, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 2008.
13. Lohman, Ibid.
15. Lohman, Ibid.
17. MacIntyre and Ramage, Ibid.
19. “Peacekeeping: Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and U.N. Operations,” U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 13, 2007. The GAO study found that if the United States had conducted a peacekeeping operation in Haiti similar to that done by the U.N. it would have had to spend $876 million compared to the $428 million the U.N. budgeted for the operation. Higher salaries and standards of logistical support for U.S. troops and police personnel accounted for much of the differential.

Chapter 2
The Indonesian Armed Forces

“This is not Suharto’s Indonesia, and this is not Suharto’s Army.”

Key Points—Reforms Have Changed the Indonesian Military

- Major reforms in the military since Suharto’s resignation
- Withdrawn from government positions and political dominance
- Civilian Minister of Defense, growing parliamentary oversight
- Human rights training at unit level and throughout military schools
- Much better record since the violence in East Timor 10 years ago; accepted responsibility for human rights abuses
- Senior leadership has impeccable record, lauded for professionalism
- U.S. military embargo resulted in “lost generation”—far fewer personal contacts has had adverse affect on U.S. security interests

The armed forces establishment has changed greatly in the ten years since former President Suharto was forced from office in May 1998, just as the entire country has embraced democracy and gradually instituted the difficult changes that come with such a dramatic political transformation. That decade has seen the TNI transform itself from being the enforcement tool of the Suharto government to a strictly nonpolitical military seeking a respectable place in a democratic society. Describing Indonesian military reform on the 10th anniversary of Suharto’s resignation, a journalist noted: “Although much remains to be done…there has also been much progress.” Although this transformation has not moved as fast as the TNI’s most vociferous critics would like, the changes are real and are being implemented in such a manner as to make them stick.
The TNI remains the most cohesive and most powerful element of Indonesian society, not only by virtue of its traditional military ethos, but also because of its unique position in Indonesia’s history. Yet the changes implemented in the past ten years have seen the TNI removed from its formerly intrusive role in most Indonesians’ daily life, seen it removed from its powerful position in governance and politics, and seen it withdraw from a dominant role in internal security. In short, the TNI today is moving steadily toward its goal of becoming a professional armed force with both traditional military duties as well as some missions unique to Indonesia (see Chapters 5 and 6).

President Yudhoyono stands firm in his efforts to slowly but surely redefine the TNI’s roles. In early 2008 he issued a Presidential Decision (KepPres) on National Defense Policy that outlines the TNI’s principal doctrine and missions. The document realistically recognizes inadequacies in the budget, low readiness caused in part by arms embargos imposed by primary suppliers, and the challenges of modernizing the force. Although replete with philosophical dialectic from the past, the document also looks to the future. It firmly commits the TNI to prepare for non-traditional threats posed by non-state actors, and recognizes the need to embrace Operations Other Than War (Operasi Militer Selain Perang—OMSP) such as disaster relief, international peacekeeping, and resource protection.

Through its efforts to be deserving of the trust of the world’s third-largest democracy, the TNI has earned the right to a normal relationship with the U.S. military establishment. Mindful of a troubled past, its leaders have committed the TNI to reform and respect for democracy. As outlined in Chapter 1, it is in the national interest of the United States to cooperate with Indonesia to achieve that objective.

**Reformasi in the TNI**

By the late 1990s most of the Indonesian military’s small core of moderate reformists, almost all of whom were graduates of U.S. military training funded by the IMET program, had reached mandatory retirement age, stymied in many reform efforts during the Suharto years by a military leadership considered hard line on the issue of reform in general and who were firm supporters and beneficiaries of Suharto’s feudalistic system. These reformers include Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, who filled a number of senior military positions during his distinguished active duty career, and who, in retirement, continues to be among the most influential voices for continued reforms in the security sector; and the late Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah, whose attempts to implement reforms while commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) became highly controversial within the TNI’s senior officer corps.

Suharto’s fall gave an opening to younger moderates in the TNI to implement the first wave of significant military reforms. These reforms were essentially self-initiated and had little to do with U.S. pressure, as the many years of estrangement and arms
embargoes had by the late 1990s left the U.S. with virtually no influence or credibility with the TNI officer corps.

The TNI gave up its quota of reserved national and regional parliamentary seats and scrapped the controversial *dwifungsi* doctrine that enmeshed the military in virtually every aspect of civil society for more than four decades. The new doctrine, called *Tri Dharma Eka Putra* (Three Missions One Deed), applies to all three branches of the TNI (the “Three Missions”). Military personnel now must retire before taking civilian government posts. This is a huge contrast to the Suharto years, when thousands of military personnel occupied civil government and societal positions at all levels. The most important of the structural changes was the separation of the police from the TNI, with each service given separate but sometimes overlapping responsibilities. This “overlap” has caused competition, pressure, and tension between the two security services that persist to the present (see Chapter 4 for a closer look at the role of the National Police).

Other reforms sought to subordinate the TNI to civilian control. This has already begun with the free election of a civilian president, and has been so sufficiently institutionalized that whoever becomes Indonesia’s next president can be assured that the military will remain submissive to his or her authority. The TNI has already demonstrated its respect for civilian authority by successively saluting a non-Javanese (B.J. Habibie), a nearly blind cleric (Abdurrahman Wahid), and a woman (Megawati Soekarnoputri). And when one of their own, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a retired three-star general, became the fourth post-Suharto president, the TNI got no special favors from their commander-in-chief.

Reform of the military establishment has yet to place the TNI under the operational control of a civilian Minister of Defense. The chain of command still runs from the president to the TNI commander in chief. The Minister of Defense is outside the military chain of command. The Department of Defense has considerable authority over the TNI budget—including allocation of funds to the services and thus a strong say in strategic defense priorities—and budgetary transparency, as well as arms purchases. The Department also prepares the defense establishment White Paper (in coordination with the three services and a number of civilian think tanks and educational institutions). However, until the Minister of Defense becomes a formal, statutory figure over the TNI in the operational chain of command (as is the case in the U.S.), civilian control is still largely incomplete, for the president does not have the time nor the expertise to properly oversee the affairs of the armed forces.

Furthermore, although the president is the Supreme Commander of the TNI, he lacks a national security staff that can help him reconcile the needs of the armed forces with the policies and resource limitations of the Department of Defense. Overcoming these gaps in the chain of command and making the necessary structural changes are
some way off and will require the understanding and support of the next generation of military officers and civilian leaders.

While far from complete, reformasi has already produced remarkable changes in the TNI. The National Defense Law (No. 34/2004) ascribes to the TNI the ideal attributes of a military in the service of a democracy. The preamble directs the TNI to respect “civilian supremacy, basic human rights, international legal obligations” and to be funded from the national budget in a “transparent and accountable way.” The current military leadership is dedicated to these principles and is far more moderate than that of the past. When he was installed as TNI Commander in Chief in January 2008, General Djoko Santoso pledged that “The TNI will complete and evaluate the reform process and maintain its neutrality in politics.” He went on to list as his main priorities to increase soldiers’ welfare, improve the TNI’s professionalism, and better prepare to respond to natural disasters and civil emergencies.

The TNI and Human Rights, Then and Now

Since the fall of Suharto the military has gradually regained much of the standing with the Indonesia populace that it lost when a flood of revelations about human rights violations began to pour out after the lifting of press restrictions. The great majority of Indonesians were not fully informed of these issues during the Suharto era, although its victims and their families or survivors certainly knew of specific TNI offenses. The most egregious of these to the outside world occurred in East Timor, starting in 1975 with the invasion of the former Portuguese colony by an inadequately trained Indonesian force. The government skillfully repressed information about the brutal actions of the Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) against East Timorese civilians from reaching the public. Reports about the dark side of Indonesian occupation became known only after the province was “opened” in 1988, and reached a crescendo in the months prior to, and then after, the 1999 act of choice vote.

Even before these reports reached the outside world, a number of mid-level military officers (many of whom graduated from IMET-supported U.S. military training programs) attempted to restrain the unsavory behavior of some military personnel. They understood the need, in conflict zones, to win the civilian populace over through good behavior rather than the use of naked force. Those officers at that time were not sufficiently senior to influence military-wide policy, but many had some standing in areas under their immediate command. As an example, the officer sent to command troops in East Timor after the 1991 Dili incident, a Protestant from North Sulawesi, headed what is widely regarded by East Timorese as the most humane period in the pre-independence years. That officer later went on to serve honorably as overall military commander in Papua and later topped his career as army vice chief of staff and as secretary-general of the Defense Department.
The army’s reaction to the 1991 Dili incident was also instructive. The military honor council formed to look into that tragedy had as its secretary another U.S.-trained officer. That body recommended disciplinary action against five levels of the army’s chain of command—exactly the same types of punishment meted out by the U.S. Army to those involved in the infamous My Lai massacre in Vietnam. It was the first time that Indonesian military commanders were held responsible for behavior of troops not under their immediate control. Unfortunately, the military and the highest levels of the Indonesian government squandered that opportunity to demonstrate responsibility. For years they refused to acknowledge the number of deaths at Santa Cruz Cemetery. It was this refusal to account for casualties—reportedly on orders from Suharto himself—that caused the U.S. Congress to cut Indonesia’s IMET Program funding in 1992, and thus begin the ebb in the U.S.-Indonesia military relationship.9

Since the Dili Incident the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has regularly given lectures at military schools on respecting human rights in combat zones. While a laudable effort to influence army doctrine and behavior, it foundered at the “point of the spear”—implementation in the field. An informal review of post-1991 human rights abuses by one of this work’s authors revealed than many offenses were committed in the heat of conflict, often by units led by junior officers commissioned not from the military academy but rather from the officer candidate school for former non-commissioned officers—who usually did not benefit from the ICRC lectures.

In order to reach more of the rank and file, the TNI asked the ICRC to expand its role. The ICRC now conducts training on human rights and military behavioral training at the tactical unit level as well as throughout the TNI education system. This had immediate effects in Aceh, where the military’s behavior was far better than had been the case in East Timor. With hardly any publicity dozens of soldiers responsible for offenses against civilians have been punished through the military courts-martial system.

In November 2008 the TNI organized the first multinational ICRC seminar in the Asia-Pacific region for military leaders. The seminar included discussions on the use of force in internal security and counterinsurgency operations and focused on the 1949 Geneva Convention and international humanitarian law. Besides host Indonesia, senior officers from Japan and five other ASEAN countries attended. A senior TNI officer noted, “We don’t want to repeat our past mistakes. Every TNI soldier sent into conflict areas in Indonesia or anywhere in the world is taught proper conduct during war before being deployed to the field.” ICRC’s country director for Indonesia, Vincent Nicod, said the ICRC and TNI had been cooperating for a long time. “Our choice to organize this [seminar] here is also due to Indonesia’s important role as peacekeeper in U.N. efforts in many regions in the world.”10
Other nations are also providing human rights training to the TNI. Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and Australia each have programs to expand knowledge of international human rights standards. For example, in early 2008 the Canadian Embassy organized seminars for military lawyers on human rights and reforms in the military judicial system in Medan, Makassar, Denpasar, and other regional military commands. Its lead speaker was the Canadian ambassador himself, John Holmes, an international lawyer by training and one of the drafters of the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court. Other human rights lawyers like Harkristuti Harkrisnowo of the Department of Justice and Human Rights and Fadillah Agus framed the discussion in the Indonesian context. The program had the full support of the TNI’s chief legal advocate, Brigadier General Heru Cahyono.11

Mr. Fadillah, the seminar organizer, has dedicated his law practice to human rights since a traumatic event in 1998 when two of his Trisakti University students demonstrating against authoritarian rule were killed by security forces. He believes the sosialisasi (internalization) process is having an effect on the many TNI officers who attend the seminars. The officers often ask him whether Americans are equally guilty of disrespecting human rights because of their record in Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison and the Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba. His reply is not to use the actions of other governments as an excuse for lax standards. “Don’t look at others. Look at yourselves.”12

The human rights issue as it relates to the TNI has to be kept in perspective. Most of the worst incidents, for which the TNI justly must accept criticism and should be made accountable through the justice system, are a decade in the past. The most significant recent case of abuse occurred on May 30, 2007 in Pasuruan, East Java, when Indonesian marines fired on a group of civilians demonstrating over a land dispute, killing four and wounding several others. Unlike in the past, when such incidents were frequently covered up with little or no discipline or punishment imposed, the TNI took firm action. Thirteen officers in the chain of command and enlisted men involved in the incident were convicted by court-martial; all received prison sentences. And the military’s judicial process was widely covered in the Indonesian media.

The military’s recent human rights record is far better than that of past history. This is partly because of the human rights and sensitivity training already routine at the unit level and throughout the military school system. It is in large part also because East Timor is now off the TNI’s map and the other areas in which it was engaged in conflict-suppression missions—Aceh and Papua, primarily—are now relatively peaceful. Amnesty International’s most recent reports on Indonesia focus not on TNI actions but on police mistreatment of criminals and poor prison conditions.13 Human Rights Watch’s latest posting on Indonesia was directed not at the TNI but at President Yudhoyono’s tardiness in implementing the 2004 law on military reforms.14 Concern
about the mistreatment of civilians, once directed mainly at the TNI, appears to have migrated to the police, which have taken over responsibility for internal security and assumed many of the duties involved in quickly ending such problems as ethnic and religious strife (which break out with amazing swiftness in Indonesia) and other law-enforcement duties previously shared with the army.\textsuperscript{15}


The TNI’s stronger sense of responsibility and maturity on human rights issues is illustrated by its response to the final report issued by the Indonesia-Timor Leste Commission on Truth and Friendship (CTF) and released to the public in July 2008. The report, skillfully and patiently overseen by retired Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, pulled no punches. The lengthy (over 300 pages) report placed most of the blame for the violence on the activities of Indonesian military and military-supported militia forces, government and institutional entities, as well as on both Indonesian and East Timorese individuals (see Figure 3). It declared, “gross rights violations in the form of crimes against humanity, such as murder, rape, torture, illegal detention and forced deportation against civilian populations did occur” throughout the former Indonesian province of East Timor. The report provides details of individuals, both Indonesian and East Timorese, pro-Indonesia and pro-independence militia groups, and military and police commanders by position and duties, who were involved in planning and

**Figure 3: CTF Conclusions about Human Rights Violations**

1. Gross human rights violations in the form of crimes against humanity did occur in East Timor in 1999 and these violations included murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, illegal detention, and forcible transfer and deportation carried out against the civilian population.

2. There was institutional responsibility for these violations.

3. Pro-autonomy militia groups, TNI, the Indonesian civilian government, and Polri must all bear institutional responsibility for gross human rights violations targeted against civilians perceived as supporting the pro-independence cause. These crimes included murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, illegal detention, and illegal detention, and forcible transfer and deportation.

4. Because of the lack of previous systematic judicial investigations of such violations the exact nature and extent of such violations could not be conclusively determined.

5. Persistent patterns of organized, institutional involvement in these gross human rights violations provide the basis for its conclusions about institutional responsibility.

directing violence; it also details involvement by non-military elements of the Indonesian government.\textsuperscript{17}

When Indonesian President Yudhoyono and Timor Leste President Ramos-Horta accepted the report in a joint ceremony in Bali it marked the first time that Indonesia had officially accepted responsibility for the East Timor violence.

The TNI commander-in-chief, General Djoko Santoso, said: “The government has accepted the report. The TNI will also accept it and wait for whatever action the government considers taking next.” He added that the 1999 violence in East Timor was “the state’s responsibility and has become TNI’s responsibility.” General Santoso said that the TNI “follows the principles of democracy and thus abides by any decisions made by political authorities.”\textsuperscript{18}

Acceptance of responsibility was in marked contrast with the attitude of General Wiranto, the TNI commander in chief at the time of the East Timor violence. He repeatedly denied that the TNI bore any responsibility for the depredations of civilian militia groups, and lost much credibility among the TNI’s officer corps by refusing to accept command responsibility for the TNI’s well-publicized support of those militias.

An earlier Indonesian \textit{ad hoc} human rights court process convicted more than a dozen senior Indonesian military officers and civilians for their involvement in the East Timor violence. All denied involvement and responsibility. The credibility of the judicial process was irrevocably compromised by inept prosecution efforts and further weakened by repeated efforts by the TNI leadership of that time to intimidate witnesses and block progress on the cases. All of the convictions were eventually overturned on appeal. Most of those accused, but acquitted, are no longer on active duty. The acceptance of the CTF final report by President Yudhoyono and the current TNI commander-in-chief explicitly repudiates the behavior of those who were convicted, but through successful appeal, escaped punishment.

The TNI has not eliminated the occurrence of human rights abuse incidents (neither, for that matter, has the U.S. armed forces). But it has been successful in reducing their incidence. The TNI by habit has been reluctant to publicize punishment of its personnel for obvious reasons of morale and self-image, and does not maintain a central statistical record of the number and types of discipline and punishment meted out for misbehavior.\textsuperscript{19} The absence of publicity about such disciplinary action lends the impression that nothing has been done to punish or correct misconduct. However, dozens of soldiers responsible for offenses against civilians have been punished, largely unpublicized, through the military courts-martial system.

The TNI and Political Power: Then and Now

Among the first reforms implemented by the TNI were several that directly diminished the immense political powers that the TNI had enjoyed in its role as the primary sup-
port apparatus for the Suharto regime. The military jettisoned the *dwifungsi* doctrine that justified military involvement in virtually every aspect of governance and national life. It relinquished its bloc of seats in parliament, and cut its long-standing tie to the Golkar political party—no more generals wearing yellow jackets at party rallies.

Internal reforms stress three factors: bringing the military under civilian control within the democratic process; curbing the military’s economic activities and huge business empire; and restructuring the defense management process, including centralized control of arms procurement and a more transparent budgeting process.

By removing itself from daily political involvement, embracing the principles of human rights, democracy, and civilian supremacy, making a host of internal structural and personnel changes, the TNI has arguably implemented most if not all of the reforms that it can accomplish by itself. Most of the remaining reform objectives can only be accomplished in concert with a major overhaul of the entire civilian governmental system.

Those remaining aspects of government-wide reforms include elimination of the military business empire and reduction or elimination of the army’s territorial organization. The two are inextricably tied to the national government’s ability (or more precisely, the lack of ability) to meet all defense and military costs from the national budget—including establishment of an adequate salary scale for military personnel, and funds for capital improvements of infrastructure and purchase of more modern military weapons systems.

**Privatization and How to Compensate the TNI for the Loss of Their Business Assets**

Until full military budget funding can be accomplished, some form of outside military income system will be required to make up for national budgetary shortfalls that still limit the TNI to only about one third of its funding. National legislation requires that the military business empire be dismantled by October 2009, and a high level “national team” (*timnas*) has recommended handing over to the state TNI-associated companies and cooperatives valued at the equivalent of $281 million. The team leader is Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas, a highly respected and influential banker and a former member of the Corruption Eradication Commission, called the divestiture “the last part of the TNI, or military reform [process].” He added that it would require the government to improve the remuneration system of the military over the next five to ten years.

The asset transfer encompasses 55 companies, 23 charitable foundations, and 1,098 cooperatives. The team urged that the military retain cooperatives serving district and regency commands because their savings-and-loan and other services are basic to the soldiers’ welfare. Erry cannot guarantee a successful outcome because that is in the hands of the Yudhoyono administration or its successor. But he has secured an
important commitment from the government: to compensate the TNI for the loss of its business assets the government must commit itself to raise the soldiers’ salaries and welfare benefits so that they no longer have to depend on outside income.\textsuperscript{22}

But neither Parliament nor the President has indicated how the income from these businesses will be replaced. Most published commentary indicates that the number of military businesses to be turned over to civilian management will be small, and the amount of income produced by them will be almost negligible. Many of the military’s businesses have failed because of poor or corrupt management, recent efforts to strip tangible assets before turnover, or because they did not survive the regional financial collapse in the late 1990s. Few are producing significant income. “It’s very difficult to dispel this notion among people that there’s no more giant octopus of the army presence as it happened during the seventies and eighties,” observed Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono. “The military business [empire is] very, very small in comparison to what it was 20–15 years ago.”\textsuperscript{23}

Still unanswered are many questions about the secretive and, from all accounts, highly lucrative illicit businesses that both the military and police have been operating for decades. The details of this unsavory aspect of military and police income will probably never be fully known, nor the system ended. Usually the only hints of the extent of illicit business income come to the public from reports of violence between members of the armed forces and members of the national police, fighting over control of illegal sources of income. Both TNI and Polri personnel are believed involved in both organized and free-lance criminal activities such as extortion and the protection of gambling, prostitution, and other illegal enterprises as well as support of more sophisticated operations such as illegal logging, mining, and piracy. Some analysts estimate that the earnings from the military’s illicit enterprises more than doubled those from its legitimate businesses at the height of the military business empire’s reach 20 years ago.\textsuperscript{24}

### Organization and Structure of the Armed Forces

The TNI organization and structure is generally similar to those of most other military forces in large countries. The chain of command for operational units runs from the TNI commander-in-chief to the commanders of tactical commands of all three services and to the territorial commands of the army. The three service chiefs of staff have considerable power and authority in personnel matters, training and education, and logistical support of their forces, but do not command the movement and missions of troops in the operational arena. In this the TNI is quite similar to the operational command of the U.S. military.

The size of the TNI—approximately 395,000 personnel—is very small for a country with a population and geographical expanse as huge as Indonesia’s. Furthermore, the deployment of forces is uneven, infantry-dominant, with the heaviest concentration
of forces in the most populous regions of the country—a classic portrayal of an armed force organized for domestic security purposes. The farthest reaches of the country, where the land or sea borders are, have a paucity of security forces. Herein lies one of the country’s strategic dilemmas: the lack of transportation assets for deployment of forces to border areas in the classical defense mission, and for deployment to remote areas where natural disasters might strike. Indonesia spends less per capita on defense than any of its ASEAN neighbors except the Philippines, and has the smallest armed force per capita of population of them all.

The Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad)
Kostrad (Komando Strategis Cadangan Angkatan Darat) is the largest and most important tactical formation in the Indonesian armed forces. With two infantry divisions, a separate infantry brigade, and organic combat and combat support units, its strength of over 30,000 is similar to that of a U.S. Army corps. With its size, weaponry, and professional competence, Kostrad is arguably the most prestigious and powerful unit in the Indonesian armed forces. Its commander is a lieutenant general chosen for his tactical competence and knowledge of strategy; his political reliability is also important.

Kostrad’s organization is very similar to a U.S. Army corps. Each of its two divisions has three brigades, each composed of three infantry and airborne battalions. Each division also has command of a field artillery regiment, an air defense battalion, a cavalry battalion, and a combat engineer battalion. There is an independent infantry brigade as well as a cavalry brigade. There have been long-standing plans to expand the independent brigade into a full division, with its headquarters in West Papua Province. Indonesia’s chronic shortage of budget funding for the TNI, however, means that recruitment, manning, and equipment purchases for the third division will not be completed for many years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Armed Forces</th>
<th>Per Capita</th>
<th>Defense Budget</th>
<th>Per Capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>230,000,000</td>
<td>395,000</td>
<td>1/582</td>
<td>$3.90 billion ('08)</td>
<td>$16.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>64,300,000</td>
<td>242,000</td>
<td>1/266</td>
<td>$4.49 billion ('08)</td>
<td>$69.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>83,050,000</td>
<td>118,000</td>
<td>1/416</td>
<td>$1.30 billion ('07)</td>
<td>$15.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>4,588,000</td>
<td>60,500</td>
<td>1/76</td>
<td>$6.93 billion ('07)</td>
<td>$1,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>25,300,000</td>
<td>107,500</td>
<td>1/235</td>
<td>$3.28 billion ('06)</td>
<td>$1,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>83,600,000</td>
<td>455,000</td>
<td>1/184</td>
<td>$3.60 billion ('07)</td>
<td>$43.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Indonesia figures from the Office of the Secretary-General, Indonesia Department of Defense, November 11, 2008. Other country data from Jane’s Information Group, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments—Southeast Asia, London, various dates, 2008.
Kostrad maintains an infantry or airborne battalion on national standby as part of its “strategic reserve” mission, with the duty rotated among the 18 battalions of the command’s two divisions. Each of the two divisions also maintains a standby battalion instructed to be ready to deploy anywhere in the country at short notice.

Kostrad units were deployed in counterinsurgency operations in East Timor, Aceh, and (still) in Papua. Its personnel have comported themselves with commendable discipline and have rarely been accused of human rights offenses against the local populace. Kostrad’s units were particularly effective in operations against the Free Aceh Movement (GAM—Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) in the early 2000s, when it combined tactical success against insurgent guerrilla forces with restraint in its dealings with the civilian population. Its “Rajawali” battalions received special training in dealing with the civilian population in conflict areas.

Kostrad has a lengthy record of U.N. peacekeeping operations as well. Its battalions formed the core of the Garuda task forces deployed to Cambodia (1991–1992) (where Indonesia’s three successive battalion-size deployments constituted the largest national contribution to this U.N. mission) and Lebanon (2007 to the present).

The Army Special Forces Command (Kopassus)

Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus) is one of Indonesia’s most prestigious, and most controversial, military units. The strength of Kopassus is highly classified but is believed to number between 3,500 and 5,000 army personnel, down from a high of about 6,000 personnel in the mid-1990s. Similar to the U.S. Army’s Special Forces and the British and Australian Special Air Service (SAS), Kopassus personnel are trained in intelligence gathering, a variety of special operations techniques, clandestine operations, sabotage, and airborne and amphibious infiltration.

Although Kopassus is widely viewed as the army’s most capable organization, its reputation is sullied by its past record of human rights abuses during its operations against insurgencies and by its “black” operations to suppress political opponents of the Suharto regime. While certainly not all of its personnel were involved in human rights abuses, the misdeeds of a relatively small number of forces, particularly in East Timor during the 1980s and 1990s, have tarnished the reputation of the unit as a whole.25

Prior to the mid-1990s, U.S. army personnel trained and conducted exercises with Kopassus. Both sides highly valued the relationship. U.S. army mobile training teams (MTT) and exercise elements have had high praise for the professionalism and skills of Kopassus personnel. The close U.S.-Kopassus relationship was interrupted in the mid-1990s after emerging information about human rights abuses caused the U.S. to end its contact with the command. The involvement of its personnel in organizing and directing pro-government militia forces in East Timor prior to and after the
August 1999 act of choice led to abominable human rights abuses and caused the U.S. and other countries to end most engagement programs with the TNI. A decade afterwards that record of violence remains a blot on the reputation of Kopassus, and is the primary cause for continuing congressionally mandated restrictions on training and education of TNI personnel (see further discussion on the “vetting issue” in Chapter 3). 26

Senior leaders of the TNI and the Department of Defense are sensitive to, and embarrassed by, the Kopassus record of violence in years past. They rightfully point out, however, that ten years have passed since Kopassus accumulated its record of misbehavior in East Timor, and point to intensive efforts to re-educate and “clean up” Kopassus in the intervening years. The army is increasingly rotating its most promising young officers through assignments to Kopassus. This accomplishes three purposes: it gives the officer corps in general an expanded professional experience, it dilutes the long-time Kopassus air of superiority, and it reduces the insularity and warlord-ism that was characteristic of the Suharto-era Kopassus persona. While senior command positions in Kopassus will likely continue to be filled by “career Kopassus” officers—as is the case in the U.S. special forces commands and other elite units worldwide—the passage of time will inevitably remove from the unit’s roster all the officers tainted by their behavior during the counterinsurgency period. Indeed, many of these officers may already have been retired by now. Furthermore, the TNI’s much greater attention to human rights training and sensitivity to this important issue make it unlikely that officers tainted by human rights accusations will be promoted to key command positions.

Given its prior history of human rights offenses, it can be argued that it is precisely the current and future cadre of Kopassus officers who would best benefit from IMET-funded education and training opportunities with U.S. forces. This training could help to inculcate a credo of better behavior the command can abide by in its future operations.

It is particularly important for U.S. forces to have a close professional relationship with Unit 81, the Kopassus counter-terrorism organization. While the INP has primary responsibility for counterterrorism investigations and operations, Unit 81 has tactical responsibility for combat operations against terrorists and terrorist activity. There are no known allegations of human rights abuses against this unit. 27

A very high level Indonesian official (who is not a Kopassus alumnus), speaking forcefully in a candid conversation about human rights problems in the TNI, said: “Kopassus has changed. It is far more professional, [and] has much better training in human rights all the way down to the soldier level.” 28 Other Indonesian and American officers with whom the authors spoke during research for this study confirmed this respected senior officer’s observation.
Navy Fleets (Armada), Air Force Operations Commands (Ko-Ops)

Despite their different operating environments, the navy and air force operational forces share a common characteristic—low readiness rates. The long embargo on arms and spare parts sales by the U.S. caused more damage to the navy and air force—which had no record of human rights abuses—than to the army, which was the primary target. As a result the two services are in desperate need of repair and upgrade of their sea and air fleets, particularly those necessary for strategic sealift and airlift. The navy also needs an exponential expansion of its fast patrol fleet to better seek out and detain foreign maritime poachers and smugglers of illegal timber and other contraband.

The navy’s major operational commands are the Eastern Fleet, headquartered at Surabaya, and the Western Fleet, headquartered in Jakarta until such time when ambitious new facilities are completed on Sumatra. Air Force Operations Command (Ko-Ops) I is headquartered in Jakarta, while Ko-Ops II is at Makassar, South Sulawesi.

Both services have opened smaller forward bases in more remote areas of the archipelago in order to better cover the huge expanse of air and sea for national defense and resource protection. For example, the air force has a major training base at Pekanbaru, Riau Province, and a major forward base at Pontianak, West Kalimantan. The navy has built small bases at Tual in Maluku Province and Manokwari, West Papua.

The Army Territorial Structure

The Indonesian army has two categories of units: centralized defense force units, which are those assigned to Kostrad and Kopassus; and regional defense force units, which are assigned to the Kodams that make up the broad and deep organizational structure that parallels civilian government from the provinces down to the village level.29

Each Kodam has assigned a number of infantry battalions, the number of battalions depending on the geographical size, population, and strategic importance of each of the 12 Kodams. Each Kodam has a designated quick-reaction battalion whose readiness level is higher than other units; it is this battalion that normally is the first to deploy in cases of natural disaster or civil unrest requiring the military to back up police forces. The quick reaction battalions have received additional unit training to prepare them for this mission. Individual Kodams, depending on resources and personnel available, are attempting to upgrade the readiness of other assigned battalions but inevitably those without the quick reaction designation are less trained for the mission. Each Korem has direct command over at least one infantry battalion.

The Indonesian army territorial structure is somewhat unique. With military headquarters and units paralleling the civilian government from province down to the village level, the army territorial force has been for decades a powerful instrument for political control for the president. The system dates from the independence struggle, when the army had to mix with the populace to fight a guerrilla war against the
Dutch. However, Suharto transformed this improvisation into an effective system for regime maintenance and suppression of opposition to his rule.\(^\text{30}\)

While the future of the army’s territorial organization has been hotly debated, its disposition is far from clear. The most adamant critics have called for the elimination of the entire structure, suspecting it to be the TNI’s mechanism for controlling politics at the local level and the enabler of both legal and illicit elements of a vast military business empire. There is merit to both charges. On the other hand, the army says that the territorial system provides security and governmental services that the civilian government is unable to provide, particularly in remote rural areas and in the smaller outer islands. The most conservative view held by some in the military is that there should be no changes made to the territorial system. The middle viewpoint, called the academic reformist view, holds that a truly professional armed force should be involved in the national defense mission specified in the Indonesian constitution, not performing duties that should be carried out by other civilian elements of the government.\(^\text{31}\)

One of the authors of this study visited one of the 12 Kodams to get a first-hand view of the role of the territorial forces today. The selected headquarters was Kodam VI, which covers all four provinces on Kalimantan, because it is a microcosm of Indonesia. It has large modern cities as well as some of the most remote and inaccessible terrain in Indonesia; its natural resources are huge—natural gas and petroleum, timber, and coal in particular; it has a land border (with Malaysia) and a sea frontier (with the Philippines and Malaysia); it has experienced major ethnic and religious strife in recent years.

According to senior Kodam VI officers, the Kodam has three priority missions.\(^\text{32}\) Foremost among them are supporting economic development and assisting the rural

---

**Figure 5: The 12 Military Regional Commands (Kodam)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kodam/Headquarters</th>
<th>Province(s) in Area of Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kodam 1/Bukit Barisan, Medan</td>
<td>North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Riau, Riau Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodam 2/Sriwijaya, Palembang</td>
<td>Jambi, South Sumatra, Lampung, Bengkulu, Bangka-Billiton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodam 3/Siliwangi, Bandung</td>
<td>West Java, Banten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodam 4/Diponegoro, Semarang</td>
<td>Central Java, Yogyakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodam 5/Brawijaya, Surabaya</td>
<td>East Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodam 6/Tanjungpura, Balikpapan</td>
<td>East, Southeast, Central, West Kalimantan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodam 7/Wirabuana, Makassar</td>
<td>South, Southeast, West, Central, and North Sulawesi, Gorontalo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodam 9/Udayana, Denpasar</td>
<td>Bali, East Nusatenggara, West Nusatenggara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodam 16/Pattimura, Ambon</td>
<td>Maluku, North Maluku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodam 17/Trikora, Jayapura</td>
<td>Papua, West Papua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodam Jaya, Jakarta</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodam Iskandar Muda, Banda Aceh</td>
<td>Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
population of Kalimantan in a wide range of societal needs. A second priority is infrastructure development in remote rural areas. The civilian government does not have enough resources or expertise to do this. Kodam troops have built and repaired irrigation facilities, rural farm-to-market roads, and a network of old airstrips so that they can take larger aircraft and improve transportation access to the more remote areas of interior Kalimantan. The third priority mission is border security. While none of Indonesia’s neighbors are considered to be a security threat, poor or inadequate border controls cause economic losses from smuggling and illegal trading. By improving transportation and access, the Kodam is encouraging the local population to help with upgrading border security and to stop illegal movement of goods, fuel, and people.

Only two of the Kodam’s army battalions are assigned a border security mission. Other battalions are scattered throughout the vast territory and are used primarily for economic development missions. They are also on standby to implement the Kodam’s secondary mission to support to the INP in case of domestic ethnic conflict beyond police capacities. The Kodam devotes considerable manpower resources to community relations and small-scale development assistance. It has a good relationship with the Pramuka (similar to the U.S. Boy Scout organization), which it sees as a valuable source of manpower and “national spirit.”

On the other side of the debate, knowledgeable diplomats and civilian observers in Jakarta point out that the Kodam’s military personnel—and by implication, some of their leadership—are directly involved in such unsavory activities as illegal logging and mining, and in the management of prostitution services in the booming cities throughout Kalimantan.33

The TNI leadership has made it abundantly clear that the territorial organization is not going to be eliminated in the short and medium terms. There is some agreement, however, that the structure might be changed. Suggestions most often put forward include eliminating territorial commands in the most populous regions (for example, on Java), or removing some echelons of the structure (perhaps at the low end of the organization at the district and sub-district levels). But many of the territorial missions will remain important elements of governance for years to come. Perhaps the most important one is the presidential order for the army to strengthen its intelligence operations throughout the entire territorial structure against suspected terrorists as a back up to the police and the National Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Nasional—BIN).

Military Leaders: Respected, Moderate, and Professional
President Yudhoyono has carefully selected the men chosen to lead the TNI and the three military services. Following conventional procedures and respecting seniority, he has picked officers that he knows personally and with whom he worked during his active duty career. These officers hold similar views on the need for military transfor-
mation, support for democratic mores, and professional development of the armed forces. Significantly, none has a human rights blemish on his record even though all served in Indonesia’s trouble spots as junior officers. In short, they are strong, well regarded professional leaders who want to move the TNI forward both as a military institution and as a firm pillar of democracy.

During his first term in office, President Yudhoyono demonstrated skill and force of personality in maneuvering his choices for eventual military leadership into position. With the assistance of his friend and ally, former TNI commander in chief General Endriartono Sutarto, he finessed the passage of the TNI leadership around the iconoclastic nationalist General Ryamizard Ryacudu. Instead of allowing outgoing President Megawati’s post-election appointment of General Ryamizard as TNI commander-in-chief to stand, the newly-elected president asked General Sutarto to stay in that post past his mandatory retirement age, and then later named his friend and former direct assistant on the TNI staff, army chief of staff General Djoko Santoso to succeed Sutarto (Santoso had earlier succeeded General Ryamizard as army chief of staff). This critical appointment followed more than a year of step-by-step senior officer reassignments that brought to important postings a cadre of younger, moderate officers loyal to the president and his moderate views on governance, change, and the role of the military in Indonesia’s new democratic society. Some of these high-level changes did not occur at once or easily; in some cases the president retained serving commanders past normal mandatory retirement age, or promoted younger officers over more senior, and in Yudhoyono’s view, less capable, commanders.

The president also deliberated with skill in selecting the new army chief of staff, General Agustadi Sasonko Purnomo. There were six candidates, all senior lieutenant generals: the army vice chief of staff, the commander of Kostrad, the Department of Defense Secretary-General, the commander of the Army Education and Training Command, the TNI chief of general staff, and the Secretary of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs. General Agustadi was the most senior of the six, but the least prominent. But the president had recruited General Agustadi to the Coordinating Ministry billet and knew him well. As young officers the president, the TNI commander, and Agustadi all served together in Kostrad’s 17th Airborne Brigade.

Military academy class cohorts and shared assignments are very important in cementing friendship and loyalty in the TNI; those who rise to high rank are expected as a matter of course to “take care of” classmates and friends through favorable assignments and advancement. From the standpoint of maintaining this hallowed military tradition, strengthening political support, and filling the top levels of the TNI and army with well-regarded and experienced professionals, President Yudhoyono’s selections were brilliant choices.
The new Army Chief of Staff brings a wide range of expertise to office. He served seven years on secondment to Parliament during the Suharto and Habibie presidencies (before the TNI gave up its quota of parliamentary seats), so he is well versed in the intricacies of parliamentary politics. He served with distinction in Aceh—without a hint of disrespect of human rights—so has the combat experience that soldiers expect in their leader. He was the top graduate in his military academy class (1974), a distinction he shares with the president (who was top graduate in the class of 1973). They each spent most of their military career in Kostrad.

With a solid leadership cohort in place in the TNI and the Army, the president has established a strong foundation for his own probable second term as president, but also for the future succession of military leadership. Most senior officers serve only two or three years in top posts because of the mandatory retirement and the need to promote rising younger leaders. The president has the power to extend senior officers in their post beyond retirement age, as was done in the case of General Endriartono Sutarto and many times during the Suharto era. More significantly, by establishing a leadership cohort in whom he has confidence and assurances of loyalty, the president can be more confident that the military shares his views and aspirations and will continue to support the consolidation of democracy.

President Yudhoyono also appointed the current chiefs of staff of the air force and navy. Although in the past those posts were important only to the services themselves, new Indonesia law gives these appointments greater political significance. The military law requires that the TNI commander in chief post be rotated among all three services, giving navy and air force officers access to the top military job in place of the traditional army dominance. President Megawati appointed the first naval officer as TNI commander in chief (Admiral Widodo Adisucipto); President Yudhoyono likewise appointed the first air force officer (Air Marshal Djoko Suyanto) to that post. The law does not specify the nature of this rotation nor does it make it mandatory, but it is likely that the next TNI commander in chief (or, at least, that officer’s successor) will be either an air force or navy officer who had served as chief of staff of his service.

The current air force and navy chiefs are both 1975 graduates of their respective academies and thus are batch mates, and close associates of, TNI commander in chief Djoko Santoso, factors that doubtless influenced their selection. The Air Force Chief of Staff, Air Chief Marshal Subandrio, is that service’s first helicopter pilot to become air force chief of staff. He was appointed in December 2007. Qualified to fly all of the air force’s helicopters, he also served as commander of the Air Force Special Force (Paskhas), which provides security for air bases throughout the country, and as commander of the Air Force Command and Staff School. Admiral Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno was appointed Navy Chief of Staff in July 2008. His prior assignment was TNI
chief of general staff, the 2nd highest posting at TNI headquarters. Also a pilot, he has flown most of the navy’s fixed wing aircraft before moving to sea and staff duties.37

Professionals All—But No U.S. Connection

While there is no doubt about the professionalism and moderation of the TNI’s top echelon, this cohort shares one characteristic that offers little comfort to the U.S.—these officers have no prior firsthand U.S. experience. Among the TNI commander in chief and chief of general staff, and the six service chiefs of staff and vice chiefs of staff, not one has been to the U.S. for education or training. They are part of the “lost generation” that resulted when the U.S. cut IMET funding in 1992 and the two countries went for 13 years with barely any personal contacts derived from the U.S. training and education system. Almost all officers who had U.S. experience prior to the IMET suspension are now retired, or near mandatory retirement age. Younger officers who are now returning to the U.S. for a variety of education and training courses will not enter the leadership echelon for several more years.

Indonesia’s military forces stagnated for a decade without the benefit of their earlier relations with its traditional security partners. Now, with those relationships restored—albeit at less than prior levels of engagement—the U.S. has an opportunity to help the TNI attain a higher degree of professionalism and readiness posture. That will entail re-engagement at every level of the military and defense structures.

Notes
4. This distinguished officer continues to serve in important postings in retirement. He is a member of the Presidential Advisory Council, and was one of the Indonesian members of the Indonesia-Timor Leste Commission for Truth and Friendship. He is a frequent speaker on reform and modern Indonesian politics at conferences and seminars in Indonesia and overseas.

8. In describing the evolution of the Indonesian armed forces, this paper uses the acronym ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) for the period up to 1998, when the military changed its name to Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI).


15. The shift in the human rights community’s attention from the TNI to the police is evident in the current reporting of the U.S. Department of State, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. The United Nations special rapporteur on torture was quoted by the Reuters news agency (November 23, 2007) as being concerned about “widespread” abuse of police detainees even while acknowledging a great improvement in Indonesia’s overall record in combating rights abuses since the end of the Suharto era.

16. The former Indonesian province of East Timor changed its name to Timor Leste when it gained independence.


23. Ibid.


26. The United Nations Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) compiled a lengthy list of human rights offenders, both East Timorese and Indonesian, from both pro-independence and pro-Indonesia factions. Upon independence those files were turned over to the Timor Leste Prosecutor-General. A list of indictees is available on line at: http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~warcrime/Serious Crimes Unit Files/default.html. A similar list of accused suspects is contained in Hamish McDonald et. al., Masters of Terror: Indonesiast Military and Violence in East Timor in 1999, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University (Canberra Paper #145), 2002.

27. Telephone interview, October 13, 2008, with a former commander of Unit 81, who requested anonymity.
29. The respective levels are Kodam, Korem, Kodim, Karamil, and Babinsa, corresponding roughly to province, regency, district, sub-district, and village.
32. Information about Kodam vi activities was obtained during a series of briefings by senior Kodam officers, Balikpapan, June 30, 2008.
34. Indonesian law requires that the TNI commander in chief must have previously served as chief of staff of one of the military services. In order to bypass General Ryamizard, the president extended General Endriartono Sutarto on active duty beyond mandatory retirement age; that timing also coincided with the mandatory retirement age of General Ryamizard and thus allowed that officer to go into retirement without further advancement.
35. Details of these connections, and other important military associations detailed in this study, come from “Current Detail on the Indonesian Military Elite, 9/04–3/08,” Indonesia, Cornell University, April 2008 and from the authors’ personal knowledge.
Among other things crucial to enhancing the TNI’s performance are improving the TNI’s weaponry system and personnel education and training systems. However, that will not be an easy task.  

Key Points—Improve Military Professionalism

- Repair, upgrade equipment to regain acceptable readiness posture
- Emphasis on strategic mobility—aircraft, ships, helicopters
- Improve and expand education and training—increase IMET
- Support Indonesia Defense University
- Build professional corps of non-commissioned officers
- Restore personal relationships at every level

Indonesia’s civilian and military leaders are nearly unanimous in urging “the need for more professionalism” in the Indonesian military. Improvements in professionalism generally break down into two main categories: “hardware”—more modern weapons systems and equipment; and “software”—the education, training, and, for lack of a better descriptive, international sophistication of military personnel. When critics demand improved professionalism they generally refer to the TNI’s role in society, politics and national life. The TNI is also aware of its societal obligations, but when it talks about professionalism it more specifically addresses its capability to perform the missions it is assigned. This difference demands that the TNI’s military improvement be examined separately from its political transformation.
“Hardware:” Replace and Upgrade the TNI’s Aging Equipment

The unreliability of much of the TNI’s aging inventory has been known for a long time but the extent of it did not really hit home until early 2008 when a 46-year-old Russian-supplied amphibious tank sank in a military exercise, killing seven marines. The accident followed the crash of an overused navy Nomad aircraft in waters off Sabang Island near Aceh, resulting in the loss of four crew members. President Yudhoyono promptly ordered all old equipment grounded and the start of an arms modernization program. But because of the government’s tight fiscal situation, whatever new arms are needed must be acquired, with only a few exceptions, through domestic financing rather than export credit. These constraints are likely to affect whatever new equipment is to be acquired, whether it is to be imported or manufactured locally under license, and sources of new supplies.

During the Sukarno era most important Indonesian weapons systems came from the Soviet Union. Suharto changed that when he took power in 1966, turning to the U.S. to replace much of the by-then-decrepit Soviet armaments. Although Indonesia continued to obtain equipment from other suppliers, the U.S. remained the primary supplier of equipment to all three services into the 1990s.

That has changed. Because of a variety of arms embargoes imposed by the U.S. and other Western countries between 1992 and 2005, Indonesia initiated a deliberate policy of searching for other suppliers in order to avoid dependence on only one or two sources. Since 2000, Indonesia has purchased Mi-35 attack helicopters, Mi-17 transport helicopters and Sukhoi jet fighters from Russia and jet trainer aircraft and amphibious vehicles from South Korea. In September 2007 President Yudhoyono and Russian President Putin signed a loan agreement through which Russia will provide Indonesia with $1 billion for defense purchases. Indonesia had planned to use that loan to buy helicopters, amphibious armored vehicles for the Marine Corps, and two submarines. But the additional outlays that Indonesia must make—travel for trainees going to Russia, for example—are so high and Indonesia’s military budget so inadequate, that the full potential of that loan is not yet realized.

In addition, the navy has bought four Sigma-Class corvettes from the Netherlands (so far three have been delivered). In short, Russia has replaced the U.S. as Indonesia’s primary arms supplier by default, but this does not imply any consequential tilt in Indonesian foreign policy. Despite China’s declaration of a “strategic partnership” with Indonesia and talk of arms purchases and closer military cooperation, U.S. analysts have not seen this relationship go much beyond its “atmospherics.” So far the only

---

**Upgrade the Hardware**

- Restore acceptable readiness posture for aircraft and ships
- Emphasis on strategic mobility—transport aircraft and ships
- Training for better maintenance, logistical support

---

...
Chinese arms deal going forward is a plan to jointly produce short-range rockets for the TNI.3

Indonesia still has important U.S. items in its military inventory. Primary among these are the c-130 transport fleet and its f-16 fighter jets. Both systems suffered badly from the six-year U.S. ban on arms purchases—readiness levels dropped below 20%, a weakness demonstrated in the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami that devastated Aceh. Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono has stated that restoring readiness for the c-130 fleet is among his top priorities.

The U.S. has already begun cooperative programs to accomplish that, as well as to repair and upgrade the f-16 fighter fleet. Dr. Sudarsono has identified the improvement of sealift and airlift capacities as the single most important priority for defense modernization. In an interview with the Jakarta-based Van Zorge Report in Indonesia, he said that Indonesia needed “to come up with a better strategy for the defence budget to focus on transportation and mobility, because the TNI for the time being can really only deal with non-military responses, including civil defence disasters. We are focusing the bulk of our defence spending on land, sea and air transportation because … these forces keep the country together.”4

Despite the high priority placed on reconditioning and upgrading the c-130, f-16 and army helicopter fleets, the costs are far higher than the TNI budget can afford. As a result, rehabilitation plans have been strung out, with only a few aircraft each year receiving necessary repairs and upgrades. It is in the U.S. national security interest for Indonesia to have an effective strategic airlift and defense capability. The Obama administration would be fully justified in helping Indonesia attain this goal through expanded foreign military financing (FMF) and foreign military sales (FMS) programs. A pro-active U.S. posture may also have the added benefit of assisting the TNI to meet its tactical and strategic air lift and sea lift capabilities requirements while resisting pressures to purchase higher-tech equipment that does not meet the TNI’s identified top priorities.

Figure 6: Major TNI Equipment Purchases Since 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Equipment</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fast Patrol Boats</td>
<td>Japan, Poland, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvettes</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter Aircraft</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Helicopters</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault Helicopters</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Landing Craft</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored vehicles</td>
<td>France, Ukraine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Software”: Improve Training and Education, Build Relationships

The TNI, generally speaking, is a disciplined organization whose personnel are trained in the basic aspects of their service specialty (army, navy, air force). However, its personnel lack the modern training of even that of its neighboring militaries in Singapore and Malaysia, and discipline frequently declines in the field, particularly in remote areas “far from the flagpole.” The chain of command is strong in principle but often weak in implementation, for the same basic reason.

TNI leaders have frequently said that their most important need is better training and education for officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO) alike. This is an area where the U.S. has particular expertise. Among all potential suppliers, the U.S. has a competitive advantage. The U.S. military education system is arguably the best in the world, and thousands of Indonesian military personnel have benefited from it over the years. What gave them that opportunity is the IMET program, which provides funds for course costs, travel, and living expenses while foreign military personnel attend school in the U.S.⁵

The menu for this training ranges from purely technical courses such as aircraft maintenance, through professional military education (PME) including the high-value command and general staff colleges and war colleges of each military service, to multi-year masters degree programs. The IMET program also funds soldier-to-soldier training opportunities in the form of MTTs, participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises,⁶ and observation training in which foreign officers attend and observe, but do not participate in, military training. President Yudhoyono is a beneficiary of IMET training, most recently at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He also earned a masters degree from Webster University through the CGSC Cooperative Degree Program.

There is no doubt that Indonesians attending U.S. military schools gain important general knowledge about modern planning, management skills, and technical know-how not available in Indonesia. However, the program produces other, more important benefits that address the national security interests of both the U.S. and Indonesia.

Immersed in American society while attending courses in these U.S. schools, Indonesian officers cannot help but modify their outlook. Part of this experience is observing the place of the military in a democratic society. Co-author John Haseman recalls that, after sponsoring an Indonesian officer at CGSC he asked the officer what

---

**Improve the Software**
- Expand training and education opportunities at all levels
- Increase IMET Program funding
- Support nascent Indonesia Defense University
- Professional corps of non-commissioned officers
- Re-establish personal contacts from national to unit level

---
his most lasting impression was during the year he lived in the U.S. The answer was a simple but important revelation: “Everyone obeys the law.” He meant that there was no separation between military and civilian; American officers had no special privileges—they had to pay taxes and bring their vehicles to a halt at stop signs like everybody else. It was an important lesson for a young officer who went on to a senior position in ABRI after his U.S. schooling, and certainly a frequent topic of discussion as that officer shared with his colleagues the impressions he gained while in the U.S. Human rights and proper military behavior are also part of this experience. Visiting officers learn it either through formal classes or simply seeing how American police officers deal with the public.

One of the strategic rewards of military-to-military contact is the formulation of longstanding interpersonal relationships. U.S. and Indonesian classmates get to know each other, gain understanding of each others’ country and armed forces, and establish personal friendships that—depending on the level of the courses attended—could mature into significant contacts in future years. Indonesians have a concept that, poorly translated, means “we know you.” It means far more than having met someone; the concept means, I know who you are, I understand you, I trust you, and these feelings are reciprocated. This concept is extremely important in working professionally with the Indonesian military.

The significance of personal contact and relationships in the bilateral relationship cannot be understated. There simply is no substitute for personal contacts and friendships established between often-young military counterparts and cultivated and built on over the years. The late Colonel George Benson, whose decades of experience with Indonesia started in the 1960s as a military attaché in Jakarta and made him a legend in U.S.-Indonesia circles, was a constant source of stories on how his job benefited from the rapport he established with senior Indonesian officers over the years. His wisdom and experience were invaluable in his policy duties as an attaché, and in civilian life to promote decades of positive country-to-country relations. He was a deep well of expertise that he willingly shared over the years as he mentored younger officers in the intricacies of personal relationships with Indonesians.

In another example, co-author Colonel Haseman served as Defense Attaché in Jakarta from 1990 to 1994. He had the invaluable advantage of hundreds of friendships he made with Indonesian officers, starting while a student himself at CGSC and continuing during his two previous assignments in Indonesia. Those friendships combined to gain for him access to the future top leadership of the Indonesian armed forces.

By the time he returned to Jakarta in 1990 with the responsibility for helping to implement U.S. foreign policy, his contacts spanned ABRI’s ideological spectrum, from hard line conservatives to moderate reformers. Those contacts gave him quick access to the most senior military leaders. The U.S. ambassador frequently sent him as the
embassy’s primary voice on human rights and labor issues in its dealings with ABRI. He delivered the official U.S. position to senior officers who trusted him to present accurately the embassy’s views, and accurately to transmit their responses. Though there was frequent disagreement and criticism between the two countries in those years, particularly on human rights issues, that quick access to the top level of ABRI, the ability to speak forthrightly and communicate sometimes-unpleasant news—in both directions—was crucial to many aspects of the bilateral relationship.

Starting in 1992 the U.S. cut the IMET program for Indonesia in the wake of the shooting of civilians in Dili, East Timor. As a result the U.S. also lost most of those all-important personal relations and freedom of access to Indonesia’s future military leadership. The loss of IMET drastically reduced the flow of promising future TNI leaders to the U.S. and resulted in a “lost generation” of personal contacts that could otherwise have assisted greatly in bilateral military relations in future years. By 2008 the number of senior Indonesian military officers with U.S. friends and experience was almost zero. This has led to fewer military contacts in Jakarta, fewer long-term personal friendships, a decrement in clear understanding on the part of the TNI leadership about the U.S., and in the ability of the U.S. to inculcate knowledge about itself and its values to Indonesian military personnel.

Perhaps the most unfortunate recent example of this lack of mutual understanding was the charge by then-Army Chief of Staff General Ryamizard Ryacudu—who did not attend training in any foreign country—that the U.S. military response to the Aceh tsunami was just an excuse for conducting espionage against Indonesia. President Yudhoyono quickly silenced such outbursts, but similar paranoia is still nascent throughout the TNI and pockets of the civilian government.

Lack of international sophistication in the TNI’s senior leadership was demonstrated on several occasions in the 1990s and 2000s. Besides ungrounded suspicions such as that voiced by General Ryamizard during the Aceh relief operations, there is a strong feeling of resentment against the U.S. by officers who have not had U.S. military education and thus could not relate to the blossoming of democracy in Indonesia.

With the lifting of sanctions in 2005 Indonesia regained its IMET funding, albeit at a very modest level of about $400,000. The current program (FY08) provides double that amount and greater latitude in kind of training available to Indonesian officers, including the so-called “red meat” courses like the Ranger School for army officers or the Surface Warfare schools for navy officers. Priorities are for management training, and professional military education at all levels.

IMET-funded schooling is not the only area where important and lasting personal relationships are built. Impressions traded by officers and soldiers of participating units during practical exercises and tactical training iterations often blossom into long-lasting contacts. The experience of the Hawaii National Guard (HNG) provides a
notable example. Its relationship with the TNI started in 2006, when the U.S. National Guard Bureau invited the HNG to begin an association with the TNI through the State Partnership program. The Hawaii-Indonesia relationship has continued since then, with strong support from current Hawaii Governor Linda Lingle and the HNG command leadership. The HNG senior leadership believes the Guard is naturally better at relationship building than the Regular Army. “Regular Army officers rotate every three years, while we can provide continuity in personal contacts,” one senior officer told the authors. He emphasized that personal friendships are important in the military culture because these relationships are based on trust, confidence and goodwill. “The captains we send out and those they meet are future leaders. If the relationship continues they will continue to meet each other and build a personal relationship up to the time they become generals themselves, making key decisions for their armed forces.”

The HNG has engaged with the TNI at the brigade level in exercises on international peacekeeping, disaster relief, and public health emergencies. Hawaii’s Guardsmen have learned a lot from its participation in Indonesia’s Garuda Shield peacekeeping exercise. They practiced, among other things, organizing convoys of vehicles through potentially hostile territory. Many Hawaiian Guardsmen have already logged Iraq duty and many others are bound to do the same before that campaign is wound down. Conversely, the TNI officers invited to attend Hawaii’s annual hurricane response exercise (Makani Pahali, or Strong Wind) absorb a valuable learning experience.

It is important that the U.S. do what it can to increase its contacts with the current and future leaders of the TNI, while at the same time building capacity and improving professionalism and performance throughout the TNI. Expanding funding for Indonesia’s IMET program addresses both of these goals. The cost of expansion is relatively modest when compared of other components of the total military-to-military relationship—but the dividends, now and in the future, make IMET perhaps the most cost-effective ingredient in a well-structured cooperative security relationship.

**Improve Professionalism in the TNI**

There are a number of areas that Indonesian military leaders and civilian reform advocates have identified for action to improve military professionalism. Many of these have been addressed in Chapter 2 or previously addressed in this chapter—the need for more modern weapons systems, better and more transparent government funding of the armed forces establishment, and better training at all levels perhaps being the most pressing challenges. These are macro level changes that require government-wide action to implement. But actions effecting behavioral change will have a more lasting effect on military professionalism. The TNI and the Department of Defense can implement these issues in cooperation with U.S. assistance and manpower. Some measures—by no means an all-inclusive list—are outlined below.
None of the Indonesian military schools award academic degrees. The average young TNI officer enters military service well schooled in the Indonesian military system. He has learned the military’s role in national history, assimilated military culture and traditions, and achieved a level of military science appropriate to entry-level officers. But he does not earn an academic degree. Similarly, mid-level officers graduate from a staff school heavy in social science and the role of the military in society, but still lacking an academic degree. Likewise, senior officers who attend the National Resiliency Institute (Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional—Lemhanas) get grounding in the functions and policies of the civilian government and the business world, but still are missing academic degree opportunities.

The TNI has slightly expanded its intake of officers with academic degrees by accepting university graduates and “greening them” through an abbreviated military curriculum at the Military Academy. The percentage of such officers remains small. There is also a very small cadre of mid-level and senior officers who obtained a graduate degree through associate programs offered to students at foreign staff colleges. Some TNI officers, for example, earned a graduate degree while studying at the U.S. Army, Air, and Navy Staff or War Colleges, including President Yudhoyono. The U.S. academic institutions involved in this program give “constructive credit” for a bachelor’s degree to allow Indonesian officers to take advantage of the cooperative degree program.

In the mid-1990s, ten young officers from Kopassus were sent to Norwich University in Vermont—on the TNI’s budget—to earn masters degrees in diplomacy and international affairs. This ambitious program was successful—nine of the ten completed the program, with academic theses that included a direct examination of human rights issues, the impact of the Vietnam War on Indonesia’s security and economic development, and an analysis of the U.S. role in the First Gulf War. The program so impressed senior TNI officers that a number of them sent their children to Norwich University for their undergraduate education—and some of those young men enrolled in Norwich University’s Reserve Officer Training Program (ROTC) and were later commissioned in the TNI. Unfortunately these programs did not continue, for a variety of reasons. The total number of TNI officers with academic degrees is tiny.

By contrast, virtually every U.S. junior officer enters military service with a bachelor’s degree; virtually all of those who remain in service for a full military career and reach the rank of lieutenant colonel and above have at least one graduate degree.

The Indonesian defense establishment is thin in both numbers and expertise. The system lacks a cohesive and academically qualified cadre of civilian and military defense experts that can provide a permanent analytical capability in the Department of Defense. External analytical support is limited to a few sympathetic think tanks.
like the Propatria Institute and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, and a number of specialists in security studies working in academic institutions. The independent analytical community, however, is too dependent on Western (mainly European) institutes for grants to conduct research. This situation can be improved if the Indonesian academic community, the private sector, or perhaps the government itself found ways to keep this intellectual resource alive and functioning. An increase in university defense study programs could provide a pool of qualified recruits for the Department of Defense. A commitment to employ such talent would attract university graduates with an interest and background in defense and security studies, particularly if they are assured of appropriate civil service status and commensurate salaries.

There is an important requirement to continue readjustment of the curricula at the several levels of Indonesian military schools. An Indonesian observer has recommended “a revamp of previous curricula and teaching methods, since the legacy of the old system preparing officers to play a sociopolitical role, under the now-defunct dual function doctrine, might still linger.” These, he recommended, should include more core military subjects such as modern warfare science, international geopolitics, humanitarian law, and international relations. Civilian university professors could teach most of these subjects, providing a greater degree of civilian faculty contacts and the concomitant benefit of increasing professional ties between civilian university faculties and the military education community.

Standing Up an Indonesian Defense University

Indonesia is moving forward to improve the educational level of its officer corps. One step being considered is the establishment of a cooperative bachelor degree program for selected high-quality students at the Military Academy, if procedures and funding can be obtained.

Another opportunity to help reshape TNI culture has been offered by Major General Syarifuddin Tippe, the Director-General of Defense Strategy at the Department of Defense. He is seeking international assistance to establish a new Indonesian Defense University (IDU) that will combine military scholarship with academics from a consortium of several Indonesian universities. General Tippe, the IDU’s intellectual godfather, is thinking of a more internationally oriented university that can get foreign defense thinkers together with Indonesian academics and make the students the beneficiaries of their combined wisdom. General Tippe’s model, in fact, is Washington’s own National Defense University (NDU), and he has assigned two senior officers, both NDU graduates, to manage the project.

If plans materialize, the IDU would serve as headquarters for three separate schools, each of which will be designed for different levels in the officer corps education system.
The Institute of Defense Strategy Studies will be based on the curriculum now being offered by the Defense and Security Management masters degree program offered at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). That program was developed with U.K. assistance, and is a two year course of instruction. Each cohort consists of 20 to 30 students; two thirds are military at the rank of captain, and one third are civilians, including some from Indonesian human rights groups.

The Joint Forces Staff College (Sesko TNI) is an integral component of the TNI’s current school system. Its students come from all branches of the TNI primarily at the rank of lieutenant colonel and colonel, who attend a six-month course in Bandung. Emphasis is on leadership, management, strategy, operations and planning. Under the IDU plan this course would be expanded to a nine-month program and upgraded in instructional content to meet the requirements for a masters degree. The University of Indonesia is providing assistance in curriculum revision.

The Total Strategic Warfare Course (KSPS), now taught at the Army Command and Staff School, is the program that the Defense Department would like to turn into the heart of their National War College for military students at the level of colonel or higher, and their civilian counterparts. The current curriculum is broad and needs refining.10

According to an IDU mission statement issued by General Tippe’s office, the proposed IDU will prepare “military and civilian leaders from Indonesia and other countries to address national and international defense and strategic challenges through comprehensive multi-disciplinary educational programs, professional exchanges, research and outreach in developing a broader security perspective.”11

The IDU project has already established academic and management contacts with several countries to glean as much information as possible on the complex issue of developing a graduate level, multi-faceted academic institute. Besides the U.K. management and instructional assistance at IISI, Germany is providing instruction for top graduates; other supportive countries include Australia, Singapore, and Japan. However the Indonesian Defense Department has announced a clear preference to follow the American NDU model, giving the U.S. an important opportunity to influence Indonesia’s strategic military thinking for many years to come.

As this is a rare opportunity to help modernize Indonesian military education, the U.S. Defense Department quickly gave the IDU a $500,000 grant for books and dispatcher two teams of NDU scholars to advise on start-up issues. A team from NDU made an initial visit to Indonesia in July 2008 to determine if, and how, NDU could assist the defense department in supporting the new IDU. Cooperation between NDU and IDU will benefit both institutes and both armed forces through mutual study and research opportunities.12 The U.S. Department of Defense has already earmarked more than $1 million for support of the IDU, which is tentatively scheduled to open in March 2009.13
Establish a Professional Corps of Non-Commissioned Officers

The backbone of the U.S. military system is its corps of highly trained and educated non-commissioned officers. NCOs are entrusted with a wide range of administrative and operational responsibilities, and train virtually the entire intake of new enlisted soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines. Young second lieutenants almost universally have experience with being subtly (and sometimes not-so-subtly) trained by their nominal subordinate NCOs. This system of mutual trust and responsibility between officer and NCO has no exact parallel in the TNI.

Over the years the U.S. has had occasional requests for information on the U.S. NCO corps from the TNI, but until very recently little has come of those sporadic efforts. Recently, however, the TNI has accepted a broader program for training the inception increment of an NCO corps with more responsibility. This is an arena in which the U.S. has unparalleled experience and expertise, as well as the capability and desire to assist the TNI.

“NCOs are the core of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marines. We hope the same culture can be acquired by the TNI,” says Marine Brigadier General John Toolan, an Iraq campaign veteran who oversees Asian security cooperation programs from the Pentagon. He believes that the TNI could have saved itself a lot of grief if it had better NCO leadership at moments of stress in the field.14

The TNI already has a training institution for NCOs (bintara) but they do not have the status and responsibilities that their counterparts have in the American military. In the Indonesian army the commissioned officers are the satriya (knights) and everybody else follows them. The Warrior Leaders program, initially taught by U.S. NCOs and hosted by the Indonesian Army Infantry Training Center at Ciputat, near Bandung, is intended to close the stature gap. It started with a squad leader’s course in April 2008 and was followed in October with a platoon sergeant’s course. The program will continue with a company sergeant’s course in February 2009 and end with a command sergeant major’s course in May. The U.S. Army Pacific Command (USARPAC) NCO Academy in Hawaii provides the instructors, all of whom are career NCOs.

A total of 44 Indonesian Army NCOs participated in the first training course, which was followed by a short course to train Indonesian NCOs how to teach the course themselves. USARPAC Command Sergeant Major Joseph P. Zettlemoyer said that “I am elated that Indonesia has taken the first steps towards professionalizing their NCO Corps. This enhances their capabilities while strengthening their units at the platoon and company level, and will eventually be a combat multiplier at the highest levels within their army.”15 U.S. planners expect the Indonesian army to take over the program and incorporate it in the curriculum of its Bandung training command.
Hindrances in the Military-to-Military Relationship

Responsible senior officials—both Indonesian and Americans—are in agreement that the military-to-military relationship is working. But they also agree that there are hindrances to full normalization, which center on what both sides see as onerous political restrictions that bring into question the all-important issue of trust between the two partners.

“Vetting”: To Disqualify Human Rights Abusers from U.S. Training and Education

Current U.S. law requires all potential candidates for U.S. military education, and participation in bilateral and multilateral conferences and training iterations, to undergo a background investigation (called “vetting”) to insure that no potential trainee has a record of past human rights abuses. The vetting process is supported by high-level Indonesian and American civilian government and military officials, who all agree it is a fair method for ensuring that individuals with unsavory human rights records do not benefit from U.S.-funded military and police training programs. The vetting requirement sends a clear signal that the U.S. will not provide career-enhancing training and education to officers (of any country, not just Indonesia) who do not respect international standards of human rights and treatment of civilians in conflict areas.

The process requires the investigation of the background of every person nominated for IMET-funded schooling. This process involves checking each nominee against lists of offenders and offending units compiled by such agencies as the United Nations Serious Crimes Unit (for East Timor human rights allegations), as well as similar data kept by other human rights and government organizations.

The wording of the law addresses “units” rather than individuals, however. This focus on “units” has been interpreted to mean having no time limits in the applicability of the sanctions. Thus, current members of a unit accused of human rights offenses in the past, but who themselves were not even assigned to that unit at the time of the alleged offenses, could be ineligible for most U.S.-funded education and training.

A reasonable person could correctly adjudge that someone personally accused of human rights offenses, or assigned to a suspect unit at a time when human rights offenses were alleged against that unit, might rightfully be rejected in the vetting process. The TNI, well aware of the political implications involved, is careful to insure that candidates nominated for U.S.-funded training have no such blot on their copybooks. To be an effective policy for enhancing international understanding of human rights, the vetting system must be scrupulously fair in screening out perceived violators of acceptable standards.

---

**Restore trust, address criticism**

- Change human rights vetting emphasis from units to individuals
- End blanket isolation of units
- Eliminate atmosphere of immunity from prosecution for civil crimes
- Reduce suspicions and nationalistic accusations

---

military professionalization: still a work in progress
The current policy effectively puts at risk all personnel currently assigned to the Army Special Forces Command (Kopassus). The TNI perceives this as unfair, and this perception has made the policy a serious impediment to the bilateral military relationship. By some accounts the same blanket discrimination is also being applied to members of the Air Force Special Forces Unit (Paskas) and the Navy/Marine Corps Frogmen (similar to U.S. SEALs), and the Indonesian National Police’s Mobile Brigade (Brimob). To be sure, some Kopassus and Brimob personnel have a well-documented record of egregious behavior, particularly when on deployment in small units in areas of conflict such as in East Timor (see Chapter 2). However, the majority of personnel now assigned to these units have behaved honorably and have never been accused of human rights abuses. It is proper to disqualify Kopassus personnel—or those assigned to any other organization—who are individually suspected of misbehavior, or who were assigned to a unit suspected of misconduct at the time alleged offense were committed. However, individuals should not be rejected for schooling merely by virtue of their later assignment to Kopassus—or any other command.

U.S. policy makers should consider rewording the vetting procedures to direct them at individuals accused of wrongdoing, rather than entire units. This would continue a strong policy to prevent human rights abusers from receiving U.S.-funded training. By extension this change should also help to insure that past offenders would not achieve important command postings—within units or the TNI headquarters—and thus be in a position improperly to influence the behavior of personnel under their control. It would also recognize that the passage of time since human rights violations occurred has brought about major changes in the personnel assigned to units such as Kopassus, as well as many reforms implemented to assure wide understanding of human rights practices (see Chapter 2).

It is wrong in principle for the U.S. to continue discriminating against entire units. At the same time it should be incumbent upon the TNI, as part of its much-improved human rights awareness, to insure that officers accused of human rights violations in the past do not rise to senior command posts where they could adversely influence behavior of junior officers and subordinate units. U.S. program managers, as part of their coordination with Indonesian counterparts, should emphasize this point in the candidate selection process.

The Kopassus JCET Cancellation

The principle purpose of the JCET program is to advance the capabilities of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) by providing them with opportunities to operate with foreign counterparts. In so doing, U.S. SOF personnel can enhance their language and other cross-cultural skills; observe the tactics, techniques and procedures of their counterparts; and gain detailed situational awareness of foreign conditions. The JCET program is also a primary vehicle for combating terrorism, as it allows U.S. SOF to improve
the capabilities of foreign counterparts to combat terrorism in their own countries. Recognizing that success in the war on terrorism depends upon international cooperation, the SOF focuses on building meaningful foreign security partnerships with counterparts. All PACOM JCET programs as a matter of policy include instruction on human rights no matter what other subjects are included.18

Typically, each JCET program involves 10 to 40 U.S. Special Forces personnel. Their mission is to train any element of the host country military that requests it. In Indonesia’s case, U.S. SOF personnel have trained mainstream personnel as well as elements of the country’s special forces from all branches of the TNI.

The U.S. had planned to resume relations with Kopassus with a JCET scheduled for spring 2008. Planners worked carefully to avoid inclusion of controversial subjects, and designed a completely “non-lethal” program of instruction. Had the event not been cancelled it would have provided training in the military decision-making process, the law of war, human rights training, medical and first aid procedures, and special operations logistics. The classroom instruction was to have been followed up by a “friendship” non-tactical parachute jump.19

The entire program was cancelled when senior U.S. administration officials learned that a powerful member of Congress—a long-time critic of U.S. military relations with Indonesia—reportedly threatened to oppose any new funding requests for Indonesian military programs if the JCET was not cancelled.20

The JCET cancellation was particularly galling to the Indonesians. The abrupt decision was taken as a slap in the face throughout the TNI and particularly the army, which was proud of the steps that it had taken to soften the hard edges of Kopassus through education, more rotation of officers through the command, and its record of generally good behavior over the nine-plus years since its misbehavior in East Timor.21

Eliminate the Atmosphere of Immunity from Punishment

Little by little the TNI and Indonesia’s parliament are reducing the once-unquestioned atmosphere of impunity for human rights abuses and other offenses committed by military personnel. In 2008 parliament proposed legislation that will require military personnel accused of non-military offenses—including human rights abuses and other forms of mistreatment of the civilian populace—to be tried in the civil court system, not by military court-martial. The military establishment has dragged its feet in accepting this provision of law, citing the poor quality of Indonesia’s civilian judicial system. This legislation, however, is an important test of reformasi and hopefully will soon be passed into law.

These reforms, however, can only apply to current and future cases. Most of the criticism of the TNI’s record of human rights abuses relates to long-past events—primarily violence in East Timor that took place during the 24 years of Indonesian occupation. The TNI has never prosecuted any of the officers accused of involvement in
this violence. Several senior Indonesian officers, active and retired, who had no part in
these troubles, believe that the reason for “no action” on the part of the TNI—or, for
that matter, the Indonesian government—is because that violence was committed “in
the name of the state.” Regardless of the level of violence, which many of the accused
admit was far more than they had anticipated, “they don’t think they did anything
wrong” because they were protecting what they thought were the interests of the coun-
try. Despite Indonesia’s dramatic transformation to vibrant democracy, these officers
all believe that there is “no chance for further action” on this issue.22

Both President Yudhoyono and armed forces commander-in-chief General Djoko
Santoso have accepted the final report of the Indonesia-Timor Leste Commission
for Truth and Friendship verdict (further details were outlined in Chapter 2), but
few observers expect any prosecution of those accused of responsibility for that vio-
lence. Both governments have repeatedly emphasized that the Commission’s work
was to look toward the future rather than continue to engage in recriminations over
past events. Timor Leste President Jose Ramos-Horta stated firmly that: “We, lead-
ers of today, must do all we can to acknowledge the lessons of the past in order to
strengthen even further the relations between our two countries for the betterment
of our people.”23

These events marked the first time that the Indonesian government acknowledged
and accepted blame for the rampage of violence that occurred in East Timor. In the
past a succession of Indonesian military and political leaders deflected blame to the
various armed militia groups and denied any connection between the Indonesian
armed forces and those militia forces. The comments of both the president and the TNI
chief also note that no further action would be contemplated until after a thorough
study of the Final Report contents and recommendations. Both countries will use the
findings in the Final Report to reinforce their determination to move forward in their
mutual desire for good bilateral relations into the future.

Timor Leste leaders are determined to move forward in reconciliation, without
expecting punishment of either Indonesians or East Timorese for crimes committed a
decade in the past. Prominent among them is Prime Minister Jose “Xanana” Gusmao,
who spent more than 20 years fighting ABRI forces or imprisoned by Indonesia, and
who has repeatedly called for reconciliation rather than punishment and vengeance.
This might be an appropriate attitude for American critics as well.

Most of those accused of various offenses in East Timor are either retired from
active government or military service, or sidelined and without influence in Indone-
sia’s political future. It is worth considering what can be gained and how much trouble
it would cost to insist as a matter of U.S. policy the punishment of retired TNI officers
who now have little or no influence over either the government or the individual lead-
ers of the armed forces.
Indonesian authorities are concerned about the atmosphere of impunity that lingers in the TNI, fostered by a corrupt judiciary system and often-inept prosecutors. Fortunately, there are trends among younger leaders as well as the officer corps rank-and-file that encourage investigation and punishment for improper behavior. Justice can still be served. There are no statutes of limitations that can prevent the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission from reopening the East Timor cases and demanding the prosecution of the guilty parties by this or the next Indonesian administration.

Indonesian Attitudes: Misunderstandings, Suspicions, Lack of Coordination

Not all of the problems in the military relationship can be blamed on the U.S. side. Indonesian attitudes, in the TNI as well as in political parties and parliament, have at times presented obstacles to a harmonious and smooth military-to-military relationship. An astute long-time observer of bilateral ties described drawbacks on the Indonesian side—which apply to its relations with many countries, not just the U.S.—in three categories: its edgy nationalism, incoherence and indecisiveness in managing security affairs, and the sheer resources deficit of the security institutions.24

A reactive, hair-trigger kind of nationalism flows through the Indonesia body politic—in parliament, in the cabinet, in the TNI, and in business. Nationalism, of course, can be a virtue in a young democratic society like Indonesia’s. But an excess of it can be counter-productive if it clouds judgments and turns investors away as has actually happened in the cases of other developing countries. History can explain much of this attitude towards the outside world. Indonesia was born insecure and it continues to feel at risk of its patrimony being challenged or taken away by outside forces. There continues to be a struggle for public opinion between the modernizing instinct of some of the Indonesian elites and the anti-foreign impulse of others. That latter attitude usually surfaces in accusations of espionage against foreign entities, or in conspiracy theories blaming Indonesia’s problems on the same. In business this mindset is reflected in overt or subtle pressure against foreign-owned enterprises.

President Yudhoyono and his staff are among those modernizing elites who can help change the way Indonesia looks at the world. The president’s foreign policy spokesman, Dino Patti Djalal, ascribes the brittleness of the Indonesian psyche to lack of confidence. In his recently published account of the Yudhoyono presidency he notes that people with this mentality are those who still “look at today’s challenges with the spectacles of 20 years ago” when Indonesia was still heavily burdened with problems and poorly thought of by other countries. They do not realize that Indonesia is now a “player” in international affairs with many opportunities still lying ahead. Djalal is confident, however, that the younger generation will be more “open-minded” and receptive to ideas from the outside world.25
Another reason Indonesia’s defense establishment is difficult to deal with is that it has yet to coalesce into a single voice. Policy, supposedly centralized, in fact, comes from several points of the compass. Coordination among the three military services is competitive rather than collegial, probably due largely to the struggle for budgetary funding but also because of the behind the scenes tussle for power and political influence within the military hierarchy. Failure, to date, to centralize the TNI chain of command under a civilian minister of defense has resulted in tension and competition between the Department of Defense and the TNI headquarters. This incoherence is revealed by the continued efforts by the services to make their own arms and equipment purchases despite policy to centralize purchases in the Department, and in the disconnects between announced policies and the sometimes contrary or delayed implementation. This problem is made more difficult by the paucity of defense specialists in government and the academic community—diplomatic observers repeatedly refer to expertise throughout the defense community as “one deep” because Indonesia has yet to create a deep enough bench of experts on defense and security matters.

Finally, Indonesia’s inability to fund fully its defense and security apparatus from the central budget adds pressure to budgeting, prolongs the struggle to civilianize the military business empire, and makes the search for funding (for both official needs and personal enrichment) a high priority at every level of the military, from leaders to individual soldiers. Until the parliament and the executive branch devise a national budget and disbursal system that fully funds its government structure, this problem will persist.

Hadi Soesastro, the executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, acknowledges that psychologically Indonesia is still unprepared for its unequal engagement with the West. He sees democracy as both a source of strength and a curse for Indonesia, as, having to speak with many voices, it is slow to determine where its true welfare lies and how to act accordingly.26

These difficulties, while sometimes troublesome to the relationship, are not disabling. These may be symptomatic, as Soesastro suggests, of nothing more than the disharmonies that inevitably result from the asymmetries of this relationship—a struggling, democratic developing nation coming to terms with the world’s last superpower—compounded by an inadequate appreciation of its value by the publics of both countries. The relationship, however, has still managed to overcome the occasional setbacks and move on, thanks to the patience, forbearance and resolution of the few individuals in both countries entrusted with its management.

Notes


6. The largest Pacific region multilateral exercise is Exercise Cobra Gold, held annually in Thailand. Indonesia has participated in Cobra Gold for several years.

7. Details on the Hawaii National Guard’s relations with Indonesia were provided during a lengthy briefing with the HNG’s senior leadership, Honolulu, June 5, 2008.

8. Other institutions like the state research institution Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI) and the Habibie Center also harbor members of this small community of defense analysts. Andi Widjajanto, a U.S.-trained defense commentator teaching at the University of Indonesia, has formed his own Center for Global Crisis Society Studies. Koesnadi Kardi, a retired air force vice marshal, has joined the ranks of independent defense critics through his Centre for Security and Defence Studies.


10. Information provided by an American who requested anonymity.


16. Section 551 of the FOAA for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109–102) states: “None of the funds made available by this Act may be provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and reports to the committees on appropriations that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice: Provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to withhold funds made available under this Act from any unit of the security forces of a foreign country not credibly alleged to be involved in gross violations of human rights; Provided further, That in the event funds are withheld from any unit pursuant to this section, the Secretary of State shall promptly notify the foreign government of the basis for such action and shall, to the maximum extent practicable, assist the foreign government in taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces to justice.” Section 8060 of the Defense Appropriations Acts for Fiscal Year 2007 (P.L. 109–289), states: “PROHIBITION.—None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to support any training program involving a unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of Defense has received credible information from the Department of State that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.”

17. The issue of unfair vetting decisions was cited by many Americans and Indonesians queried about problems in the military relationship during the research for this study.
18. Information provided by a U.S. Special Forces officer who requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of this subject, September 26, 2008.

19. Ibid.

20. This chain of events was reported in John McBeth, “Much Ado About Joint Military Drills,” The Straits Times, Singapore, May 31, 2008.

21. This analysis was provided to the authors by several Americans familiar with the issue, who requested anonymity because of the political sensitivity of the subject.

22. These officers spoke with unusual candor to the authors of this study, on the condition that they not be described or identified, because of the obvious sensitivity of their views.


24. These concepts were discussed freely with the authors with a variety of military and civilian sources, including Indonesians, Americans, and resident expatriates in Jakarta, with the provision that none of the sources would be identified.


Chapter 4
The Indonesian National Police: A Reform Success Story in the Making

Key Points

- Police reforms taking place faster than TNI reforms
- A strong commitment to community policing, Indonesian-style
- Police leadership taking action against corruption in the force
- U.S. assistance adds muscle to police capabilities across the board

The U.S.-Indonesia security relationship has two primary components—one involving the armed forces, and the other the national police. The Indonesian National Police is an increasingly important partner because it assumed much of the military’s internal security mission after its separation from the armed forces. This requires concomitant changes in U.S. policies for assisting foreign police forces, including the obvious need for military-police cooperative programs that mesh with U.S. national security interests.

There are two strikingly different perceptions of the INP. One is reflective of opinion polls that consistently rank the armed forces as the most respected institution in the country and the police close to the bottom. A 2007 poll done by the police itself on how they are viewed by the public was downright embarrassing: 53.0% of respondents had complaints about bad treatment by the police and 47.1% thought the police are not friendly enough.

Imparsial, a human rights advocacy group, calls the police the most violent of all public security agencies, citing as example its rough treatment in 2008 of Jakarta
students protesting the reduction of fuel subsidies. The INP in fact was greeted on the 62nd anniversary of its founding by a harshly critical story in *The Jakarta Post* about the mother of an East Javanese teenager forced to raise the equivalent of $21,000 to ensure his admission to the Police Academy. People still assume, the story suggests, that once a police academy graduate joins the force he would stand to gain many times more that amount from being on the take.

Then there is the generally more upbeat view of reform advocates who have closely followed the INP’s progression since its separation from the armed forces in 1999–2000. For instance, in a paper recently issued by an Australian research institute, Andrew MacIntyre and Douglas E. Ramage give the INP credit for initiating a vigorous program of internal reforms and for scoring remarkable gains on many fronts. While the police have not completely shed a militaristic culture dating back to Suharto’s authoritarian regime, they report, police reform is actually happening much faster than military reform. The paper’s authors suggest that the public may be judging the two institutions by different standards. The armed forces get a pass because, “having retreated from national political life, [they] feel little public or political pressure for further reform,” they argue. The police, on the other hand, continue to be part of the everyday lives of Indonesians, and whatever faults they may have are magnified by their intrusive presence.

**A Hard Climb Towards Respectability**

The breakup with the TNI in 1999–2000 left the police a virtual orphan with inadequate personnel and equipment, and a reputation for corruption and impunity it is still trying to live down. But one task the army handed down to the police has assured them of unhindered future growth—the virtually exclusive responsibility for law enforcement. This gave the INP the mandate to start building capacity to provide this indispensable public service nation-wide. It has grown to become a near equal of its former parent institution in size, stature and command of public resources. The number of its uniformed force increased from 276,000 in 2005 to 360,000 in 2007. By contrast, the TNI’s roster of uniformed personnel grew only slightly, to the current level of approximately 395,000. To pay for the additional police manpower, the government increased its budget allocation for the police by 225% from the 2003 level, or a far larger budget increase than the armed forces received over the same period. Further growth is inevitable because Indonesia’s police-civilian ratio is still below international standards.

*Transformasi* (transformation), the police proudly call it. How did they pull it off? Simply by being willing to change. With few residual perks and a bad reputation to live down, they were more strongly motivated to reshape structures and doctrines than the tradition-bound armed forces. Equally important, the INP has been more open to advice and assistance from foreign donors. Over a five-year period (2000–2005), the police received...
tens of millions of dollars in foreign assistance while the TNI was still being denied military supplies and training by the United States and other Western donors as punishment for human rights abuses committed before and after the 1999 act of choice in East Timor.7

The police were not too proud to ask for help. They were willing to start small, at the local level, which made it easier for prospective donors to choose how they could help, and where. The East Nusatenggara provincial police (polda—kepolisian daerah), which absorbed the brunt of the fallout from East Timor violence when more than 200,000 East Timorese were forced across the border, was the first of the poldas to undertake donor-funded reforms in 2001. The donor, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)-funded Partnership for Governance Reform, then took its work to the poldas of West Kalimantan, East Java and West Java. The Yogyakarta polda got a community policing program started with the help of the Asia Foundation.8 The U.S. Department of Justice’s international police development program, called ICTAP (International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program) used the South Sulawesi regional police as a platform to demonstrate the merits of planning reforms based on “reliable information, rigorous monitoring and disinterested evaluation.”9

The results of ten years of self-reform are understandably mixed, considering how far the INP has had to go to be where it is now. “Getting an institution that large to change is like trying to turn the USS Ronald Reagan in the reflecting pool of the Washington Mall,” says Gerald Heuett Jr., the U.S. Embassy’s senior law enforcement adviser, who manages the ICTAP program.10 He notes that there are too few policemen assigned to detective work—just 9.6% of all personnel when the ratio should be closer to the international norm of 30%. He also believes that the proportion of policemen in management positions should be increased to 15% from less than 10% of personnel, as is currently the case.

Good intentions, of course, are not enough. Despite recent increases in the police budget, the INP remains resource-strapped. As is equally the case with the armed forces, about three-fourths of the budget is needed to cover salaries and allowances; the remaining one-fourth is insufficient to insure a satisfactory level of performance. Low pay, another limitation shared with other public employees, forces patrolmen to moonlight in outside jobs as motorcycle taxi drivers, security guards and small store owners for additional income to feed their families and educate their children.11 Jacqui Baker, a British scholar researching the relations between the Indonesia’s armed forces and police, finds the police reforms to be limited by a “compromise-and-concession” approach in dealing with the political elites. She describes the results so far “commendable but very patchy efforts at genuine change, more frequently where some forward-thinking middle-ranking officers have met with foreign donor support.”12

Ten years of self-reform, however, are already starting to show some results. The advance in gender equality, for instance, is readily seen in the growing number of
policewomen in the streets, even in the front ranks of a crowd control formations. Placing the women there is believed a psychological deterrent against mob violence. The INP is proud to have its first woman regional police chief. Commissioner General K. Rumiah is the daughter of an East Javanese police officer who raised her to accept discipline and personal responsibility and to respect the rights of other people. She has turned her command in Banten Province into a model for reforms being instituted on the provincial level. Her policemen have been ordered back to the classroom. In accordance with standards set by INP headquarters, all four of Banten’s district offices have a special treatment room for women and children victimized by domestic violence or sexual crimes.13

Other reforms are still working through the system, largely unseen and unappreciated by the public. The INP had been unwilling early on to make public its disciplinary actions against erring officers for fear of making its sullied image even worse. However, at the advice of western donors the police have agreed to let the media report the increasing numbers of suspensions and dismissals. The numbers tell the story: in 2006 only 4,700 officers were subject to disciplinary actions, but in 2007 19,459 officers were investigated and 16,500 were disciplined.14 Among those who got the axe was a former chief of detectives at national police headquarters, who was sentenced to two years imprisonment for receiving bribes while investigating a scam at the state-owned Bank Negara Indonesia.15

While the East Javanese mother was complaining about being ripped off by police brokers, an internal TNI publication was telling a different story. Why can’t the Indonesian military academy recruit its cadets as fairly and transparently as the police academy does, asked an army major in an article in the armed forces monthly Patriot. The major reports that the police academy’s admission procedures are now open to the mass media, NGOs and the general public. Even the mandatory physical and psychological examinations, he noted, are reviewed by doctors from public hospitals and members of medical faculties.16

The results indeed are a model of fairness and democratic outreach. Of the 300 applicants accepted by the academy in 2007, 230 were degree-holding college graduates and 70 were high school (SMA) graduates. Of the 230 degree holders, 200 were men and 30 were women. Of the 300 successful applicants only 46 were children of active or retired police officers. Of those 46, only four were children of police generals—but none of parents ranked higher than one-star grade.17 Once in the academy, the previously mentioned Australian research institute reports, the cadets are exposed to a revised curriculum with a strong emphasis on human rights and community relations. When they graduate they will be ready to join the force as junior-grade police inspectors (equivalent to second lieutenants in the army) better prepared to serve their communities than their predecessors had been in Suharto’s day.
The Sutanto Factor

The INP arguably could not have brought its reforms this far without the leadership of General Sutanto, a 58-year old native of Pemalang in Central Java. He seemed to have been destined for this role. He was a 1973 classmate of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono; he graduated from the police academy and the future president from the military academy in that same year. Academy relationships are important in determining military or police careers so it was almost inevitable that President Yudhoyono would consider his peer from academy days to succeed INP chief General Da'i Bachtiar in 2005.18

Bachtiar’s four-year tenure as INP chief was highlighted by notable successes against terrorism. He led the crackdown against the Jemaah Islamiyah militants who were blamed for a string of terrorist acts including the 2002 Bali bombings that killed 202 people. Breaking with tradition, he opened the door to millions of dollars in grants, donations and technical assistance for the police from the U.S. and other countries. This was a culture-changer that turned the INP from an inward-looking police force lacking in self-confidence to one well connected with the rest of the world of law enforcement. But a long list of reforms remained unfinished.

From the day he joined the force, Sutanto was known as a tough crime fighter. As successively sector police chief, district police chief, and police region chief, he took on gambling rings, drug traffickers, illegal loggers and illegal miners. He was furious at people who commit crimes thinking they could get away with it.19 When he was the North Sumatra police chief he worked tirelessly to rid the area of gambling and narcotics. It is said he was so thorough in cleaning up the place that a highly influential crime lord had him kicked out of his job. He was reassigned to East Java, where he again went against criminal elements and again was grounded by his superiors. When a police officer displeases the higher-ups he is usually trundled off to one of the many police educational institutions. Sutanto’s places of exile were the National Anti-Narcotics Agency and the Police Institute of Education and Training (2002–2005). He had also served as an adjutant to President Suharto in 1995–1998, arguably the only uniformed officer around that authoritarian figure who did not use his post for political advancement. General Sutanto reached mandatory retirement age in 2008. His successor faces many challenges; perhaps chief among them is to prevent any backsliding and to build on the gains achieved so far.

Strong leadership is a prerequisite for reforms but that alone is not enough to assure success. “The upper and middle ranks are committed to reform but it’s still business-as-usual among the rank-and-file,” says Muradi, a Universitas Al Azhar scholar who has closely observed the INP’s growing pains. He sees resource scarcity slowing everything down. Even whole police units are forced to augment their operating funds from personal friends, donations from their communities and in some cases from criminal activities.20
A Commitment to Community Policing

General Sutanto will likely be remembered most by future generations of Indonesian policemen for his commitment to community policing. He was experienced enough as a criminologist to know that this new philosophy partakes of many interpretations—almost as many as the jurisdictions where the concept has been tried out. He called the *Pemolishan Masyarakat*, or *Polmas* for short, and bases it on three assumptions:

- The police alone cannot do its job without the active cooperation of the community it serves.
- The community has to be an equal partner of the police and they have to solve local issues together, especially if these are unique to the localities.
- The police have to make good use of local knowledge in crime prevention and detection. For this reason the police have to live and work right in the midst of the community.\(^\text{21}\)

The Indonesian National Police further defines community policing as:

“…a more personal approach with emphasis on problem-solving rather than that which merely rigidly follows the formal letter of the law. In the aspect of law enforcement, especially regarding disputes among community members, informal resolution methods are regarded as more effective than the formal mechanism of the criminal justice system that often attributes marginal significance on the victim in resolving the problem he/she suffers.

“…more than an approach and/or strategy but rather a philosophy that replaces [the] conventional paradigm with a new policing model within civil society. This model essentially regards members of the community not merely as objects but partners in policing, and [the] resolution of issues (criminal offenses) …more of a goal to be achieved rather a matter of formal/procedural necessity that have to be followed through.

“…as a strategy, a policing model that underlines equal partnership shared by the community policing officers and the local community itself in resolving and overcoming every social problem which threatens security and public order within the community with the aim of reducing crime and fear of crime as well as enhancing the quality of life of the community members.”\(^\text{22}\)

This is not too far different from the way community policing is described by western authorities.\(^\text{23}\) Indeed, the credit for its incorporation in some Indonesian jurisdictions has to be shared with western donors, particularly the Netherlands government, the United Nations Development Fund, and *ictap*. Despite a generous Dutch offer of $18 million to help the *INP* train in the practice of democratic policing, the police almost missed the boat. The International Organization for Migration (*iom*), the Netherlands’ designated agent for this program, sought in vain to get
Sutanto’s predecessors committed to this approach to policing. Sarah Domingo, the IOM’s Indonesian program officer, recalls that when she made her presentation there was only one officer in a room who expressed interest. It was Sutanto, then the head of the Police Institute of Education and Training. Within six months of becoming chief he incorporated community policing into INP doctrine in a decree issued to all units of the force.\footnote{24}

Procedures had to be tweaked and modified to suit the conditions of the districts where the model was tried out. In East Java, a crime-prone province where Sutanto once served as police chief, the police station operates on a full 24-hour cycle with a staff of policewomen who attend to the complaints of women while policemen wear casual clothes rather than uniforms to put people at ease. A radio program runs 14 hours a day informing the community of the program and asking for its cooperation—“public journalism,” as the police call it. In Bekasi, a densely populated suburb of Jakarta, the INP has adopted the Japanese-style neighborhood center (koban) system with the help of motor vehicles and communications equipment supplied by the Japan International Cooperation Agency. In Riau, a province made up of many islands, Batam with its colony of foreign-owned factories is treated differently from Natuna and Lingga islands whose inhabitants make their living from the sea.\footnote{25}

It is too early to judge how effective these pilot projects will be. Western observers warn these communities against expecting dramatic reductions in crime. “This is very much like the Neighborhood Watches in the U.S. They don’t eliminate crime, they just displace crime and send it to more vulnerable neighborhoods,” says a U.S. police adviser. “The best one can hope for is to keep crime at a manageable level.”\footnote{26}

Change at the Top

General Sutanto reached mandatory retirement in the fall of 2008. President Yudhoyono selected as his successor another professional police officer highly respected for his efforts to improve police science, police administration, and the police image. The new chief is Bambang Hendarso Danuri, who had been the director of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Like General Sutanto, Commissioner General Danuri is a classmate of President Yudhoyono—all three went through the common orientation year together and graduated from their respective academies in 1974. He has been close to General Sutanto, both in their personal relationship but also in their common commitment to reform and improvement in Polri. His appointment is seen as a reaffirmation of the President’s commitment to reform and regeneration in the National Police.

General Danuri’s early police assignments included successively higher postings in Bogor, Bengkulu, Lampung, South Sumatra, and West Papua. He became chief of CID in West Nusatenggara (Lombok and Sumbawa Islands) in 1997 and later served in similar posts in Bali and East Java Provinces. He served as provincial police chief in
North Sumatra—one of the country’s most challenging postings—before becoming head of cid in 2006. There is every indication that he will be as tough on crime and dedicated to reform as General Sutanto has been. As the cid chief, he won plaudits for ordering the arrest of militant Islamic leaders for inciting violent crowd behavior. General Danuri also had the backbone to authorize the arrest of former National Intelligence Agency (BIN—Badan Intelijen Nasional) deputy chief Muchdi Purwopranjono as a suspect in the murder of human rights activist Munir Said Thalib. Muchdi for a time had appeared immune to prosecution because of his status as a retired TNI lieutenant general, but his fate was sealed when President Yudhoyono made it clear that former generals accused of malfeasance are not above the law.27

A Festering TNI-Police Rivalry

Fighting between TNI and INP personnel is a serious concern shared by the leaders of both institutions. Some of the clashes (bentrokan) start as shoving matches and fist fights but the violence could rapidly escalate as other policemen and soldiers come to the aid of their comrades with pistols and rifles. One such incident frightened a Central Maluku community so much its residents refused to leave their homes for days. Most of the incidents occur in areas where permanently-stationed army units and the newly-empowered police fight it out over turf and jurisdictional authority—and the money (legal and illicit alike) and prerogatives that come with them. At the root of the conflict is the still-unsettled question of how the armed forces and the police have to share responsibility for internal security. The 2002 police bill handed over the bulk of that responsibility to the police but the subsequent 2004 armed forces law left the door open for the military to step back in when civil disturbances have to be overcome with stronger force than the police can muster.

At the same time the decades-old structure of army territorial commands remains virtually unchanged even though many of their traditional duties have been taken over by the police. A new national security bill that could clear up some of the legal ambiguities has been stalled in parliament by champions of both institutions. But such legal remedies alone may not suffice. Defense Minister Sudarsono insists that insufficient budget support for both institutions is still at the root of the problem.28 At the bottom of it, too, is the growing resentment, envy, and humiliation felt by the TNI at being challenged by its erstwhile “younger brother.” History has dealt the TNI the poorer hand. With the decades-long Aceh conflict over, the TNI has no more shooting wars to fight. Like other armies in peacetime, it must find other missions to justify its existence (refer to Chapters 2 and 3 on the TNI and challenges to its professionalism, and to Chapters 5 and 6 for new non-traditional missions).

Retired police officers are also emerging as a factor in electoral politics. Retired Police Commissioner General I Made Mangku Pastika, who made his name leading
the investigation of the 2002 terrorist bombings in Bali, was easily elected governor of his home province of Bali under the banner of the opposition Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). He has promised collateral-free working capital loans to small enterprises and other programs that could generate 10,000 new jobs a year.

Another manifestation of this boomlet is the effort of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) to recruit General Sutanto as its presidential candidate. One political commentator ranks the police chief as one of the dark horses (kuda hitam) in the 2009 race, along with Sultan Hamengkubuwana X of Yogyakarta; Din Syamsuddin, the president of the modernist Islamic association Muhammadiyah; and Sutiyoso, the retired army general who in 2008 completed two terms as Governor of Jakarta. So far Sutanto has polled far behind the leading contenders for president, which include President Yudhoyono and former president Megawati Soekarnoputri. Many think he may well end up as a vice presidential candidate for one or another of the leading political parties. He has brushed aside questions about his possible candidacy, denying any interest in politics.29 Adang Daradjatun, the former deputy police chief under Bachtiar, did dive into politics under the PKS banner but failed in his bid to succeed Sutiyoso in the Jakarta gubernatorial contest.

Has the surge in police empowerment gone too far? Some critics think so, charging that some of the bentrokan reported in the media are triggered by the police takeover of protection rackets previously controlled by the army. Another unwelcome manifestation of the INP’s broader reach is the rising number of complaints about police violence. The National Commission on Human Rights reports that there are far more of these complaints involving the police than there are against the military and other public security agencies. The complaints accuse the police of violent arrests, molestations, rape and sexual harassment, and other abusive actions.30 The shift in the attention of the human rights community from the military to the police is evident also in the reporting of the U.S. Department of State, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. The United Nations special rapporteur on torture has expressed concern about “widespread” abuse of police detainees even while acknowledging a great improvement in Indonesia’s record in combating rights abuses since the end of the Suharto era.31

One retired army three-star general charges that the police have become “too powerful for their own good. They see themselves as a second TNI.” He bristles at the INP’s conceit in staging its 62nd anniversary celebration at Jakarta’s National Monument with President Yudhoyono and other dignitaries in attendance.32 The army once thought it had an exclusive right to such a ritual. The INP’s residual military trappings—the generals’ stars on the shoulders of its leaders, the army-like drill formations—only serve to reinforce the image of an institution rivaling the military in power and influence. Miss Baker, the British scholar investigating the TNI-police relationship, has a more disturbing interpretation of this sibling rivalry. She reports
that officers in both institutions still nostalgically regard themselves as part of the old ABRI family and feel “deep-rooted anxieties about the longevity of civilian supremacy.” In her interpretation the food fights by the lower ranks obscure the “fragile and shifting pacts” between locally-based police and military leaders to cooperate as a hedge against a possible return of the military to political power.33

**The Issue of Civilian Supremacy**

The TNI and the police are roughly in comparable positions in the power structure. Both report directly to the president, virtually bypassing direct cabinet supervision. The defense minister nominally has some say over the TNI’s budget and acquisitions but otherwise the armed forces are left to manage themselves. A National Police Commission, authorized by a 2002 law and formed in 2005, advises the president on issues relating to the INP’s performance and can propose candidates for its top post. But it does not have direct supervisory powers over the police. Thus the recent demands, not least of all from the TNI and its supporters, for the police to be placed under the Department of Home Affairs (Department Dalam Negeri). The TNI has taken the position that it would not subordinate itself to the Department of Defense unless the INP accepts similar cabinet oversight.

The INP resists these calls, arguing that the cabinet department lacks the capacity to deal with law enforcement. In this respect the police would make a better fit under the Department of Justice, but there are few calls for that alternative. Some western donors disagree with the proposition that subordinating the police to the Department of Home Affairs strengthens the principle of civilian control. “The police is already a civilian agency so that argument doesn’t wash,” says a U.S. police adviser.34 Underlying these objections is a concern that cabinet supervision could politicize the police and weaken its ability to enforce the law.35 Some senior police officers believe that placing the police and other law-enforcing agencies under a U.S.-style Department of Homeland Security would be a suitable compromise. Like other seemingly intractable political issues, this one has been left on the president’s desk. Most observers foresee no quick resolution, likely not until after the 2009 presidential election.

**An Expanding U.S. Assistance Program**

In the authors’ first study on U.S.-Indonesian security relations, they identified the United States as the “most important member of an ad hoc international coalition of Polri angels”36 This is still the case. The U.S. ICTAP program continues to expand. It now spends an average of $8 million a year in 12 separate projects, from equipping police forensic labs to running emergency management courses. It would not be fair to call this program too “hardware-oriented,” as some critics suggest. One of its major initiatives, getting the police to adopt a liberal, human rights-based “use of force” pol-
icy, has to do with tactics and doctrine, rather than hardware. U.S. advisers would like the Indonesian police to practice the same kind of restraint on the use of deadly force that the police forces in most liberal democracies observe. If the Indonesian police sign on to this policy, they would be one of only a few police forces in Asia to do so.

The Problems of the Police Mobile Brigade
The U.S. program is also reaching out to the Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob), a unit so notorious for its conduct in the past as to be shunned by all other Western donors. The Brimob was roundly criticized by human rights groups for its excessively rough behavior in suppressing the Free Aceh Movement in the late 1990s. The U.S. Congress has explicitly forbidden any U.S. assistance to the unit. What then to do with Brimob? This is a large force of more than 30,000 personnel, equivalent to more than two army divisions. They cannot just be left alone as wasting assets. U.S. advisers are exploring the possibility of involving Brimob personnel in three “mainstream” missions being supported by State Department funds if the unit can be shown to have undergone sufficient internal reforms to be eligible for U.S. training.

Serving as U.N. Peacekeepers. There is an increasing demand for stability police units to serve alongside regular U.N. military peacekeeping contingents, as described in Chapter 6 on international peacekeeping. With additional training, particularly in proper use-of-force rules of engagement, Brimob can step into that role and serve ably enough to bring credit to the INP and to the nation. Its earlier military-style training, a liability in the past, could be an asset in this U.N. role, as it requires the police to serve as formed police units (FPU) rather than as individual officers. Exposure to the performance of their peers from other countries and to the secular world outside Indonesia can have the same effect on Brimob personnel as it has on TNI contingents serving in U.N. missions: an incentive to raise their standards of professionalism and competence.37

Training for disaster and humanitarian crisis management. ICTAP is helping the INP to prepare itself to respond quickly and efficiently to disasters just as the TNI is doing with its own service branches (See Chapter 5 on New Missions). The current ICTAP training is being extended to all senior police leaders across the archipelago—but not to Brimob because of the congressional restrictions. U.S. advisers believe that because of its formed-unit configuration Brimob can naturally fit into a rapid deployment role in the event of a natural disaster or humanitarian crisis.

Re-Engagement with a Reformed Brimob?
- End isolation of Brimob, expand training of personnel and units
- Brimob potential includes potential for these missions:
  - U.N. peacekeeping
  - Disaster relief
  - Combat illegal logging

THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE: A REFORM SUCCESS STORY IN THE MAKING 65
Combating illegal logging and other environmental crimes. Brimob units are also naturally suited for this role because they have the organizational and operational capability to work in challenging terrain and difficult environmental conditions. U.S. officials report that they have already demonstrated this capability in Kalimantan and other areas where illegal logging and other forms of natural resources plunder are a major concern. These are all missions of a humanitarian nature that can be widely supported by civil society and the Indonesian people at large. Effectively executed, they can result in a high degree of public welfare. The U.S. should seriously consider these proposals to “mainstream” the Brimob and to provide the necessary support if the unit can adopt these missions.

---

**Figure 7: ICITAP’s Indonesian Police Development Program**

**Marine Police Special Boat Unit**
Increasing the unit’s capability to protect ports and waterways from drug and human trafficking, terrorist threats, piracy, and illegal fishing.

**Countering Cyber Crime**
Training a Cyber Crime Unit to conduct domestic as well as transnational investigations; assisting Indonesia in becoming a pilot country for the Child Exploitation Tracking System.

**Trafficking-in-Persons**
Training the police and NGOs in a “point of origin” strategy that focuses attention on rural areas in North Sumatra and East Java believed to be primary targets of human traffickers.

**Use-of-Force Policy Project**
Advising the police in adopting a code of police behavior that could be as progressive as that observed in Western democratic countries.

**Forensics Development**
Enhancing the INP’s capacity to conduct forensic analysis of evidence unique to terrorism and arson, including post-bomb blast analysis, explosives identification, ballistics, chemistry, biology and documents analysis; developing DNA analysis capability in Surabaya and other regional labs.

**Curriculum Framework Development**
Working with INP training institutes, criminology faculties in local universities and the Ministry of Education in standardizing basic curricula for all three entry-level police positions.

**Criminal Investigations Development Assistance**
Augmenting the capacity of the INP’s Criminal Investigation Division and providing criminal investigative assistance to other specialized police units with a special focus on terrorism and other complex transnational crimes.

Source: ICITAP, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division
Notes
1. INP is an English language abbreviation. The National Police are widely referred to in Bahasa Indonesia as Polri—an acronym for Kepolisian Nasional.
4. The Jakarta Post, July 2, 2008. The article quoted the INP spokesman Inspector General Abubakar Nata-prawira acknowledging the existence of some individual officers acting on their own as brokers for academy candidates. He said the INP condemns the practice and has taken measures to put a stop to it.
5. MacIntyre and Ramage, Ibid.
7. The United States lifted its arms embargo in November 2005 and other donors followed suit shortly afterwards.
9. “South Sulawesi’s Police: Acting Locally, Thinking Nationally with a Global Perspective,” INP/ICITAP.
10. Interview, Jakarta, June 27, 2008.
11. Muhammad Nurdin, a retired police inspector general elected to the House of Representatives, in a question-and-answer interview with The Jakarta Post, July 7, 2008. Moonlighting by policemen, of course, is an economic expedient not unknown in the U.S. and other advanced societies.
17. Major Wijanarko, Ibid.
18. Bachtiar, a 30-year career officer, was rewarded for his service in April 2008 with an appointment as ambassador to Malaysia.
19. These details of Sutanto’s career are culled from D. Danny H. Simanjuntak, Rival-Rival Politik SBY, PT Buku Kita, Yogyakarta, 2008.
20. Interview, Muradi (like many Indonesians, he has only one name), executive director of the Centre for Defence and Peace Studies, Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia, Jakarta, June 30, 2008.
22. Decree No. 737/X/2005, Ibid.
23. A quartet of authors of authors defined it as an approach that “incorporates a new philosophy that broadens the police mission from a narrow focus on crime to a mandate that encourages the police to explore creative solutions for a host of community concerns, including crime, fear of crime, disorder and neighborhood conditions. It is a philosophy that turns policing on its head by empowering the community. …In this sense policing derives its role and agenda from the community rather than dictating to the


25. *Esat Langkah Polri*.


32. *Ibid*.


34. *Ibid*.

35. *Ibid*.


37. The INP took pride in sending its first FPU, a 140-officer Bhayangkara Garuda contingent, to serve a year long deployment with other United Nations peacekeepers in Darfur, Sudan. INP chief Bambang Hendarso Danuri called the assignment an honor to the country and to its police force.
Chapter 5

New Missions: Maritime Security, Resource Protection, Disaster Management

Key Points—TNI Emphasizes “Military Operations Other Than War”

- As peace prevails TNI turns its attention to non-traditional security
- Indonesia is still ill-equipped to secure its large maritime domain
- TNI, police require assistance to better prepare for the next natural disaster
- Stronger law enforcement results in decline in illegal logging cases
- U.S. can, and should, support the TNI’s new missions

Democracy Brings a New Social Environment

For a volunteer army some of its most trying times are when the nation is at peace. It has to justify the cost of combat readiness when peace is driving up demand for other public goods like education, health and economic development. Unlike a conscript army, this army of professional soldiers cannot be easily demobilized, particularly when letting them go would just worsen unemployment, as would be the case in Indonesia. The army must find other missions to justify its existence, perhaps even reinvent itself. This roughly is the situation the TNI finds itself as it searches for an accommodation to its changing circumstances.

Historically, the TNI’s paramount mission has been to crush any separatist movement or challenge to the authority of the center. That mission is largely accomplished. The danger of separatism has ebbed. East Timor is now a fledgling independent state but with serious teething problems that should give pause to any other Indonesian province contemplating separation. The once-rebellious Aceh is now back in the fold,
peace there achieved through a politically negotiated settlement. Papua is the only serious internal security problem remaining but it is manageable through political measures; its disorganized separatist movement is a political challenge, not a serious security threat to the nation. The turnover to the police of primary responsibility for other internal security threats like counter-terrorism also contributes to the TNI’s involuntary idleness.

The Indonesian military is by no means alone in its predicament. There are ample examples around the world of militaries forced to adapt structures and doctrines to changes in their environment or new demands on their service. Half of Europe’s militaries have given up conscription in favor of an all-volunteer force because of the declining appeal of conscripted service. As the threat of conventional war fades, Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands and other European militaries have redefined their missions to place their highest priority on international peacekeeping. The need to downsize armies and promote European security integration has led Germany and the Netherlands to form the bi-national First German-Netherlands Corps. The Swiss army is abandoning its dependence on a militia army and developing an expeditionary capability so that it can join its European peers in out-of-area missions.

Closer to home as far as the TNI is concerned, the Philippine armed forces have created a separate National Development Command to intensify civil-military operations in the conflict-prone areas of southern Mindanao. Last but not least, the U.S. military has reformulated its basic doctrines several times since the Vietnam War, most recently when it had to revise its strategy to defeat the Al Qaeda-led insurgency in Iraq.

Civilian reform advocates are urging the TNI to “turn outwards” so as to be better able to defend the nation against external enemies. Such a change in posture indeed would promote professionalism to the extent it pulls the TNI further away from domestic politics. The hitch, though, is that there are no external enemies to fight—at least those of the conventional kind. East Asia has been in a state of uninterrupted peace for more than 30 years since the end of the Vietnam War. Even the once-feared China is now accepted as one of Indonesia’s strategic partners. But the country still faces serious security threats, although no longer of the traditional kind. Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono identified some of these threats in arguing why Indonesia does not need a large conventional military. “First, because we don’t need it, second we can’t afford it, and third because much of the national budget is spent on economic development and social protection,” the minister said in an interview with a Reuters correspondent. Indeed, he says the TNI should shifting its focus from buying new war machines to helping the country fight its economic and humanitarian battles.
Non-Traditional Security

The Defense Minister’s reference is to what the academic community calls “non-traditional” security, or sometimes “economic” or “humanitarian” security. There is growing interest in this alternative perspective, according to peace scholars Ramesh Thakur and Edward Newman, because “traditional security has failed to deliver meaningful security to a significant proportion of the people of Asia.” For most people in the region, they argue, “the greatest threats to security come from disease, hunger, environmental contamination, crime and unorganized violence.” There is a similar appreciation of such threats in the Indonesian defense department’s 2003 White Paper. The paper recognizes that the largest foreign threat the country faces is from “organized crime by non-state actors (seeking) to gain profit by manipulating domestic conditions and the shortcomings of government apparatus.” It also acknowledges that the country faces other non-traditional threats like “piracy, smuggling, illegal immigrants, narcotics and the prohibited drugs trade.”

The TNI is retasking itself to meet these non-traditional threats as part of what it calls “military operations other than war,” a concept borrowed from U.S. and other Western military doctrines. The 2003 Indonesian defense white paper assumes that these tasks are to be undertaken only in support of the police and other civilian agencies, unless the threat involved is beyond the capacity of those agencies to overcome. But whether the TNI will be content with a supportive role if the civilian agencies are not up to the job remains to be seen. These adjustments are being made without any major structural or budgetary changes and in the do-the-best-with-what-you-have manner that usually characterizes how this resources-short military operates. Doing things on the cheap, however, is not likely to produce optimum results.

This study calls the TNI’s recent efforts in the area of non-traditional security as “missions” to give them the attention they deserve. The term “missions” has been deliberately chosen to dramatize the changes in the way the region views its security environment and the importance of the new tasks the armed forces are being asked to perform. In the military it is always said that its primary objective is “accomplishment of the mission.” Three of these “missions” are discussed in this chapter: maritime security, resource protection, and disaster management. Another important mission, international peacekeeping, is covered in the next chapter. Peacekeeping is not a new duty for the TNI, but formally describing it as a “mission” is new terminology.

TNI’s Non-Traditional New Missions

- Maritime security
- Disaster preparation and management
- Natural resource protection
New Mission: Maritime Security

Indonesia has acquired from the remnants of colonial empires a larger territory than it can comfortably handle. A look at the map shows how much maritime space this is and how difficult it is to develop and secure it. There are 50,000 miles of coastline—the second longest in the world after Canada’s. Indonesia has more than one million square miles of territorial waters and an additional 1.2 million square miles of eez. That adds up to almost 70% of Indonesia’s territorial domain. The only other Asian country with a comparable maritime space is the Philippines, with 10,800 miles of coastline and a total marine area, including its eez, of 850,000 square miles. There are more than 17,500 islands in the Indonesian archipelago, whose length from Sabang in northern Sumatra to Merauke in the southern coast of Papua stretches more than 3,100 miles—about the distance from Seattle to Bermuda.9

Indonesia has sea borders with ten other countries: India, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, Palau, Australia, Timor Leste and Papua New Guinea.10 History reminds us that what is now Indonesia was once the realms of proud maritime empires, wealthy estuarial kingdoms, and seafaring adventurers who turned to piracy and slave trading when down on their luck. Rarely were these seas completely safe for navigation, even in modern times. In 2003, 121 acts of piracy—or to be more precise, robberies at sea—occurred in Indonesian waters. By the International Maritime Bureau’s count, that was more than a quarter of all such crimes committed that year.11 The descendants of the orang laut, or people of the sea, who used to go marauding at the behest of their Buginese or Malay sea lords are now generally peaceful. But poverty still wracks their riverine communities; the more desperate ones can turn to opportunistic crime if they chance upon a poorly watched cargo ship or a defenseless fishing boat. That such poverty persists is a cruel irony considering the potential wealth that remains untapped—at least indigenously—in these waters. Fisheries resources alone are thought to be worth $6.16 billion a year. More than a third of these are harvested illegally and taken away by foreign fishing fleets.12

The newly independent Indonesia was fortunate it had no external enemies lusting for pieces of this geographic sprawl, but even the minor separatist outbreaks in the Outer Islands taxed the resources of the military in the early years of the republic. Securing this territory is no easier today, even though the threats are largely of a criminal rather than a military nature. Infrequently patrolled borders and weak or uneven law enforcement have resulted in a high incidence of illegal logging, fisheries poaching, fuel smuggling, human trafficking and armed robberies at sea. The illegal excavation of sand for export to land-short Singapore threatens the existence of small islands in the Riau Archipelago. The 21st century has brought about a yet unfathomable threat: according to one study, climate change could submerge more than 13,000
square miles (34,000 square kilometers) and imperil the well-being of two million people living in the coastal communities of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Java.\textsuperscript{13}

There is one basic reason for Indonesia’s sense of maritime insecurity: although the nation has a maritime doctrine called \textit{wawasan nusantara} (Archipelago Concept) it still lacks a matching maritime development policy. The government has a cabinet-level Department of Maritime and Fisheries Affairs, but critics complain that it does little else but issue fisheries licenses. The Java-centricity of most Indonesian policy-making is also to blame. Demands for the development of the outer island provinces are paid scant attention, or may even arouse suspicion of separatist intent. The absence of maritime policy is evident in the poor condition of Indonesia’s ports and harbors and the underdeveloped state of the shipping and fisheries industries, rues Yoost Mengko, a retired navy rear admiral.\textsuperscript{14} It also shows in the lack of maritime-oriented studies and research material in Indonesian universities. “Instead of believing that Indonesia is a maritime nation, we are [content] to see our country as an agricultural state,” laments Gadjah Mada scholar I Made Andi Arsana. “Being a large archipelagic country, Indonesia needs heroes to continue what our pioneer generations have begun.”\textsuperscript{15}

If the Archipelago Concept were a serious nation-building program and not just a catchy shibboleth, the Indonesian navy would be as strong, as if not stronger than, the army. In fact, however, the navy, the military service primarily responsible for protecting the maritime domain, remains secondary to the army in resources as well as in political influence. It is the largest in Southeast Asia in the number of ships in its inventory. But by Indonesian parliament’s estimates, barely half of the navy’s 143 ships are operational, the rest tied up pier side in permanent disrepair. Only 11 of the 18 main combat ships (frigates and corvettes) are mission-capable and only 32 of the patrol boats can do sea duty.\textsuperscript{16}

History can explain at least in part this discrepancy. Indonesia, newly liberated from its colonial masters, did not have enough foreign exchange to build a credible navy and so casting its lot on an army with a heroic role in the independence struggle was almost an inevitable choice. There are positive indications, however, of Jakarta’s intent to rebuild the TNI-AL’s capability. Indonesia purchased four modern Sigma-class frigates from the Netherlands, three of which have already been delivered and commissioned as \textit{kri Diponegoro}, \textit{kri Hasanuddin}, and \textit{kri Iskandar Muda}. The fourth ship is scheduled for delivery in 2009. The defense department has also expedited the delivery of four landing platform docks, the last two of which are being constructed in the state-owned P.T. PAL shipyards. These beach-landing craft are intended to be of dual use, for strategic military sealift and as valuable assets for the navy to have when it has to bring relief to areas affected by natural disasters.

Belatedly, the navy is winning over important champions in parliament and in academic circles. DPR Commission 1, responsible for foreign policy and defense, is
supporting an expanded naval presence in the archipelago. The current plan calls for
the Western Fleet headquarters, currently in Jakarta’s Tanjung Priok port, eventually
to relocate to Sumatra, and for a new Central Fleet to be created and based in Makas-
sar, South Sulawesi. There is even talk of moving the Eastern Fleet headquarters from
Surabaya to Sorong, West Papua.17

The navy’s own vision for 2024 is of a main strike force of 56 frigates, 38 corvettes,
six minesweepers, and 10 submarines, augmented with a fleet of 66 fast patrol boats
along with 98 support ships. Such an armada, along with a matching naval aviation,
could cost well over a trillion dollars, more than Indonesia could conceivably afford
even assuming optimum economic growth. The alternative to making such a huge
investment in naval power is to tap the maritime domain’s economic potential, creat-
ing more jobs and welfare for its coastal inhabitants. By one estimate, the potential
economic value of its capture fisheries, mariculture, aquaculture and marine biotech-
nology industries could be as high as $84 billion a year.18

Working Jointly with Civilian Agencies
The government ended some confusion about the responsibility for maritime security
by creating the Maritime Security Coordination Board (Bakorkamlia), representing
11 civilian agencies but with a navy admiral at its head.19 Some may question why a
naval officer should be in charge of a mostly civilian mission in this post-
dwifungsi era. But there is much to argue for the navy’s leadership, as its capability in ships and
personnel far exceeds that of the Marine and Fisheries Department, the Marine Police
and other civilian agencies represented on the board. The challenge for the Indonesian
government is to make sure that this provisional arrangement is not undermined by
turf rivalries and that its combined resources are used optimally. In this mission and
others like it the TNI has to find a comfort zone in which it can work collaboratively
with civilian agencies while acknowledging at the same time its subordination to civil-
ian authority. Currently, the TNP is undertaking what it calls a monitoring, controlling
and surveillance function through cooperation with the navy, with priority attention
given to the Arafura Sea and the South China Sea.20

The effectiveness of this solution remains to be seen. The board itself is a jerrybuilt
structure; the Directorate of Sea Transportation was pulled out of the Department of
Transportation to form the board’s administrative core. Apart from this bureaucratic
transplant, the board has no other administrative resources. The navy does not get
along well with the Marine Police because the latter agency is seen to be encroaching
on the navy’s traditional duties. A Law on Shipping recently signed by President Yud-
hoyono creates a new potential enforcement arm, the Sea and Coast Guard. The law
gives it a broad mandate: to conduct ship safety patrols, monitor marine pollution,
oversee salvage activities, secure maritime navigation aids, and support search and
rescue operations at sea. But the emergence of this new actor also adds to the burden of coordinating and optimizing the government’s slim resources.

**New Mission: Disaster Preparedness and Management**

One of the greatest threats to Indonesia’s security is its vulnerability to disasters, both natural and man-made. The range of calamities that can befall the citizens of this archipelago straddling a good length of the Pacific Rim of Fire is appallingly long: from tsunamis and monsoon floods to earthquakes, landslides, volcanic eruptions, fire-generated haze, terrorist bombings, influenza epidemics and even destructive mudflows such as the one caused in 2006 by an energy company drilling for natural gas in East Java.\(^{21}\)

The Aceh tsunami in 2004 shocked the **tni** into realizing its severe incapacity to cope with a disaster of that scope. The Chinook helicopters rushed to the stricken areas by the Singapore armed forces outperformed the **tni**’s few serviceable choppers. The **tni** had to appeal to the United States and other countries for additional transport to deliver relief to survivors.\(^{22}\)

There is no question now of the importance the **tni** is placing on its disaster management mission. In his 2008 message to the armed forces, **tni** commander-in-chief General Djoko Santoso urged all units to have “increased readiness to meet natural disasters … according to the social and geographical conditions of each area.” In his own annual message air force chief of staff Air Marshal Subandrio rues the mandatory funding delays that would keep the air force from attaining a minimum force level to support **tni** operations and training but still vows to prepare his service to be at “maximum readiness to respond to national disasters.”\(^{23}\)

The **panglima**’s instructions are being heeded at least by some units. If disaster strikes, the Teluk Bayur naval base stands ready to look after the safety of the residents of Padang. This community on the western coast of Sumatra is better sheltered from Indian Ocean tsunamis than Banda Aceh further north, which was overwhelmed by monster waves the day after Christmas Day in 2004, or neighboring Nias island which also lost thousands of lives to earthquakes and the tsunami. But the base commander, First Admiral Husin, is not taking any chances. He has a thousand navy sailors and marines and a fleet of patrol boats and helicopters ready to assist civil authorities in an emergency.\(^{24}\)

The air base at Bali’s Ngurah Rai International Airport, for its part, is placing all its aircraft and personnel at the disposal of the community were it to be struck by floods, landslides or destructive winds. To their credit, these sailors and airmen are offering to help out of a sense of humanitarianism as well as of duty. Inevitably, there already is some jockeying between the **tni** and the police for the right—and the budgetary endowments that come with it—to be the designated “first responders.” Defense Minister Sudarsono, no doubt aware of the budgetary implications, has asserted the
military’s competence to assume that role. Glossing over the fact that the TNI had to call on other countries for help during the Aceh emergency, he proudly says it was “first on the scene with transport ships and helicopters” in the initial search-and-rescue efforts and later in the delivery of relief supplies.²⁵

It is fair to assume that the TNI is on the way to designating disaster management as a major mission. The military regional commands (Kodams) have been instructed to prepare equipment and train personnel for this purpose, and the command structure has already been adjusted by preparing a rapid response battalion in every province (see Chapter 2). TNI headquarters directed major commands to hold work meetings every year to discuss contingency plans in the event of civil emergencies and to coordinate planning with civilian agencies. The TNI has conducted a disaster relief exercise in West Sumatra and is planning another on flood disaster relief in Jakarta, including field training in evacuation, medical treatment and search-and-rescue operations. The TNI is also planning more joint disaster relief exercises with U.S., Australia, Malaysia and Singapore.²⁶

The first TNI responder to natural disasters will normally be the locally assigned territorial infantry battalion. The Kodam quick reaction battalion (if not the one closest to the scene) will also deploy in a first-responder role. The territorial battalions are configured much the same as the tactical battalions of Kostrad, but have a lower priority for equipment and manpower fill. The Aceh disaster tragically showed that deployment of units from outside the disaster region will also be required—several of the territorial battalions in Aceh were decimated by casualties when its troops and facilities were overwhelmed by the earthquake and waves. As a minimum, the quick reaction battalions in the 12 Kodams have had unit training for disaster response, but not all battalions can be assumed to have reached that level of readiness. These units, in particular, therefore, could benefit from disaster response training as targeted units for U.S. MTT unit training programs. Alternatively, U.S. army expertise in disaster response could “train the trainers” and conduct consecutive MTT training programs for battalion staff and cadre, who would then return to pass on their experience in locally-conducted upgrade training.

Sharing Responsibility for Disaster Response
While not taking either side, U.S. officials believe the police should at least share some of that responsibility. “They are on the ground 24/7 and in many communities will be the only force available to rescue and aid victims until a larger effort can be organized by the national government,” a U.S. disaster management adviser says. In the second stage of rescue operations, he adds, the government will depend on the armed forces to provide transport and additional manpower while the police will be critical in population control and law and order duties.²⁷
Like other policy differences between the two major security institutions, this one has yet to be resolved at the highest levels of government. In most democratic countries the civilian authorities are entrusted with the management of a civil emergency, with the military and the police working under their supervision. This is the proper approach to avoid the militarization of what are essentially civilian functions. The government appears supportive of that principle and a recently enacted Disaster Management Law indeed places the responsibility for disaster relief on both the civilian National Disaster Management Agency and its regional branches. The exact roles of the **tni** and the police, however, are yet to be defined by implementing regulations issued by the Office of the President.\(^{28}\)

How the intended system works may not be clear until the government is forced to respond to another major emergency. The body of regional experience suggests that civilian authorities lack the experience and resources to cope with the havoc caused by typhoons and cyclones. They continue to depend heavily on the armed forces for field operations and technical advice. The Philippine counterpart to the **NDMA**, the National Defense Coordinating Council, is structured to have strong military leadership. The council is made up of 15 cabinet secretaries, the heads of the Philippine Information Agency and the Philippine National Red Cross, and the chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with the Secretary of Defense serving as chairman. The Malaysian equivalent also depends on military leadership.

A **PACOM**-sponsored disaster management exercise tested the ability of the **NDMA**’s predecessor (called **Bakornas**—**Badan Koordinasi Nasional**) and found it wanting. To put this trial in perspective, it assumed an event of catastrophic proportions but with historical reality: a violent eruption of the Anak Krakatau volcano (in the heavily trafficked Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra). In this exercise scenario the volcanic blast provided the theatrics but the real killer was an ensuing earthquake and tidal wave that took 1.5 million lives, which would seriously challenge the resourcefulness of any civilian agency on this planet.\(^{29}\)

### New Mission: Protection of Natural Resources

Minister Sudarsono identifies the massive theft of natural resources as another non-traditional security threat. This rampant criminal activity includes fisheries poaching, illegal logging and smuggling of various kinds and, as earlier noted, it results in losses of as much as $16 billion a year. These depredations are primarily the concern of civilian agencies like the police, the forestry department and the maritime and fisheries agency but the **tni** is already claiming an urgent need for its help.\(^{30}\) Its stakeholdership is supported by a presidential regulation implementing the national defense policy. It instructs the Defense Department to direct other departments and agencies to assign personnel and set up programs that can help the government monitor and protect...
natural resources. Although the regulation does not identify the agencies affected, it is presumed that these include the police as well as the Departments of Forestry, Maritime and Fisheries, Home Affairs, and Transportation. The navy-led Maritime Security Coordination Board has been specifically tasked to focus on the protection of maritime resources, smuggling and pollution.

Illegal Logging
Indonesian law bans the export of raw logs. Why millions of cubic feet of logs continue to be shipped out of the country each year defies comprehension. The major cause of the problem is weak law enforcement. Ironically, the decentralization of government functions, which was intended as a major governance reform, had the effect of further enfeebling forestry laws. Among other unintended consequences it led to the breakup of the forestry agency’s original corps of some 10,000 forest rangers, so that barely half that number is available to look after the national forests. Agus Setyarso, the executive chairman of the National Forest Council of Indonesia, estimates that at least 20,000 rangers are needed for the job.

The need for more forest guardians prompted President Yudhoyono to order 19 separate government agencies to join the fight against this economic crime. The marching orders were handed down specifically to the Kalimantan territorial commander (Kodam vi) whose area of responsibility includes not only the porous land border with Malaysia but also hundreds of thousands of square miles of tropical forests in Borneo.

The Indonesian public cannot be blamed for being more than a little skeptical about the effectiveness of such a pronouncement. It is a widely believed that some corrupt TNI and police officers share in the profits of the illegal trade for personal gain and that even otherwise honest ones accept the money to augment their short budgets for operations and maintenance. In 2005 the enormity of the problem was driven home to the public by an international environmental group’s expose of the plunder of Papua merbau timber resources by illegal loggers, mostly for the benefit of China’s wood-flooring industry. The culprits were identified as Malaysian-Chinese traders, along with hundreds of other individuals, including forestry officials and military and police personnel, who collaborated with the traders. The government cracked down hard on the merbau-exporting ring, leading to the arrest of some 400 individuals, including TNI and police officers. But the outcome was generally disappointing, as many of the suspects fled the country to escape prosecution.

The outlook is somewhat more encouraging in Kalimantan, where international efforts—including the U.S.-supported Heart of Borneo project to save the forests and chimpanzee habitats—are spurring the government to act. U.S. officials also credit President Yudhoyono’s personal interest in the campaign for its successes so far. InP chief General Sutanto’s sacking of the West Kalimantan regional police chief certainly
captured the attention of the entire law enforcement community. “He didn’t seem to care about what happened in the area under his supervision,” explained INF spokesman Inspector General Abubakar Nataprawira. The ousted provincial police chief was not charged criminally and only reassigned to another post, but the axing was a signal the government is getting serious about its pledges.

Some Gains Against Illegal Logging
In Riau province, the police are also lending some credibility to the campaign. In the two years he served as regional police chief, Commissioner General Sutjiptadi brought 216 cases against suspected illegal loggers and their accomplices. Many of the cases could not be successfully prosecuted because of insufficient evidence, reflecting an endemic weakness of the Indonesian justice system. But the provincial police chief’s efforts resulted nonetheless in jail terms of one to three years for 30 individuals. They were mostly managers or field operators. No senior executives or middlemen were among them, which suggests the difficulty of fighting a trade fueled by China’s explosive growth and managed by powerful business interests that may be outside the reach of Indonesian justice in Singapore or other suspected havens.

So far it has been the police in the forefront of the campaign against illegal logging. The TNI, no longer with any direct law enforcement authority, is expected to act only in a supporting role. In Kalimantan the army is part of an interagency team watching out for contraband logs as well as protecting reforested areas. In response
to the president’s directive, Kodam VI has increased the number of its border outposts to tighten its vigilance against traders transporting logs across the border to the Malaysian state of Sarawak. Indonesian soldiers are not trained to be border guards, but in Kalimantan and Papua they must serve in that capacity for lack of a civilian agency with that specialized function. The increased border surveillance has scored a few hits. Early in 2008 a border patrol busted an illegal logging operation by a Malaysian-owned company and seized a Caterpillar tractor and scores of felled logs in its possession. The Malaysian proprietor was allowed to leave after the intervention of Royal Malaysian army troops.\(^42\) In another case, Kodam troops responding to tips from the populace captured a raft of illegally felled logs that was several kilometers long—a brazen attempt to move millions of square feet of illegally harvested timber to market.\(^43\)

**Fish Poaching**

The Indonesian navy is working with the police and the Maritime and Fisheries Department to curb the unauthorized operation of foreign fleets off Natuna Island and in the Sulawesi and Arafura Seas. The diligence of these enforcers is evidenced by the fact that at one time as many as 130 vessels from China, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines were impounded in Indonesian ports, while as many as 500 crewmembers were in jail on charges of illegal fishing.

But the navy is still a long way away from winning this battle. It has only 20 ships available for a mission that requires at least 50, according to an admiral investigating the illegal fishing cases. This task is no easier for the navy than it is for the army catching illegal loggers. Cases have dragged on for months despite the creation of special fisheries courts to break up the jam. The fact that much of the illegal catch winds up in Chinese kitchens adds to the diplomatic sensitivity of pursuing this mission too aggressively.\(^44\)

---

**Figure 9: A Surge in Illegal Fishing Cases\(^45\)**

![Figure 9: A Surge in Illegal Fishing Cases](image-url)
U.S. Assistance for the Police and TNI to Support New Missions

An important ICTAP training program may help Indonesia become better prepared to handle the next major disaster. It is not intended to show partiality in the competition between the armed forces and the police for leadership in this mission. But U.S. program managers have no other choice. This is because ICTAP programs operate on State Department funds, which by U.S. law can only used to assist civilian agencies.

The TNI also gets some U.S. assistance in the form of joint exercises with U.S. air force and naval units and educational grants but nothing as extensive as the police program. The ICTAP program will train regional and district police forces all over the archipelago in handling almost every conceivable disaster that could occur in the country. The program got started in Sumatra because the island is at greater risk of destructive earthquakes and tsunamis than any other area of the archipelago. The training will then move to the islands east of Bali, and wind up in Java and Kalimantan.

Years of U.S. police experience in handling civic emergencies have been summarized in a pocket size, waterproof Indonesian-language manual distributed to all police chiefs and their senior officers. At least five members of the typical class of 35 trainees represent local government or social workers so that their organizations can also benefit from this knowledge. When the program has run its course, virtually all local police units will have some basic knowledge in how to cope with a massive flood or earthquake or how to help the national authorities deal with a terrorist bombing, a hazardous chemical spill or a passenger plane crash.46

The basic thrust of the training is to have as many communities as possible schooled in standard operating procedures (SOP) for any contingency. This could spell the difference between success and failure if several communities are affected by a disaster and have to communicate quickly and coordinate with each other or with rescue workers dispatched from the center. The PACOM-affiliated Multilateral Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) has pitched in to help the TNI develop SOPs for emergency response. The MPAT seeks to expand the initiative throughout the region so that the broader ASEAN community will have common procedures for managing disasters.

Although ICTAP’s Marine Police program has a primarily counterterrorism objective, to the extent it can help the police catch fisheries poachers it also contributes to the resources protection mission. The boats—four stationed in Bitung, North Sulawesi and five in Tarakan, East Kalimantan—are well positioned to intercept Chinese and Taiwanese fishing boats fleeing Indonesian waters with illegally caught hauls. The boats have already accounted for the seizure of $4 million in illegally obtained logs, fish catch, and smuggled fuel.47

Inevitably, there have been resentful inquiries from the TNI on why the U.S. has given these high-performance boats to the police and not to the Indonesian navy. The explanation, again, lies in the convoluted and highly legalistic nature of the U.S. aid
appropriations process. There does not appear to be any deliberate intention to favor the police at the expense of the TNI. It may just seem that way to observers unversed in the complexities of U.S. policy-making and budgeting. If these actions are being misunderstood, they should clarified. The U.S. must be able count on both the TNI and the INP, as well as on other civilian agencies, in security matters of common concern to the two countries.

**Blending Security Assistance with Economic Assistance**

The increasing attention of Indonesia (and other developing nations) to non-traditional security concerns should be a cue to the new U.S. administration to reconsider the conventional practice of separately planning and dispensing security assistance and economic assistance. There is a practical reason for the conventional practice: these resource streams are owned and managed by turf-conscious bureaucracies that may have different views about dealing with the world. To what extent the State Department, the Defense Department, and USAID consult with each other may be deserving of another study. To the Jakarta Country Team’s credit, bureaucratic fealty matters less on the ground than they may to the Washington chiefs they report to. The embassy staff has worked as a team to design programs with both security and economic objectives in mind. The Tri-Border Initiative described in Chapter 7 is an excellent example of how such teamwork can meet a number of different national security and economic interests.

Compartmentalizing the two resource streams has the effect of limiting the provision of security assistance only to the military and economic assistance only to civilian agencies. This practice complicates the ability of program managers to support each of the three security missions described in this chapter. There are as many as 12 separate Indonesian agencies, including the navy, with some responsibility for maritime security. Both the TNI and the INP are being called upon to help protect natural resources, which suggests that the Forestry and the Maritime and Fisheries Affairs departments, the agencies with the primary responsibility for this mission, are themselves in need of assistance or are too corrupt to effectively enforce the law. Disaster risk management obviously would require the joint action of both military and civilian institutions.

The U.S. administration should consult with Congress on giving program managers the flexibility to combine economic and military assistance in a coordinated program to support specific missions. In combating illegal logging, for instance, military assistance can be used to retrain TNI units for this mission and State Department-managed funds can be used to strengthen the enforcement capabilities of the forestry agency. This would require a greater degree of coordination and joint planning by the country team's military and civilian members. An assistance package for maritime security likewise should allow program managers to work with the TNI, the police, and other agencies with comparable tasks, in consultation with the Indonesian government.
This is not to discount the need for maintaining traditional economic assistance programs, such as for education and public health. The U.S. should continue supporting these objectives, although in the context of the availability in greater volume of such assistance from multilateral agencies like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and in the aggregate from other bilateral donors. The U.S., however, has a comparative advantage in managing security assistance and this can be made even more productive if it is directly supported by economic assistance from the State Department, USAID, and other U.S. civilian agencies.

The three new missions just discussed are of a “civil-military” nature, which opens the possibility of flexible, cross-agency, and even multilateral assistance for multiple services. The TNI is undertaking a fourth “new mission”—international peacekeeping—which traditionally has been mostly a military affair. Peacekeeping is certainly not “new” to the Indonesian armed forces. In the past it has been considered an additional duty to the traditional ones of defense of the motherland and internal security. As described in the following chapter, the TNI may find it to its advantage to upgrade peacekeeping to a formal “mission.” This implies the need to train for the more difficult peacemaking operations increasingly in demand. This also implies the need for more robust bilateral and multinational assistance for both the TNI and the INP, whose peacekeeping responsibilities are also on the rise.

Notes
9. The statistics for Indonesia in metric measurements are as follows: 81,000 kilometers of coastline, a territorial waters expanse of three million square kilometers, 3.1 million square kilometers in the EEZ. The distance from Sabang to Merauke is 5,000 kilometers. The Philippine has 17,500 kilometers of coastline and a marine area, including its EES, of 2.2 million square kilometers.


19. The Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Widodo Adisucipto, named Vice Admiral Budhi Hardjo to succeed retired Vice Admiral Djoko Sumaryono as Baskorkamla head on September 23, 2008.


21. The mudflow was the accidental result of the construction of a gas well by a subsidiary of the oil and gas company Lapindo Brantas. Controversy swirled over the extent of the company’s liability, heightened by the fact that its parent company is owned by the family of Coordinating Minister for Peoples Welfare Aburizal Bakrie, a political ally of the president, and the complaints of some affected residents that they had not been adequately compensated.


25. Agence France-Presse, date unavailable.

26. Correspondence with Colonel Junias Tobing, Head of the TNI Center for Strategic Studies, October 5, 2008.

27. Interview, Jakarta, June 27, 2008.

28. Law No. 24/2007 Relating to Disaster Management, signed on April 16, 2007, replaces an earlier disaster-coordinating agency created by executive order with this new agency, the NDMA. The law defines the NDMA as a non-department agency but equal in rank to a ministry, with a steering committee and an executive body. The steering committee will be made up of “relevant government officers” and professional community members, all subject to a “fit and proper test” by the House of Representatives. The executive body is to be appointed by the president. It is presumed that the interests of the defense department, the TNI and the police will be represented in those subsidiary bodies. The law also creates regional and district agencies to work in coordination with the national body.


32. BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, September 24, 2008.
34. Presidential Instruction No. 4/2005.
36. Wikipedia reports that the tree’s timber, called *merbau* or *kwila*, is a very durable and termite-resistant wood, making it a highly valued material for flooring and other uses. The bark and leaves of the *ipil* are used in traditional medicines. *Merbau* can contain a “gold” fleck that runs through the grain, considered to be attractive by some. Due to extensive logging of the tree, it is endangered in many places in Southeast Asia, and almost extinct in some.
37. The 2005 report, by the Washington and London-based Environmental Investigation Agency and its Indonesian affiliate Telepak, was widely reported in the Indonesian media, leading to a flurry of government actions including the creation of an interagency team headed by then-INP chief General Da’i Bachtiar to break up and capture the *merbau* smugglers, and a special $6.3 million fund to finance the effort.
40. Source: Indonesian National Police.
42. Indonesian Department of Defense, April 13, 2008.
45. Source: Indonesian National Police.
Chapter 6
The TNI and International Peacekeeping Operations: A Welcome Return

Key Points—Indonesia’s Strong Return to U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

- TNI determined to return vigorously to U.N. peacekeeping operations
- Indonesian peacekeepers well-received in Lebanon’s Shiite heartland
- Indonesia is Southeast Asia’s largest contributor to U.N. peacekeeping
- U.S. uses GPOI funds to support TNI peacekeeping deployments

Although out of the heavy-duty international peacekeeping business for nearly a decade, the TNI did not hesitate to respond to a United Nations request for a contribution to its reformed peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon. It was Indonesia’s turn in 2006 to occupy the Asian seat in the U.N. Security Council. The 850-man mechanized infantry battalion task force it dispatched to join UNIFIL—called Indobatt in U.N. parlance—was a symbol of its desire to be seen worthy of the seat. But the TNI really needed no other motivation than pride in its lengthy peacekeeping record. It had sent troops to serve under the U.N. banner 23 times before the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis starved it of extra cash and sharply reduced its troop contributions to U.N. missions. As an infantry colonel, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono himself won plaudits serving as the U.N. chief military observer in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995.

There was encouragement as well from U.S. officials who saw peacekeeping as a way of refocusing the TNI’s attention on professionalization. The TNI had appeared undecided on what to do next after its initial steps at reform. The army’s former dominance in domestic stability operations has been formally transferred to the INP.
After pulling out from East Timor and winding down its Aceh operations, the army in particular has many more troops available for international peacekeeping operations. The U.N. invitation gave it an opportunity to brush up its old skills at expeditionary soldiering. The army also used the Lebanon assignment as justification for correcting one of the army’s most serious deficiencies: its aging inventory of road equipment. It bought scores of new vehicles—armored personnel carriers, trucks, trailers, ambulances and water tanks. They were given a fresh coat of white paint and U.N. markings and delivered to Lebanon by a ship hired by the U.S. Military Sealift Command.

The first Lebanon deployment, Garuda \textit{xxiii-a} in the \textit{tni} nomenclature, was rated a success. The Indonesian soldiers shivered in their tents in the unusually chilly Mediterranean winter of 2006–2007 but as the weather warmed they took up their duties with alacrity, gaining the respect of the local people as well as the other contingents in \textit{unifil}’s Sector East. Mustered under French and Italian leadership after the inconclusive Israeli-Hezbollah war, \textit{unifil} has a delicate mission to perform, as much diplomatic as military. There was some fussing between Jakarta and the U.N. about precisely where the battalion was to be stationed and exactly what its duties were to be. Indonesian Defense Minister Sudarsono refused the use of Indonesian soldiers to disarm Hezbollah fighters because that could cause a “backlash” with Indonesian Islamic groups and undercut domestic support for the U.N. mission. Although one of \textit{unifil}’s charges is to neutralize and collect rocket launchers and other weapons, he insisted that this job should be left to the Lebanese armed forces. In fact, these rules of engagement were eventually adopted by the entire \textit{unifil} command.

**Diplomacy-Backed Peacekeeping**

\textit{unifil} appears to have done nothing to place the Indonesians in a safer position than its other 29 contingents. Sector East, which Indonesia shares with the Spanish, Irish, Finnish, Indian and Nepalese contingents, is right in the middle of the Shiite heartland that has offered up fighters and martyrs to the Hezbollah cause. The Indonesians see posters of Hassan Nasrallah, the charismatic Hezbollah leader, on both sides of the roads they patrol, as well as black-scarved women still grieving the loss of loved ones in the \textit{harb al tummuz} or summer war. Indobatt’s duties also include field intelligence to forewarn \textit{unifil} on any fresh threat of violence. Checking on the presence of males of militarily recruitable age could stir up trouble unless done discreetly. \textit{unifil}’s peacekeepers can never be fully relaxed, as their mission is seen by Hezbollah as an instrument of American-French imperialism to be thwarted at every turn.

Sector East also borders on the Blue Line that separates southern Lebanon from Israeli-controlled territory. Some 12 kilometers of this tense border are in Indobatt’s area of operations. At times it has had to interpose itself between passing Israeli patrols and Lebanese soldiers to prevent an incident. The only fatal terrorist attack that \textit{unifil}
has suffered so far occurred in this sector. On June 24, 2007 on the road between Mar-
jayoun and Khian a booby-trapped Renault car exploded as a Spanish patrol passed
by, killing three Spanish soldiers and three Colombians serving with the Spanish con-
tingent. The attack occurred not far from the northernmost reach of Indobatt’s own
patrols. UNIFIL and Lebanese investigators first suspected Hezbollah operatives to be
behind the bombing, but a dangerous confrontation with the powerful Shiite militia
was avoided when media leaks cast the blame on a Salafist cell that had sneaked into
the country intent on doing harm to both UNIFIL and Hezbollah.4

Simply having come from Indonesia might have given the Garuda contingent
an extra measure of safety. “People knew Indonesia as the country with the largest
Muslim population and a non-aligned policy,” recalled Colonel Surawahadi, a burly
airborne-trained officer who commanded the first Garuda deployment to Lebanon.
Timely Indonesian diplomacy also helped assure the battalion’s welcome. Foreign
Minister Hassan Wirayuda called on all the contending Lebanese parties when he
visited Beirut. He then went on to Damascus, which made no secret of its support of
the Hezbollah militia, to assure the Syrian leaders of Indonesia’s neutrality and good
intentions for the region. Indonesia’s active diplomatic mission in Beirut did whatever
troubleshooting was necessary to protect the soldiers from the incessant local political
crossfire.5

Although Israel initially objected to the Indonesians’ UNIFIL assignment because
Jakarta does not recognize the Jewish state, the Indonesians had little to fear from the
Israelis either. In one of their earliest involvements in U.N. peacekeeping they stepped
right in the middle of the Israeli-Arab conflict. They were part of the United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF II) (1973–1979), deployed to insure the withdrawal of all Israeli
troops from the Sinai Peninsula and to establish a buffer zone between the opposing
forces. The Indonesian contingent was forbidden formal contact with the Israelis but
its senior officer—who concurrently served as UNEF II commander—Indonesian Major
General Rais Abin, had no qualms about casually meeting his Israeli counterparts on
their side of the border. Rais proved to be an able soldier-diplomat. The Indonesians had
no trouble from the Israelis throughout their service with UNEF II.6

In Lebanon, more than 20 years later, the Indonesians were judged the most popu-
lar of the UNIFIL contingents by an opinion poll sponsored by the Hezbollah television
channel, Al Manar. They did it almost entirely on their own merits, proving once
again their natural inclination to get along well with civilians in their operational area.
This is an attitude that does not come easily to regular troops. The academic literature
warns that soldiers have to make a major transition in doctrine and conduct before
they can be effectively reassigned to peacekeeping duties. They have to shift from “no
contact” with civilians to intense interaction and cooperation with civilians, from
combat skills to negotiation skills, from an adversarial role to a pacifying role, from an
identifiable enemy to an impartial goal, from military victory to underlying conflict resolution and from forcible action to consent-based action.²⁷

**The TNI’s Long and Useful Experience in Civic Action**

Indonesian soldiers do not seem to need such a transition. Civil-military cooperation comes naturally to them, as it is part of their foundational doctrine. Serving in the United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC), Indonesian troops famously welcomed their Cambodian neighbors into their camp and shared their own food and medicine with them, while it was the practice of most of the other continents to keep the local people outside the wire. The TNI’s early history as a guerrilla force has taught it to rely on the support and goodwill of the civilian population. In Lebanon its soldiers are simply applying civil-military skills honed at home by its traditions of *dwifungsi* and *ABRI Masuk Desa*.⁸

One of the authors of this monograph visited the Indonesian contingent in Lebanon during the spring of 2008 and had a first-hand look at the TNI’s hearts-and-minds approach. When visiting a village for the first time the Indobatt commander seeks out the mochtar or village chief and asks if his soldiers can help repaint the village mosque or clear the irrigation canals. The soldiers offer their prayers at the Shiite mosques although the Muslims among them are Sunnis and thus on the opposite side of the Islamic theological divide. They have full-time Arabic translators everywhere they go but the many Arabic cognates in the Indonesian language makes communication a little easier for everyone. During the author’s visit he was shown numerous photographs of the results of this *bonhomie*—village chiefs inviting visiting patrols to have tea with them, soldiers playing with village children.

Italian Major General Claudio Graziano, the UNIFIL commander, has acknowledged that some of his patrols have been stoned or their progress blocked by angry residents. It is understandable why some villagers might be stricken by the sight of more men in battle dress, even if they wear blue helmets and ride in white-painted Renault armored cars. A Shiite parliamentarian has complained to UNIFIL of patrols that take pictures of “homes, fields and individuals, and practically anything moving…which frightens women and children.”⁹ To Indobatt’s credit it has never been the object of such stone throwing.

Although the contingent would not discuss its specific procedures, it has also done it has share of intelligence gathering for UNIFIL headquarters. Summing up his appraisal of how his soldiers performed, Colonel Surawahadi said he is thankful they all served well and finished their tour without a single casualty or breach of the peacekeeping rules. It was a good enough grade in a year when other countries’ contingents serving in U.N. peacekeeping operations elsewhere abused their welcome and betrayed their calling by sexually abusing children under their care.
A Commitment to U.N. Peacekeeping

Indonesia can only be pleased by the result of its peacekeeping effort in Lebanon. It has shown that it can sustain a battalion-sized overseas deployment for longer than a year; less than a fourth of the U.N.’s troop-contributing countries (tcc) have that capacity. Indonesian officials have spoken of committing as many as 2,000 soldiers and policemen to U.N. duties. Indonesia does not have a large enough military to challenge the top tccs, but if it delivers on that goal it could at least claim a place in their middle ranks. Indonesia is the largest Southeast Asian contributor to U.N. peacekeeping operations, but ranks only 24th in the world among all peacekeeping supporters.

There are financial incentives to U.N. troop contributions, which may be the one reason why developing countries with large armed forces can barely afford consistently top the tcc charts. The U.N. reimburses the tccs to the extent of $1,028 per soldier for every month he or she is on peacekeeping duty, plus $68 per soldier per month for personal clothing, gear and equipment. Each soldier earns a recreational leave allowance of $10.50 per day, for up to seven days of leave, after completing a six-month period in the mission. This is a windfall in benefits for individual soldiers in poorly paid Asian armies. If Indonesia has 2,000 peacekeepers serving in various U.N. missions that would mean $26.3 million in additional income for TNI officers and soldiers. The tccs, additionally, are compensated for the loan of their troops in hard currency.

A fresh Indonesian battalion has replaced Colonel Surawahadi’s command, which suggests that Jakarta will maintain its commitment to UNIFIL while its mandate lasts. After meeting with Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora in Dakar, President Yudhoyono offered an additional contribution of 75 military policemen to assist UNIFIL in criminal investigation and traffic control. And in September 2008 Indonesia deployed a 140-man formed police unit to support the U.N. humanitarian objectives in Darfur and has offered to deploy a military unit as well.

---

**Figure 10: Ranking Contributors to U.N. Peacekeeping Missions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank/Country</th>
<th>Number of Peacekeepers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pakistan</td>
<td>10,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bangladesh</td>
<td>9,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. India</td>
<td>8,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Indonesia</td>
<td>1,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Malaysia</td>
<td>708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Philippines</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (as of August 2008).
Armies can choose whether to form specialized stability and reconstruction units like the United States and Japan have done, or to make peacekeeping a service-wide core competency like Argentina has done. The TNI appears to following Argentina’s example of teaching peacekeeping disciplines to as many personnel as possible and across all service branches.12

Historically the bulk of Indonesia’s U.N. peacekeeping deployments have centered on units from Kostrad. The two UNIFIL task forces took most of its army strength from Kostrad, as did the three-battalion task force units deployed to Cambodia in the early 1990s. Thus Kostrad is the center of current peacekeeping planning and deployments, although training has expanded to other army units and schools as well as to the air force and navy. The composition of the newly-deployed Indonesian battalion task force suggests how the wealth is being spread around. Of the 850-man roster, 528 are from the army, 242 from the navy (mostly Marines), 60 from the air force, 16 from TNI headquarters, three from the Department of Foreign Affairs and one from the Department of Defense.

Another indication of the TNI’s intent to build on its Lebanon experience is the establishment of a permanent peacekeeping training center near its headquarters in the outskirts of Jakarta. The center’s first commander was a bright young brigadier general, Zahari Siregar, who won his first star faster than most other members of his academy class. In July 2008 he gained promotion to major general as well as a prestigious assignment as commander of Kostrad’s 2nd Division. This is a clear indicator to the army’s officer corps that U.N. peacekeeping experience is a powerful component of any officer’s career.

Can the TNI Cope with the Riskier Chapter VII Missions?
The TNI has demonstrated beyond doubt its ability to do what the literature calls “classical” peacekeeping, or as it has been practiced under the common understanding of Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter (“Pacific Settlement of Disputes”). Essential to this kind of operation is the impartiality of the peacekeepers and presumption that the intervention has the consent of all the disputants, and that the peacekeepers can use force only in self-defense. Sensitive to its long-held policy of non-alignment, Indonesia has expressed a preference to contribute peacekeepers only under Chapter VI authority.

But the relatively non-violent conditions presumed by Chapter VI no longer apply to many of the emergencies to which the U.N. is obliged to respond. Indeed, peace scholars describe most of the current U.N. peacekeeping operations as “Chapter VI and a half” to take account of the resistance encountered by the blue helmets and the violence that has caused them numerous casualties. A total of 116 peacekeepers have been killed since January 2007, including ten who perished in a single helicopter crash
Technically, the U.N. Security Council has never invoked Chapter vi to justify the dispatch of peacekeepers. Indeed, if the Security Council has to invoke a legal basis for dispatching peacekeepers, it would be more inclined to do so under the more intrusive Chapter vii (“Action with Respect to Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”).

Jakarta can no longer assume that the peacekeepers it places under the U.N. banner will operate under relatively non-violent Chapter vi conditions. Sudan, where 140 of its police personnel are serving, is certainly one of those more dangerous places. It is fair to ask whether Indonesian authorities are training soldiers and policemen bound for U.N. assignments well enough to handle their enforcement duties as well as their humanitarian ones. In Cambodia the Indonesian contingent’s otherwise praiseworthy record was tainted by reports of its lack of toughness in the face of local opposition. Unlike the well-equipped and well-armed Dutch battalion, a Western observer wrote, the Indonesians were “more passive when threatened.” Thirty of them were forced by the Khmer Rouge to give up their weapons and go the latter’s headquarters where they were held prisoners for five days. The Malaysian contingent, in contrast, was feared by the Khmer Rouge but they also proved adaptable by learning the Khmer language and developing a relationship with Khmer elements.

The contrast in operational craft between the Indonesia and Malaysia was also manifest in southern Lebanon, where one contingent plays the good cop and the other the bad cop. The Indonesians, with their excellent intercultural people skills, have a specific geographical area of operations for which they are responsible. The smaller 362-man Malaysian contingent has no aor of its own but rather serves as a rapid reaction force in the event of an attack against any element of UNIFIL.

A Mission Worthy of U.S. Support
The U.S. is supporting the tni’s return to U.N. peacekeeping operations with a fresh source of funding called the Global Peace Operations Initiative (gpoi). The gpoi is a multilateral, five-year program launched by the Group of Eight. Its objective is to train and equip 75,000 soldiers, most of them African, for peacekeeping operations by 2010. The U.S. is the leading contributor to the gpoi, but France, the U.K., and other European donors have their own bilateral training programs for African militaries. In 2005 the State Department opened the scope of the program to benefit other countries beyond Africa. Bangladesh, Malaysia, Mongolia and Thailand were the first Asian beneficiaries, although assistance for the Thai military was temporarily suspended between 2006 and 2008 because of its coup against the elected civilian government.

The $2 million bill for shipping Indonesia’s military vehicles to Lebanon in 2006 was charged to the gpoi’s Transportation and Logistics Support Arrangement. pacom has planned as much as $12.7 million more through the 2010 fiscal year to support the
TNI’s efforts to rebuild its peacekeeping capacity. Most of the funds are earmarked for training but some will also be spent on equipment. The program has the option of sending TNI trainees to well-established centers like Malaysia’s Port Dickson facility. But in the long run the better investment is helping the TNI equip and staff its own peacekeeping training center. The U.S. country team in Jakarta was preparing to do just that, but lost the prospective funding for unexplained reasons. When this study was being researched, the TNI’s facility, officially called the TNI Peacekeeping Mission Center, consisted only of a nearly empty building. Most of the training is done at the TNI’s Education and Training Command in Bandung or at the bases from which contingent elements will be drawn.

The U.S.-supported training follows standard U.N. guidelines but eventually it should be expanded to include the tactics and craft required for the more “muscular” kind of peacekeeping increasingly in demand in Africa and the Middle East. Its objectives would include the separation and disarming of warring parties, the protection of safe havens, and the military-assisted delivery of humanitarian relief. Such an approach to peacekeeping might require Indonesian peacekeepers to adjust their peacekeeping doctrine and training to meet the increasing difficulties and dangers of this calling.

To this point this discussion has focused on the Indonesian side of the bilateral security relationship. How is it likely seen from the U.S. side? If recent experience is illustrative of the challenges involved, the biggest ones lie in the ability of both sides to communicate with each other and bring their policies and resources to bear on their common objectives.

Notes
1. TNI names its peacekeeping contingents after the legendary Indonesian winged beast, the Garuda, and numbers them in the order in which they are sent. The Lebanon deployment is thus the TNI’s 23rd peacekeeping mission. The letter after the number identifies each cohort of troops carrying out the mission. Thus Garuda XXIII-A is the first cohort, Garuda XXIII-B its replacement, and so on.
2. The reorganized U.N. force is also called UNIFIL II to distinguish it from an earlier, much smaller force that was entrusted by UNSC Resolutions 425 and 426 to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in 1978. The 2,000-soldier force could not stop a second Israeli invasion in 1982 and again was helpless to prevent the short but extremely destructive Israeli-Hezbollah war in the summer of 2006. UNIFIL II, called up to enforce UNSC Resolution 1701, is a larger 13,000-man force, predominantly European in support of France’s historic equities in Lebanon (although its largest contingent is an Italian brigade and the force commander is the Italian Major General Claudio Graziano). The addition of the Indonesian and Malaysian contingents softens the all too obvious European character of the mission and makes it more acceptable to the predominantly Muslim population of southern Lebanon.
5. See Eduardo Lachica, “Jakarta’s Foray Into Armed Diplomacy,” *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 170 No. 5, June 2007 for an account of how the UNIFIL contribution may lends credibility to Indonesia’s efforts to be part of the Middle East peace process.


8. *Dwifungsi*, the New Order doctrine of concurrent military and political functions, was abandoned by the TNI soon after Suharto left office, but the tradition of civic action in the villages (*ABRI Masuk Desa*) survives in both tactical and territorial units.


10. As of June 2008, by the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations count, the top ten TCCs were Pakistan 10,569, Bangladesh 9,136, India 8,896, Nigeria 5,232, Ghana 3,251, Jordan 3,072, Rwanda 2,988, Italy 2,779, and Senegal 2,129. Indonesia ranked 18th with 1,094 personnel.


12. Worboys, *Armed Forces & Society*. The author reports that the Argentine army’s doctrinal embrace of an international peacekeeping mission has had the beneficial effect of turning its attention away from domestic politics.

13. From remarks by Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations, to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, March 10, 2008. Altogether 2,440 U.N. peacekeepers have given their lives in this service since its inception.

14. For an official explanation of how the U.N. asserts its intervention authority, see “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines.” Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Operations, United Nations, 2008. The document warns that linking U.N. operations with a particular U.N. chapter would be “misleading” and advises troop-contributing countries to be guided by “the tasks assigned by the UNSC mandate, the concept of operations and accompanying mission Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the military component and the Directives on the Use of Force (DUF) for the police component.”


17. Briefing, PACOM, Honolulu, HI, June 3, 2008.


19. Christopher Dankerer and James Gow call this approach “second generation: or “strategic” peacekeeping, in which some degree of consent by the parties at dispute is required but less than what is needed for traditional peacekeeping. From Erwin A. Schmidl, editor, *Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping*, London, Portland, Frank Cass, 2000.
Chapter 7
Managing the Security Relationship: A Model for Interagency Teamwork

Key Points—Interagency Cooperation to Manage the Security Relationship

- Tempo of U.S. engagement slows down due to TNI resource constraints
- U.S. helps stand up a new Indonesian defense university
- U.S. needs to regain the trust of the Indonesian armed forces
- A multi-agency U.S. effort improves surveillance in Indonesian waters
- U.S. assistance likely to be more “software” than “hardware” oriented

The U.S. lifted sanctions against the TNI in 2005 and revived arms sales, training programs, sea exercises and other bilateral activities that make up a normal military-to-military relationship. The Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) at the American Embassy in Jakarta manages the U.S. security assistance program under the supervision of the defense attaché and Ambassador. The size of the security assistance organization has varied over the years, depending on the size of the various programs being administered, and it has had several names—the Defense Liaison Group through 1981, the Office of the Military Attaché for Defense Programs, through the late 1990s, and since then called the ODC.

The relationship between the defense attaché and the chief of security assistance has always been very good, even as its status ranged from a separate office (through 1981 and again from 1994 to 2008) and as a subordinate office under the supervision of the defense attaché (1981 through 1994). A worldwide reorganization has again placed the ODC under the supervision of the defense attaché.¹ This organizational format is
the best possible, since it combines defense policy and security assistance in one office, under one experienced senior military officer. The current 

ODC has nearly doubled in size from its nadir in strength in the early 2000s; it is now up to 16 people, including four U.S. military personnel. It has set strategic objectives that are ambitious but achievable, assuming the 

TNI’s determination to complete its internal reforms and the constancy and staying power of U.S. policies.2

These objectives remain, but practical limitations have slowed the U.S. effort a step or two. The 2008 calendar of military-to-military engagements, originally set at 140 events, will probably be reduced to less than a hundred. For 2009 the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is setting a more realistic target of 98 events.3 Analysts in both Hawaii and Jakarta emphasize that the goal is quality rather than quantity in planning these events. Thus, these scalebacks do not signal a weakening of resolve or effort on the part of the relationship managers. But they expose the rust that still clogs the mechanism after more than a decade of virtual neglect. Washington’s objections to the participation of the Indonesian Army’s Special Forces Command in a joint exercise not only forced its abrupt cancellation but also caused the TNI to hit back at the U.S. by pulling out of a number of other events (the JCEF controversy is covered in Chapter 3). The TNI also had reasons for requesting a curtailed schedule, as they had to beg off from participation in some events because the number of events exceeded personnel available to participate as well as cases of inadequate resources or preparation.4

A lack of trust on both sides continues to be a limiting factor. “The Indonesians still wonder about us, whether we can be a reliable partner,” a U.S. official mused aloud.5 To gain a full degree of mutual trust takes patient, resolute diplomacy on the part of the United States. It also requires Jakarta’s understanding and acceptance of the political complexities of U.S. policy-making, and that can only come with time. The mission is not only affected by Washington’s legalistic bureaucracy and turf-fighting but also by the difficulties of dealing with Jakarta’s tribalistic defense structure. There is no one-stop shop to go to. The Indonesian Defense Department and TNI headquarters have separate “dialogues” with the U.S. because each could well have different priorities if not agendas. Just as in the U.S. armed forces, one cannot assume that the three services are always in synch with each other.6

The U.S. Country Team in Jakarta is making the necessary adjustments. The tempo of relationship-building is settling down to a slower but surer pace. The amount of U.S. security assistance is now being dictated by the TNI’s absorptive capacity as well as the availability of U.S. deliverables.

Counterterrorism, the underlying justification for most of this assistance, remains the primary U.S. mission even though it has become less prominent in the public discourse. For most Indonesians the worst of the terrorist threat is behind them. This is not an entirely unreasonable attitude as Indonesia has already jailed or convicted more
than 400 members or sympathizers of the Islamic terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah and other extremist cells—a record of success that can be attributable as well to U.S. and Australian assistance. Indonesia, in deference to the sentiments of its Muslim majority, is taking a softer approach towards JI, treating captured activists humanely and, in exchange for lighter punishment, encouraging them to disavow their violent cause or share information that could lead to capture of other terrorists.7

A High-Maintenance Relationship

The security cooperation agenda for Indonesia is essentially the joint product of the U.S. Defense Department’s Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, PACOM, and the U.S. Embassy’s Defense Attaché Office (DAO) and ODC, with some input from the State Department’s Bureau of Political and Military Affairs and other agencies. Although the U.S. president is at the top of the chain of command, Indonesian security affairs rarely get up to the level where they have to be attended to by the National Security Council. Higher level attention in Washington, of course, could help bridge policy differences and overcome resource constraints; as such attention was lacking the middle and operational levels have to improvise as best as they can.

A major limitation, of course, is how much resources the U.S. Congress is willing to appropriate for the purpose; until recently the amounts available were well below what was needed to rebuild the relationship. To the extent the program has succeeded, it has largely been the result of the initiative and resourcefulness of the hands-on managers.

The relationship is reviewed at a senior policy-making level through the Indonesia-U.S. Strategic Dialogue (IUSSD), which brings the Pentagon’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Southeast Asian Affairs and the Indonesian Defense Department’s Director-General for Strategy together every year.8 The U.S. offer to help start up a new Indonesian Defense University sprang out of the April 2008 IUSSD meeting (see Chapter 3). The widening agenda of the IUSSD, formerly a rather pro forma affair, reflects Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s efforts to upgrade the quality of the security dialogue with major ASEAN countries, in some cases from scratch. Similar partnership-strengthening events are on the calendar with the Philippines and Vietnam; recently the first strategic dialogue was held with Malaysia. The IUSSD process should be retained by the incoming U.S. administration, as it takes focuses on the “big picture” and encourages creative thinking at the senior policy-making level.

The agenda is also laid out to meet PACOM’s operational requirements, which include exercising its expeditionary forces, exchanging intelligence, and establishing and maintaining personal contacts with the Indonesian military. In that respect both the DAO and the ODC serve as implementing agencies for the Honolulu-based combatant command. But the agenda also depends on the Country Team’s determination of what programs can work and what the Indonesians will accept. This is how they earn their keep, as the
Indonesian political structure is ridden with sharply conflicting interests and can be maddeningly difficult to deal with. Yet this relationship continues to improve.

PACOM is reshaping its Indonesian engagement to take the TNI’s resource limitations into account, and to be more responsive to its non-traditional security concerns like disaster management and resources protection. Two of PACOM’s non-combat agencies, the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance and the Multilateral Planning Augmentation Team, are specifically staffed to attend to these concerns. The command’s J5 staff handles policy issues throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and coordinates the many other staff elements with programs affecting Indonesia. The command’s J45 staff deals specifically with security assistance programs. Both staff offices have desk officers for Indonesia, and coordinate closely to insure policy and operational support mesh well. At the same time, U.S. national-level planners are adding more multilateral exercises to the agenda to accommodate Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ desire to engage Indonesia in ways other than the traditional “hub-and-spokes” template but without weakening bilateral ties.9

**Emphasis on Lift Capacity and Sustainability**

On balance, given the existing constraints, the programs are returning good value even though no major weapons packages are yet being discussed. Defense Minister Sudarsono has declared the government will have no money to buy any new fighter planes and submarines for the next five years. But the door is open for Indonesia to buy more C-130 transport planes and the current FMF plan is heavy on technical support to keep the Indonesian air force’s remaining C-130s and F-16 jet fighters in flyable condition. The air force continues to be the only Indonesian buyer of American equipment on cash or commercial credit terms. The current order book adds up to $39.7 million, including $15 million for C-130 spare parts and $9.5 million to upgrade a propeller shop and a maintenance depot in Bandung.10 “Their interest is no longer in pointy-nosed aircraft [jet fighters] but in expanding lift capacity,” observed a senior analyst at the U.S. Pacific Air Forces Headquarters (PACAF) in Hawaii. “If PACAF has a say in this it would be to advocate improving maintenance of existing systems rather than adding new ones to the inventory.”11 Currently, the Russian-delivered Sukhois are the TNI-au’s show horses but U.S. officials believe that once it has enough money to buy “pointy-nosed” planes again it would consider F-16s because they come with a more reliable and convenient maintenance package.

**Strengthening Cooperation in Non-Combat Missions**

With no more armed insurgencies left for the TNI to fight, the two sides have agreed to refocus security cooperation on what conventional doctrine calls military operations other than war, and especially on managing preparations for disaster relief operations,
maritime security, and international peacekeeping. Since 2007 many of the U.S.-Indonesia bilateral exercises have addressed readiness for these kinds of missions.

The U.S. Coast Guard has joined the three other U.S. service branches in helping train Indonesian counterparts. A special Coast Guard skill that Indonesian sailors are learning quickly is what their tutors call visit, board, search and seizure operations. In a recent exercise a Coast Guard maritime safety and security team showed how it is done. A suspicious-looking ship is hailed and asked to stop. A boarding party climbs up its Jacob’s ladder and makes a sweep of the cabins and cargo to make sure the ship carries no contraband or undocumented passengers. There is a code for the use of force depending on the degree of active resistance by the ship’s crew. This is a useful skill for the Indonesian navy to have, as every day there are ships and boats entering Indonesian waters that could be associated with criminal activity.

The TNI will focus on these types of non-traditional capabilities for the foreseeable future. Speaking to foreign news correspondents in Jakarta, Defense Minister Sudarsono said “Our focus is on transport ships, transport aircraft, transport vehicles because the role of the defence force is more of an emergency response to help Indonesians affected by natural disasters, man-made disasters.”

Relations with the TNI Service Branches
There are perceptible differences in the way the U.S. relates with the three Indonesian services. The Indonesian Marine Corps (Korps Marinir—Kormar) is the clear favorite. They are enthusiastic about exercising with their American counterparts. The air force is the next easiest for the U.S. to deal with. It is the most internationally-exposed service (English is the language of international aviation). The army is hardest of the services for U.S. officers to deal with. They can find few friends there of late. They are reminded too often of the “lost generation” of TNI officers who were denied funding for IMET funded educational opportunities during the embargo years from 1992 to the early 2000s. U.S. contacts with the army are generally productive, but they can get chilly if incidents such as the JCEP cancellation continue to occur.

The Marine Corps: The Crowd Favorite
The Kormar is probably the favorite branch of military service in the eyes of the Indonesia populace. They are viewed as more relaxed in their relations with the people. Even when used in crowd control situations—as was the case, for example, during the 1998 violence in Jakarta surrounding the forced resignation of Suharto—the crowds were more likely to put roses in Marine Corps rifles than retreat in alarm, as they would do in the face of police or army troops. Marine Corps relief operations in western Aceh at the time of the 2004 tsunami also earned them great credit for their effectiveness, discipline and hard work.
Unlike the more autonomous U.S. Marines, the Kormar is a subordinate command of the Indonesian navy, which tends to take care of its needs before looking after the Marines’, so they are literally at the bottom of the TNI food chain. The U.S. Marines, though, treat the Kormar like brothers. In their joint exercises both sides can truly say they learn from each other. The U.S. Marines show the Indonesians their techniques in “satellite patrolling”—using GPS devices to maneuver in a hostile urban environment. They learn, in turn, how the Kormar stay bunched up during jungle patrols to avoid members getting lost in the thick undergrowth while avoiding becoming an easy target for an ambush. For the Kormar, who lack such equipment, it is a thrill to storm a beach on U.S. Marine air-cushioned landing craft in simulated attacks on terrorist bases. Once the Third Marine Expeditionary Force completes its relocation to Guam, they will look towards Indonesia for more opportunities to match their skills with their Indonesian brothers-in-arms.

Rebuilding Readiness in the Air Force

PACAF is conscious of the need for active personal ties with the TNI-AU; in the event of a regional contingency it would help to know the ability of its pilots and the capability of their aircraft. During the U.S. arms embargo the air force was denied replacement parts for its dwindling fleet of C-130 transport planes and other U.S.-origin aircraft. Among the one-star or two-star officers, there may still be some ill will towards the United States carried over from the embargo years, but the younger officers tend to be free of this attitude and seek a closer partnership with their U.S. peers for professional reasons. This fraternal spirit was evident when American and Indonesian aviators worked together with the Singapore air force in bringing relief to the survivors of the 2004 tsunami disaster. It came to the fore again when both services cooperated in bringing supplies to victims of the cyclone that devastated the Irrawaddy Delta in Burma. Among the three service branches the air force has the least number of joint events in this military relationship, so there is interest on both sides in having more of these, especially if these involve in-flight exercises.

Re-Engagement with the Army

The army remains the strongest and largest of the Indonesian service branches, and will remain so for the long term. The army was the primary target of the U.S. restrictions in the 1990s because of its poor human rights record, particularly in East Timor. Ironically, those restrictions had the least effect on the army’s readiness posture—the air force and the navy were far more adversely affected even though there were precious few allegations against either service. However, the army suffered most in the field of education and training and familiarity with the U.S. military, as the U.S. historically has had far more contacts with the army than with either of the other services.
Aware of the need to rebuild their relations with the TNI and especially with the army, the Country Team is encouraging a U.S. military personnel assignment policy that maintains a steady stream of American officers in attendance at Indonesian military service command and staff schools. For the first time in years the U.S. has seats in the command and staff schools of all three Indonesian services; the newly assigned Chief of the ODC in Jakarta was the first U.S. graduate of the TNI’s joint command and general staff school (Sesko TNI). The revised IMET Program continues to recognize the army’s traditional dominance in the allotment of schoolhouse seats. For 2009 the army will get 16 seats in comparison with 10 for the navy and four for the air force (not counting the army officers among the 11 set aside for TNI headquarters and the Department of Defense). Given the far greater size of the army, this is a reasonable apportionment of IMET seats.

While the army will continue to receive the largest number of IMET education spaces, it has the least amount of person-to-person training iterations. This is largely attributable to the April 2008 JCET cancellation (refer to Chapter 3), which the army took as a slap in the face. This contretemps will take careful diplomacy to repair, and will also need a more enlightened policy from Congressional critics.

While the issue of re-engagement with Kopassus simmers, a more positive venue for in-country training may lie with Kostrad. The largest of the army’s tactical commands, and with its units scattered across Java and Sulawesi, Kostrad would seem to offer an ideal combination of justifications for increased training contacts. Kostrad is not a controversial subject in the political relationship between the two countries, and the many types of units under its command (infantry, airborne, engineer, artillery, etc) make it an ideal partner for teaching and learning soldierly skills. Its commander is eager for more training opportunities with the U.S. Given the likelihood of continued reliance on Kostrad personnel for its international peacekeeping mission (see Chapter 6), U.S. engagement with Kostrad fulfills a variety of mission-essential training opportunities.

Making Up with the Navy
The navy also requires careful handling. It complains that U.S. law has affected it adversely and unfairly. The long U.S. ban on arms sales to Indonesia has hurt the navy and the air force more than it did the army—whose record of human rights abuses the measure presumably was intended to punish. The navy was denied spare parts for the Claud Jones-class frigates and LSTs it had gotten earlier from the United States, causing many of these ships to be decommissioned. One navy chief of staff, who blamed the U.S. for being an undependable supplier, arbitrarily cancelled a number of joint exercises. The navy had one other, more internal reason for declining to show up: it was ashamed of its own incapacity. “We come in big ships and they have nothing to match what we bring,” observed a U.S. Pacific Fleet planner.
It is equally hard for the U.S. to get the Indonesian navy to exercise with the Malaysian and Singapore navies because the Indonesians fear being humiliated by their neighbors’ superior warships and seamanship. The TNI-AL cannot receive foreign ship visits at its own bases because the docks are cluttered with unserviceable ships that cannot be easily moved, and the lack of ship-provisioning facilities. For these practical reasons all foreign ship visits are done in commercial ports.

The Indonesian navy’s limitations often show up at the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s annual series of bilateral exercises, called Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT), with the armed forces of six Southeast Asian nations. In the 2007 event a U.S. Navy task force made a multi-stop cruise through the region. Composed of the dock landing ship USS Harpers Ferry and the guided missile frigates USS Jarrett and USS Ford, the task force began the exercise in the Philippines and then moved on sequentially to Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and Indonesia. There were exercises at each stop, intended to help the host nations hone their skills at combating seaborne threats like piracy, port robberies, drug smuggling, human trafficking and terrorism. The CARAT exercises have benefits for the U.S. navy too, not the least of which is the opportunity to attain a higher degree of interoperability with Southeast Asian armed forces.

In the Philippines Philippine Navy helicopter pilots earned their deck-landing qualifications by landing on the USS Harpers Ferry flight deck while the ship was underway. The exercise also simulated an attack on a terrorist group with U.S. and Philippine marines sending swimmers to secure a beach before storming it aboard combat rubber reconnaissance craft. Ten Thai officers embarked on the Harpers Ferry and the Ford and had a week of at-sea exercises with the crews of those ships while enroute to Thailand’s Sattatip naval base. The Malaysian phase also allowed 140 Malaysian Marines to experience life at sea aboard the Harpers Ferry. The Singapore exercise was arguably the most comprehensive of them all, combining land, sea and air operations, including maritime interdiction, surface gunnery and diving and salvage operations.

Compared to the preceding exercises, Indonesia’s 2007 CARAT event was disappointing, limited as it was to pierside activities in Jakarta’s commercial port of Tanjung Priok, without the usual at-sea stages. The Indonesian exercise was renamed Naval Engagement Activity (NEA) in recognition of its more modest objectives.

The 2008 NEA was an improvement over the previous year’s one, with sea exercises that brought participants to Surabaya and two other sites in East Java. It gave the Indonesian navy its first opportunity to practice the use of the CENTRIXS system, which enables two or more different navies to exchange electronic data and “internet-chat” communications while engaging in operations. Among other things, this and similar experiences argue for providing the Indonesian navy with technical assistance in logistics, ship maintenance and repair, and in rehabilitating some of its seaborne command and control and operational surveillance systems.
Other sailor-to-sailor events have increased. In May 2008, for example, the U.S. Seventh Fleet flagship USS Blue Ridge visited Jakarta. The Fleet’s Commander, Vice Admiral Doug Crowder, hosted Indonesian navy officers and the Jakarta press corps aboard his flagship for an orientation briefing. “Indonesia is an active participant in the Pacific Command security cooperation programs, which include exercises, regional workshops and seminars promoting security issues,” he said. “We are happy to be here and to strengthen our military relationship with Indonesia and also to get a better understanding of the local culture.”

The current tni-AL leadership appears to be interested in a good working relationship with the United States, which should be enough reason to maintain a regular schedule of bilateral events with this service, despite the occasional letdowns. An apparent misapprehension on the part of the Indonesian navy that it is being discriminated against or neglected by U.S. policy should be corrected. More personnel exchanges would help. The U.S. could also insure that the Indonesian navy continues to receive annual quotas for its mid-career officers to attend the U.S. Naval Command and General Staff College and Naval War College.

A Naval Partnership in Oceanographic Mapping

One undertaking in which the U.S. and Indonesian navies have had a successful partnership for decades involves the complex scientific work of oceanographic survey and mapping. The two countries marked the 30th anniversary of this cooperation in February 2008 by the Jakarta visit of the USNS Mary Sears, the current U.S. participant in this mission.

The first U.S.-Indonesia joint hydrographic survey was conducted in 1978. Since then the cooperative program partnering the U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office (navo) with the Indonesian Navy Hydrographic and Oceanographic Service (janhidros) has carried out more than 200 survey and mapping missions in Indonesian waters. The products include three-dimensional underwater maps as well as measurements of water temperature, salinity, and ocean current measurement—all essential to safe naval operations. Both navies also benefit tactically in surface as well as submarine navigation from better knowledge of tidal currents and sea bottom.

At the 30th anniversary celebration Rear Admiral Willem Rampangilei, the JANHIDROS Chief, lauded this long standing cooperative program, saying that it has “led to increased safety of navigation, safety at sea, as well as the protection of our maritime environment.”

The USNS Mary Sears also helped the Indonesian navy locate the “black box” and aircraft wreckage of the ill-fated Adam Air passenger jet that crashed into the sea off Sulawesi in January 2007. The ship’s crew located the wreckage and “black box” in waters around 2,000 meters deep. An unusual ship with an uncommon crew, the Mary
Sears is manned by civilian mariners, contract employees of the U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command. Nine scientists from NAVO conduct the ship’s scientific activities.

Securing the Tri-Border Area

The U.S. Country Team’s largest and the most creative enterprise yet is aimed at helping Indonesia secure the vital waterways it shares with its neighbors with a combination of radar surveillance, police boat patrols, and port and border security. It alleviates Indonesia’s concerns about the insecurity of its maritime resources; at the same time it strengthens assets that support the U.S. missions of counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and combating transnational crime.

The first phase of this project, now virtually complete, consists of a string of radar stations on the Indonesian side of the Malacca strait that complements a similar radar array on the Malaysian side. The Malaysians installed their radar stations with their own money but most of the Indonesian radar equipment was acquired through a combination of U.S. Defense Department and State Department funds. The second phase will extend the surveillance network to both sides of the Sulawesi Sea as part of what U.S. planners call the Southeast Asian Tri-Border Initiative (SATI). Setting up this regional picket line could cost more than $50 million, not counting the contributions of Indonesia and its neighbors, before it becomes fully operational sometime in 2009.

If the project succeeds in its stated goals it could be counted as a rare triumph for U.S. military diplomacy in this region. Its history dates back to a proposal made in 2004 by then-PACOM commander Admiral Thomas Fargo to organize a coalition-of-the-willing to protect maritime traffic through the Malacca Strait and other international waterways against the threat of piracy and terrorism. The proposal was initially misinterpreted as one that would post U.S. military units to guard the straits, leading to sharp assertions of sovereignty rights by both Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta. Some creative fence-mending by PACOM later resulted in the littoral states agreeing to the alternative of lining both sides of the strait with radar stations, some to be U.S.-supplied, but the entire network to be operated by the littoral states themselves. These states also retain the exclusive responsibility to patrol the Strait with Singapore’s robust assistance at the southern end of the strait. Technically, Singapore is not a “littoral” state with special rights to the strait but one with as much at stake in its security as Malaysia or Indonesia.

This solution just about finesses all the objections to the original Fargo proposal. Indonesia already had a few radar stations operating in the strait before 2004 so the U.S. can appropriately say that it is just enlarging and modernizing what originally has been an Indonesian enterprise. All the U.S. program did was to “upgrade old equipment and bring in new ones,” a U.S. planner says. Nevertheless, shortcomings on the Indonesian side in terms of trained personnel and an effective command, control and communica-
tions system to utilize and share the radar information should be addressed in future assistance packages. Indeed, upgrading information-sharing and operational readiness across the board should be major objectives for navy cooperation.

The first phase is generally considered to be a success, with the number of piracy incidents down by more than half. Early assessments of the terrorist threat in the Malacca Strait appear to have been exaggerated; there have been no indications so far of any group planning to attack shipping for political reasons. The tri-border zone, however, is judged to be a more dangerous place. It is a porous, poorly watched and crime prone subregion encompassing the 110,000-square mile Sulawesi Sea in the south and the 110,00-square mile Sulu Sea in the north. A recent Rand Corporation study reported that the “Sulawesi-Mindanao arc” serves as a corridor for the transit of Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists between safe houses and training camps in southern Philippines and their areas of operation in Indonesia. The underfunded Indonesian and Philippine navies have had no capacity to patrol these waters effectively, making them a haven for smugglers, drug traffickers and terrorist groups. Tellingly, the two navies cannot “talk to each other” in the operational sense, or exchange real-time data. Much still depends on personal relationships between Filipino and Indonesian commanders and intelligence officers to get things done.

![Figure 11: U.S.-Assisted Surveillance of the Tri-Border Passages](image)

(Neighboring and adjoining countries not pictured.)

Note: The large circles represent actual or proposed U.S.-provided radar installations on the Indonesian side of the Malacca Strait and on both sides of the Sulawesi (Celebes) Sea. The squares represent proposed sites of communication centers supporting the surveillance system. Placement of radar stations and proposed communication centers is approximate.
Much attention has been made of the fact that the bulk of East Asia’s energy supplies are delivered by supertankers through the Malacca strait. What is less known is that the behemoths in this fleet that are too large to navigate the shallow Malacca Strait take the alternate route through the Lombok Strait and the Makassar Strait and into the Sulawesi and Sulu Seas on their way to Japan or China. Large U.S. naval vessels also use the latter routes, making safety of navigation an important security interest for the U.S. as well. The tri-border area thus has nearly as much importance to the safety of navigation in the region as the Malacca Strait.26

At the start there were some difficulties getting agreement on the location of the radar stations for the second phase of the U.S. program. The Indonesian navy, which showed little interest in SATI’s counterterrorism mission, wanted the stations sited further east where they could help deter illegal fishing, smuggling and other criminal activity. The U.S. team prevailed, however, so Phase Two is underway without any further hitches. The program calls for a chain of sophisticated coastal sensors around northern Kalimantan and northern Sulawesi to monitor boat traffic through the southern entrance to the Sulu Sea. These sensors, called integrated maritime surveillance systems, have a radar range of 25 nautical miles and a camera range of 15 miles. They can track virtually all of the normal traffic along these coasts. Malaysia is providing similar radar coverage of the waterways on the Sabah side of northwestern Borneo. A cooperative Philippine effort, called Coast Watch South, would provide maritime and aerial surveillance of the Sulu Sea from the southern tip of Palawan to Davao on the eastern side of Mindanao.27 Both Malaysia and the Philippines are getting U.S. assistance for these actions, in the hope that they can join Indonesia in making this informal trilateral arrangement work.

Marine Police Patrols
The Indonesian Marine Police will back up the radar surveillance network using high-speed boats supplied under an ICTAP program. The Indonesian police have 15 of these modified Defender-class boats, similar to those used by the U.S. Coast Guard. These 31-foot-long, foam-collared craft, built by Safe Boats International of Port Orchard, Washington, are nearly perfect for the Marine Police’s needs. They have a range of 225 nautical miles, which puts them in reach of most maritime traffic in the Makassar Strait. At a top speed approaching 40 knots at hour, they can run down the fastest boats used by pirates and smugglers.

Five of them are based in Tarakan, in northeastern Kalimantan, from where lawless elements can without notice slip through by boat into Philippine or Malaysian waters inside of an hour. The Marine Police will base another four of those boats in Bitung, near Manado in northern Sulawesi, where these units can check on traffic on the eastern side of the Sulawesi Sea. The Marine Police are detailing two of the
Bitung-based boats to Sangihe Island, north of the northeastern tip of Sulawesi and just a short boat ride away from Philippine territory, for four months a year. Here they conduct missions against transnational crime as well as counterterrorism missions with personnel from the crack counterterrorist Detachment 88 aboard. Another quarter of these boats already operates from Batam Island in the Riau Archipelago near Singapore. Their crews already had some success interdicting trade in illegal logs and catching undocumented migrants.28 The tri-border initiative also calls for “fusion centers” to be set up in Manado, Batam, Surabaya, and at the Marine Police Command Information Center in Jakarta to gather and analyze intelligence gathered by the surveillance network.

Is this investment paying off? ICTAP believes it does although the results are still admittedly modest. In less than one year the Marine Police Special Boat unit has already seized more than $8 million in illicit cargo, illegal fish catches and pirated property, not to mention intercepting several attempts at human trafficking.29 The U.S., however, has neither the authority nor the responsibility for making sure that the Marine Police work seamlessly with the Indonesian navy and other agencies with similar maritime responsibilities. Whether U.S.-funded “fusion centers” can facilitate intelligence sharing and mission coordination has yet to be demonstrated.

The Indonesian government plans to build radar stations in its easternmost regions, even though they would operate outside the SATI system. Two of the proposed sites are at Timika and Merauke on the southern coast of Irian Jaya. The apparent objective is to put extra sensors on the Arafura Sea where Indonesia and Australia are cooperating to curb illegal fishing.30

Despite some initial difficulties getting its Asian partners on board, SATI demonstrates the value of the kind of multilateralism increasingly favored by the U.S. in this region. Defense Secretary Robert Gates described that approach as “more cooperation among our allies and security partners—more multilateral ties rather than hubs and spokes,” without weakening bilateral ties.31 SATI might have started out as a hub-and-spoke initiative but it is evolving into a multilateral arrangement as Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines work out trilateral cooperation agreements among each other.

A Total Team Effort
The tri-border initiative is a product of an unusual and highly praiseworthy exercise in interagency cooperation. The Defense Department, the State Department and other federal agencies have set aside bureaucratic rivalries to agree on a single undertaking. They have pulled resources from various pots of money to get it going. The committee of U.S. Embassy officials who run it, called the Maritime Security Coordinating Group, has neither a recognized hierarchy nor a chairman, although many important bureaucratic interests are at play here.
The Defense Attaché is the senior military representative in Jakarta but he also reports to the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Office of Defense Cooperation is the executive arm of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency but it also serves PACOM’s strategic objectives for the region. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has a Washington-side perspective on how the department’s resources should be spent. The Justice Department is represented by ICTAP as well as by the Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF West) through the Drug Enforcement Agency. The embassy’s economic section looks after port security for the group while the political section is responsible for communicating with other stakeholders in the U.S. government and international counterparts. Gerald Heuett Jr., the U.S. mission’s law enforcement adviser and manager of ICTAP program, calls this exercise in interagency cooperation “the best I’ve ever seen in my 25 years in government.”

The tri-border initiative grew out of the conventional decision chain, although creative adjustments were made along the way. As is usually the case, the process began with an Indonesian request for assistance—in this case, for maritime surveillance. The ODC came up with a proposal of 10 radar stations on the Indonesian side of the Malacca Strait and another seven for the Sulawesi Sea. The proposal suited PACOM’s strategic priorities so it was sent to the Defense Department for funding. The Pentagon approved the funding and designated its electronic warfare specialist, the San Diego-based Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), as the implementing agency. SPAWAR in turn contracted out the installation to Techno-Sciences Inc. (TSI), a Beltsville, Maryland firm that had already sold maritime surveillance radars to the Malaysian armed forces.

TSI has not only had to set up the radar antenna arrays on 11-meter towers and build the housing for the control consoles, it also had to teach the Indonesian navy how to operate the system. It works the same way air traffic controllers tag and monitor passing or arriving aircraft. All the legitimate shipping passing the strait are required to have automatic identification system devices that can be recognized by the surveillance radar. Vessels without an AIS signal are queried and, if necessary, asked to stop for investigation by the marine police or coast guard. “It has the same kind of deterrent effect as having traffic radar on a city street. If you know it’s there you’d think twice about overspeeding,” says a TSI manager.

The Marine Police project is mainly an ICTAP’s contribution, although it had to call on other agencies for some parts of the mission. The U.S. Coast Guard pitches in by teaching the Indonesian police basic seamanship, navigation, and boarding procedures. Another agency, JIATF-West, provides boat maintenance, an indispensable part of the program. Unless these boats are lifted out of the water and their hulls cleared of barnacles every two or three weeks their performance can be cut down considerably. Although JIATF-West, a primarily counternarcotics operation, has
responsibilities elsewhere, it is helping the police keep its boats seaworthy. USAID also pitches in by building schoolhouses and community clinics in localities where the coastal radar and Marine Police operations are based. In effect, USAID is providing a service in strategically important communities, which in U.S. military parlance is called civil-military cooperation, or CIMIC. There should be more of this interweaving of security-economic assistance.

1206, 1207 Funds Re-energize U.S. Security Assistance Programs
The DoD got its financing for the radar network from a provision (Section 1206) of the 2006 fiscal year National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The section sets aside $300 million for the Defense Department to use at its discretion to assist other countries in counterterrorism, stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian relief and other nontraditional missions. Some of the SATI funding also comes from Section 1207 of the NDAA, which authorizes the Defense Department to pass on up to $300 million to the State Department. The provision is intended to encourage the State Department to pick up some of the peacemaking burden being increasingly borne by the Pentagon.34

The 1206 and 1207 programs are a fresh and more flexible source of funding for security assistance for countries in the region. Before their availability the Defense Department could only draw funds from programs in the State Department budget, which are usually subject to earmarking and critical oversight by legislators with special interests to protect or advocate. For years the IMET and FMF programs for Indonesia have been severely and adversely affected by this kind of legislative micromanagement. U.S. program managers reject the notion that 1206 money is being used to reverse the program-planning process and evade congressional oversight. “It just gives us a way to put all the elements of the project together without being overly bothered by bureaucratic restrictions and earmarking,” says a member of the country team. “We’ve been able to stretch the rules as far as we can without breaking them.”35

So far the use of 1206 money to pay for the radar equipment has been without controversy, which is unsurprising considering the importance of SATI to the common interests to the U.S. and its regional partners. The 1207 program deserves broad support as well because of its so-called “3-D” utility—for diplomacy, development and defense. The FY2007 act provided $17 million in 1207 money to support SATI with Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines all being beneficiaries.36 These new programs, however, have one limitation: they can set up a project but they cannot guarantee sustainability. To keep a project going year after requires additional appropriations through the Defense or State Department budgets.

For SATI to succeed the Malaysians and the Filipinos should deliver their side of the bargain. Malaysia is arguably the best prepared of the tri-border states for patrolling
and coastal policing duties. The Royal Malaysian Navy has more capable ships and is better trained than either the Indonesian or Philippine navies. Malaysia has also its own national coast guard, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, to guard its peninsular waters and the more sensitive maritime space off Sabah. The Philippines’ Coast Watch South is patterned after Australia’s Customs-managed offshore monitoring system aimed primarily at deterring illegal immigration. It plans to have a fusion center that can gather, analyze and disseminate intelligence like the Indonesian facilities are expected to do. The United States is chipping in $5 million in 1207 money to help the Philippines cover the cost of the infrastructure and training. But it may take more than five years before the system can work at full efficiency.

Moving the Relationship Forward

It is remarkable that the Country Team in Jakarta has been able to put together and implement what is in effect a whole-of-government approach to security sector reforms in Indonesia even without the guidance of a national policy on this practice. Its work on the armed forces and the police is appropriately complemented by programs in justice sector reforms, which are the responsibility of USAID and a U.S. Justice Department adviser. The Indonesian experience should energize U.S. policy-makers to set common doctrines for this kind of interagency cooperation.

Although the adoption of a national policy on security sector reform is outside the scope of this study, it finds that U.S. efforts in Indonesia and other aid-receiving countries could be strengthened by the ability of program managers to work more closely across interagency lines, maximizing the use of military and civilian skills, and bringing this synergy down to the operational level as a recent United States Institute of Peace report has described.

For the next set of relationship managers, the obvious priority is to ensure the continuity of programs proven to be effective and rewarding. They should be fully cognizant of the provisional nature of 1206 and 1207 funding and their statutory limitations. Senior members of the foreign affairs and armed forces committees have warned against using 1206 money for “ill-defined” purposes or as an outright substitute for regular assistance programs like FMF and FMS. There have been no congressional objections to the use of these funds for the Sulawesi Sea radar installations—the Country Team was wise to resist Indonesian requests to emplace the radars in locations where U.S. interests would not be directly served. But to assure sustainment of these and other high-cost programs the Obama administration should plan to get the necessary funding through conventional security programs like FMF or FMS, rather than attempt to skirt around them through 1206 money or its equivalent.

Military program planners should take into account Defense Minister Sudarsono’s preference for airlift and sealift assets, which plays to American export strength.
The completion of the tri-border project is, obviously, another priority because of its region-wide counter-terrorism potential. It also generates sales for radar and communications equipment, which are likely to benefit U.S. vendors. A gradual increase in the ICITAP program through the next administration can be assumed, based on its six-year record in Indonesia. Some amount of nontraditional funding like 1206/1207 should be available to meet urgent but unanticipated demand under conditions acceptable to Congress.

On the whole, however, the Indonesia program is likely to be more oriented on “software” than “hardware”. There is need for more education and training of TNI personnel to continue the process of professionalization and to build their capacity for handling non-traditional security threats as well as the more conventional kinds. The U.S. should make expansion of IMET funding a central part of this relationship. As has been stated previously, there is arguably no more cost-effective investment than this program, which brings 60 to 70 officers a year to the U.S. for immersion in American military and civic values for less than $1 million. Stepping up the program to $1.5 million, as the Country Team has already proposed, is a reasonable goal that would allow up to 100 Indonesians to benefit from IMET-funded professional military education and training.

Another priority should be to establish better communication between the administration and Congress on Indonesian policy, so that there could be better mutual understanding of the facts and the effects of legislation on the ground. The appropriation process should be more transparent; potentially controversial legislation should be debated in open hearings so that all relevant arguments can be heard. The executive branch should keep Congress fully informed of program implementation. Ideally, the State Department and Defense Department should make it a practice to testify jointly on Indonesian policy so that the administration would be speaking with just one voice. Importantly, the top echelon of the State Department must be engaged on a continuous basis, not only when arm-twisting or gloss is needed to justify Indonesia initiatives. The engagement of the most senior State Department officials, especially the Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary for Political Affairs, can help defuse lower-level controversies, especially relating to vetting and the acceptability of forms of U.S. assistance and cooperation. Congressional staffers responsible for drafting policy and proposing restrictions on military assistance should make it a point to visit Indonesia so as to get a full and balanced picture of the potential effects of this legislation.

Closer consultation between Congress and the executive branch—and among executive branch agencies—can obviate relationship-destabilizing problems like the vetting issue described in Chapter 3. The vetting process can be properly executed under norms that do not unnecessarily distort the intention of policy-makers. Congress should also
consider ending its blanket ban on assistance to the Army Special Forces Command, the navy and air force special forces commands, and the TNI’s Mobile Brigade with the same degree of objectivity and fairness. There is no doubt that both Indonesian and U.S. managers understand the degree of oversight that Congress wants to maintain on this issue, but that can be accomplished without assessing total blackouts on personnel who are free from human rights blemishes. The inculcation of respect for human rights in Indonesia’s security institutions should remain in the forefront of U.S. policy, but placed in proper balance with other important national interests.

In this context, there is an argument also for elevating consideration of Indonesia programs and consultations to a higher level in the National Security Council staff. Not one of the current six deputy National Security Advisors is an Asianist, and the Asia directorate tends to be dominated by China and Japan specialists. More systemic and systematic attention to Southeast Asia and Indonesia should help keep the NSC and White House on track to promote real U.S. strategic interests in this region.

Congressional appropriators should seriously consider Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s appeal for a more robust civilian-agency role in security building, while the State Department would do well to investigate how the concept can be applied to Indonesia. In one sense this approach would “civilianize” some of the programs that heretofore have been basically military in nature. There may be a need to augment the Country Team with specialists from civilian agencies can help in the maritime security and resources protection missions. The State Department’s Bureau of Oceans, the Environment and Science can lend some of its expertise to assist Jakarta in developing a comprehensive maritime development plan. Other useful augmentations to the mission could include Coast Guard officer who can work with the navy and marine police, Department of Homeland Security personnel who can help train the army in border security and customs and immigration enforcement, and Department of Interior experts who could counsel on the enforcement of forestry and fisheries regulations.

Notes

1. ODC e-mail, November 6, 2008.
3. Including conferences, seminars, subject matter expert visits (SMEE), ship visits, and mobile training teams (MTT). The estimates of the number of 2008 and 2009 events are from the ODC briefing.
4. The TNI was hit in mid-2008 with escalating fuel prices and a 15% budget cut and the double whammy caused it to drastically reduce participation in joint exercises and its own training activities.
5. Interview, Jakarta, July 1, 2008.
6. These opinions were given privately to the authors by a number of active and retired U.S. military officers.
8. That USIBSD meeting was co-chaired by James Clad for the Pentagon and Major General Syarifuddin Tippe of the Indonesian Defense Department. The USIBSD venue alternates between Washington and Jakarta.


10. ODC briefing, Ibid.

11. Interview, PACAF Headquarters, Hickam AFB HI, June 4, 2008.


14. These are admittedly the subjective judgments of U.S. officers with whom the authors have spoken.

15. ODC briefing, Ibid. The Indonesian side chooses the courses and candidates for the IMET Program.


22. ODC briefing, Ibid.


24. The tri-border states have initiated coordinated patrols and exercises on a bilateral basis (CORPAT Philindo, Malindo Jaya, Philmal GBC) but these occur so infrequently as to have little deterrent effect on criminal activity without the additional assets offered by the United States and Australia.


27. Briefings to the authors by the U.S. mission in Jakarta and the PACOM in Honolulu.

28. Briefing by Gerald Heuett Jr. and other members of the Jakarta ICITAP team.

29. ICITAP briefing, September 27, 2008.

30. See “Indonesia to have Four More New Radars: Defense Minister,” The Jakarta Post, July 14, 2008. According to this account, Indonesia may have difficulty implementing this plan because of the limited capacity of the state-owned firms that are to design and supply the equipment.


32. Interview, Jakarta, June 27, 2008.

33. ICITAP itself is a bureaucratic oddity, staffed by the Justice Department but authorized to use State Department funds to help democratic countries professionalize their police forces.

35. Background briefing to the authors.


40. See Anne Scott Tyson, “Gates Warns of Militarized Policy,” *The Washington Post*, July 16, 2008, which recalls a 2007 speech by the defense secretary calling for a substantial increase in the State Department budget so as to ease the nation-building burden that events have heaped on the Pentagon.
Chapter 8
Indonesia’s Other Security Partners: More Than Enough?

Key Points—Indonesia Has Many Security Partnerships
- Australia is a generous Indonesian security partner
- The Dutch extend assistance discreetly through multinational agencies
- Sibling rivalries impede security cooperation among Southeast Asian neighbors
- South Korea, Poland among new entrants in Indonesia’s limited arms market

Australians used to describe their role in Southeast Asia as that of a “deputy sheriff,” but this self-deprecating locution is heard less often these days. Australia is seriously approaching equality with the United States in its willingness and ability to contribute to Indonesia’s security. Indeed, if generosity is the badge of commitment, one can say there is a new sheriff in town.

A Cornucopia of Defense Relations
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has offered to provide Indonesia with as much as $2.3 billion in economic assistance over a five-year period—more than four times the accustomed level of U.S. assistance. The Lombok Treaty, moreover, commits Australia to a far more comprehensive partnership with Indonesia than the United States or any other country can ever aspire to. The pact calls on the signatories to cooperate and consult with each other in, among other areas, defense, defense technology, law enforcement, transnational crime, counterterrorism, intelligence-sharing and maritime and aviation security.¹
The United States, it goes without saying, would also like to have its own strategic cooperation agreement with Indonesia. By an informal (and probably incomplete) count, Indonesia has already signed up with China, Russia, South Korea, Pakistan, Australia, India, Japan, South Africa, Poland, Germany, New Zealand and the United Kingdom—so why not one with the United States too? The subject was discussed at the last meeting of the Indonesia-United States Strategic Dialogue, reportedly at Indonesia’s own initiative. But this task was put off for future negotiations because the issue was overshadowed by the TNI’s more immediate needs. This was not greatly surprising, as the U.S. so far has had little success signing any kind of security-related agreement with Indonesia.2

Status of Forces (SOFA) rights are the main stumbling block. Successive visits by State Department political-military and civilian Defense Department officials have been unsuccessful, even counter-productive, in bringing the Indonesians around to Washington’s practical requirements. Clearly a new “art form” is needed to reach a pragmatic accommodation with Indonesia, as well as with other Asian countries like India where defense relations are expanding. Whether it is by narrowing U.S. demands for SOFA rights, or casting them in a broader light to reflect the full value of “strategic partnerships,” a new modus vivendi should be sought to update the relationships that were established based on formulas applied during the heyday of the hub-and-spoke alliances of the 1950’s and 1960’s.

A U.S. offer to sign the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)—the virtual price of admission into the ASEAN security family—could be a possible sweetener. The Bush administration let the opportunity to sign the TAC pass by, although every other presumptive Indonesian partner has done so, including China, Russia, Japan and India. The Obama administration should reconsider the issue on its own merits. The only possible hitch is that in U.S. practice such an accession has to be ratified by the Senate. That could be an opening for special pleaders to load the bill with various demands and conditions that would only defeat its purpose.

Australia: Nearest Neighbor

Why, one might ask again, does Indonesia hesitate to enter into an agreement that might look like an alliance with the United States, and yet embrace the Lombok Treaty that is virtually one in all but name? History can explain this paradox. Indonesia has long defined its profession of non-alignment as being totally distinct from the imperialistic ways of the superpowers, and there is only one left, the United States. Australia, however, gets a pass, being a self-described middle power with an occasionally rocky relationship with Indonesia that has to be stabilized and husbanded with treaty obligations that can endure over time through changes in government.3

The United States should be grateful that Australia stepped up when it did. Back in
the 1990s Australian military schools took in hundreds of TNI officers, making up for the suspension of the U.S. IMET program. Even with the recent revival of IMET, Australia continues to train more TNI officers than the United States does; in 2007 there were 110 TNI officers training in Australia compared to 60 Indonesian IMET grantees. The exercises that the Australian Defence Forces conduct with the TNI generally focus on the same missions that PACOM has—intelligence-sharing, maritime security, disaster management and peacekeeping. The U.S. and Australian events calendars are thus mutually reinforcing, since standard operating procedures and interoperability are stressed in both programs.

Sharing the Burden in Maritime Security

Geography gives the two allies a natural division of labor. U.S. assistance in maritime security is focused on the Sulawesi Sea tri-border area, while Australia’s efforts are concentrated further east in the Timor and Arafura Seas where Canberra and Jakarta have almost identical concerns about third-country fishing. Taiwanese and South Korean fishing fleets enter these waters with high-technology gear and haul away large catches, to the detriment of the livelihoods of local fishermen and causing serious harm to the marine environment. The Australian and Indonesian police are jointly operating a transnational crime center in Kupang, West Timor to be better able to respond to criminal activity in the Timor Sea. This region is destined to become a highly productive maritime area, which, in addition to its fisheries, could become a major gas-producing region for Asia as a whole.

Australia has been as generous as the United States in providing the INP with the tools and the know-how it needs to combat terrorism and transnational crime. The Australian Federal Police has set up a bomb data center in INP headquarters and is helping the INP interact more effectively with Interpol, the Lyon, France-based international clearinghouse, for the support of cross-border criminal investigations. Both the U.S. and Australia have donated forensic laboratory equipment and are the major backers of Detachment 88, the INP’s elite unit that has already bagged scores of suspected terrorists.

Australia’s landmark contribution to the INP is the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, which, despite its name, is located in the INP Police Academy grounds in Semarang, Central Java. The Center is actually an independent foundation jointly managed by the INP and the Australian Federal Police, with other countries like the Netherlands, Canada, the United Kingdom donating equipment or support for specific courses. For instance, Italy supports a course on maritime crimes, Australia another on forensic investigation, and England a third on crimes against women and children. The center has already drawn 3,000 participants from 35 Asia-Pacific countries, representing almost all branches of law enforcement—police detectives, prosecutors, tax and customs collectors and immigration officers.
Without being an outright surrogate for the United States, Australia can promote Western values as well as cross-cultural sensitivity in ways that are still beyond America's capacity. Some 15,000 Indonesians study in Australia, more than twice the number enrolled in U.S. universities. At the same time 170,000 Australian youths are learning Indonesian in public high schools, and that number could increase further with Indonesian being one of three target languages in Canberra's $62 million program to boost Asian language study in public schools.\(^6\)

The Australian Defence Forces strongly encourages its officers to learn *Bahasa Indonesia*, and a significant percentage of its officer corps have at least a rudimentary knowledge of the language. By contrast, only a tiny handful of American military personnel have any ability in the language—just those destined for assignment to the U.S. mission in Jakarta, or those recently returned from assignment in Jakarta. Indeed, the largest residual Indonesian language capability in the U.S. military is probably in the 1st Special Forces Group at Fort Lewis, Washington, whose personnel study many of the Asia-Pacific languages as part of their unit readiness training program.

Australian Prime Minister Rudd wants the relationship to cover more ground, particularly in security cooperation. But there are limitations on both sides. Australia has a much smaller military than the U.S., so it could have as much difficulty getting new programs started as Indonesia could have absorbing the proffered assistance. Both Indonesia and Australia have to guard against the relationship going sour, as it did in 2006 when 22 Papuan asylum-seekers were accepted by an Australian agency with authority to act independently of the government. The incident angered Indonesians and revived suspicions about Australia's possible support of Papuan independence claims. The Lombok Treaty has a heavily-lawyered provision intended to allay such misgivings.\(^7\)

There is also a residual animosity towards the Indonesia military in some Australian liberal intellectual circles that diplomatic fence-mending cannot totally overcome. This could cause another upset if the production of an Australian film recreating the 1975 Indonesian invasion of East Timor does not heed Jakarta's plea for the inclusion of "Indonesia's point of view." A dramatic highlight of the film is the death of five Australian journalists who, in the judgment of an Australian inquest, were murdered by Indonesian troops to prevent them from reporting the invasion, or, in the Indonesian version, were simply caught in a deadly crossfire.\(^8\)

**The Dutch: Prudent Aid-Giving**

The Netherlands is another donor that has to tread carefully because of its historical associations with Indonesia. The former metropolitan power has no large aid bureaucracy in Jakarta. Instead, it conveys tens of millions of dollars of assistance through the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, the International Organiza-
tion for Migration and other multinational organizations. “Working with multinational agencies gives us higher leverage which makes our interventions more effective and their impact more sustainable,” explains Said Razili, a Dutch diplomat overseeing security assistance. The Dutch are not necessarily looking for credit, but they feel obligated to have the best possible diplomatic representation in Jakarta. The current ambassador, Nikolaus van Dam, is their most senior diplomat with previous postings in Berlin, Egypt, Turkey and Iraq. His prior service in Muslim countries gives him easier access and greater credibility with Indonesia’s mostly Islamic society that most of his Western colleagues.

Virtually all of the Dutch security assistance in Indonesia has gone to the Indonesian police. Aside from their work through multilateral agencies, the Dutch are directly assisting the police and other law enforcement agencies in keeping Jakarta’s Sukarno-Hatta international airport safe for domestic and foreign travelers. The Dutch have no official facility for financing arms sales like the U.S. and other international vendors. Their sale of Sigma-class corvettes to the Indonesian navy is strictly a commercial transaction. The price tag is $869 million for the four ships or $217 million for each.

The corvette sale had to wait until parliamentary objections to the Netherlands doing business with the Indonesian navy were withdrawn. The navy had been accused by human rights advocates of shelling civilian communities during the military campaign against the Acehnese secessionist force, GAM, in the 1990s. Public opinion of the TNI sank even lower when a Dutch journalist, Sander Thoenes, was killed, reportedly by Indonesian soldiers or militiamen, during the 1999 violence in East Timor. Normal relations were resumed when the United States lifted its own embargo in November 2005 and the Thoenes family withdrew a claim against the Indonesian government because of the difficulties of obtaining supporting evidence. The Dutch are now helping the state-owned Indonesian shipyard, P.T. PAL, build a “national corvette” for the navy. But they have expressed no interest in supporting arms transfers to any other branch of the TNI.

Distrust Among ASEAN Partners
With Indonesia and its ASEAN neighbors facing common security problems, one could easily assume that they would have no problem solidifying their military partnerships. Practical necessity as well as pressure from the U.S. and other major donors has forced them to agree to cooperative arrangements and act in greater concert than they did before. This led, for example, to the implementation of coordinated patrols by the Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean navies in the Malacca Strait and the occasional bilateral Philindo and Malindo exercises in the tri-border area. These are essentially bilateral patrols; intra-ASEAN diplomacy has to be raised to a higher level before these armed forces can interoperate trilaterally on a regular basis. Much as the

INDONESIA’S OTHER SECURITY PARTNERS: MORE THAN ENOUGH? 121
military services themselves want to go beyond established routine, the politicians in their capitals stand in the way of more robust cooperation.

The still-unratified Indonesian-Singapore Defence Cooperative Agreement (DCA) arguably could have served both countries well had not politics intervened. Its fate was doomed when Indonesian officials made the DCA’s approval conditional on Singapore signing an extradition treaty. Once signed, this treaty can be invoked by Jakarta to haul back corrupt Indonesian businessmen who had fled to Singapore with all their assets. Singapore in turn made further negotiations on the treaty conditional on Jakarta accepting the DCA. This raised the political price of both instruments higher than either country could afford. Indonesian parliamentarians bristled at what seemed to them to be Singapore’s excessive requirements for military exercises on Indonesian territory. Emotional charges that Singapore is illegally importing logs and sand from the Riau Islands and abusing Indonesian maids further poisoned the debate.\textsuperscript{11} Eventually, Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono threw up his hands and said the government could not ask the House of Representatives to ratify both treaties because Singapore had not met all of Indonesia’s demands.\textsuperscript{12}

Getting Indonesia and Malaysia to set sibling rivalries aside is no easier. The Indonesian navy still smarts from an incident a few years ago when one of its ships, the Tedung Naga, collided with a Malaysian vessel off the coast of Borneo while both countries were disputing ownership of the oil-rich Ambalat block. The incident was probably accidental, the result of poor seamanship or faulty navigation, but media hysterics made it seem worse. Although the coordinated patrols have helped reduce piracy incidence in the Malacca Strait, some Malaysians are heard to complain that their Indonesian brothers are not pulling their weight; they even voice suspicions that some off-duty Indonesian navy personnel themselves may be robbing fishing boats to scrape up extra income.\textsuperscript{13}

There may be a reasonable explanation for this grumbling. The Indonesian navy has generally older ships than the Malaysians and is more severely affected by rising fuel prices. What happens at sea is anybody’s guess but it is not inconceivable for a naval crew to let criminals go free in exchange for a share of the loot to pay for fuel or provisions. Indians do not abide Malaysian condescension gladly. Their resentment grows even more over reports of mistreatment of thousands of Indonesian domestic workers by their Malaysian employers.

Even more erosive of this relationship are Indonesian fears that Malaysian interests may be complicit in the illegal harvesting of Indonesian logs. No less than the Indonesian navy chief of staff voices that suspicion: “If you drive along highways in Malaysia, you will see virgin forests on both left and right sides of the road. But there is a sawmill somewhere there. Whose logs are they processing?\textsuperscript{14} Both governments have taken steps to correct practices that can arouse ill feeling. The Malaysian navy
chief of staff, Admiral Tan Sri Ramlan Mohamed Ali, insists that although Malaysia and Indonesia may sometimes have policy differences the cooperation between their navies is “solid.” There also continues to be, by most accounts, a high level of cooperation in counterterrorism among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Such cooperation, however, is largely dependent on personal ties among officers in these countries, and is yet to be grounded in an integrated system of intelligence exchanges and coordinated enforcement.

China: Too Big to Ignore

China seemed ready early on to carve out a place for itself commensurate with its aspirations as Asia’s rising power. After President Yudhoyono and President Hu Jintao signed a defense cooperation agreement in April 2005, the Chinese offered to jointly produce with Indonesia several lines of war machines including military vehicles, tanks, and missiles. This was a strategically appropriate gambit, as it addressed one of the TNI’s most urgent needs: the replacement of aging equipment, if possible with foreign exchange-saving domestic production. The agreement also called for officer exchanges so that the two countries could study each other’s defense structure with the objective of wider cooperation in the future. The signing of the agreement, combined with a growing two-way trade and the evident success of China’s “charm offensive,” led Indonesian Ambassador Sudrajat (a retired army major general and former defense attaché in Washington who is much admired for his intellect and strategic savvy) to aver that the two countries are “almost in a honeymoon state.”

China actually has been careful not to overplay its hand. There have been few ship visits in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta’s seaport, to exhibit China’s fast-growing naval power. The Chinese may be prudently avoiding stirring up latent sinophobia in this part of Southeast Asia while cashing in on the returns of their “soft power.” Of the industrial projects the Chinese promised to help, so far only the missile production line appears ready to start operating. Chinese weapons makers are working with the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT) for producing the missile launchers and with P.T. Pindad, another state-owned entity, for the missiles themselves.

Missile production alone, however, will have little impact on the TNI’s capability. As the absence of external threats forces its attention to tasks other than combat, its equipment priorities are changing. It needs patrol boats and patrol planes more than tanks and missiles. And more lift capacity like jeeps, trucks, amphibious craft, and transport planes. So far the traditional donors have been slow to help Indonesia build production lines for these multi-purpose equipments.

Russia, at least prospectively, has outsold the Chinese in this market. Its far more generous offer of a $1 billion credit line was intended to finance the TNI’s purchase of 22 helicopters, 20 tanks and two submarines. But that was before an upsurge in oil
and food prices caused the Department of Finance to freeze all major arms purchases and imposed a blanket budget reduction of 15 percent on all government agencies. The financial crunch has also caused the Indonesian navy to cancel a $75 million purchase of Skytruck multi-purpose planes from Poland. The Skytrucks, originally designed for light transport, were to be used by the navy as maritime patrol planes.\textsuperscript{20}

South Korea
South Korea has become a highly competitive vendor in this market because of its willingness to accept counter-purchase or barter arrangements. A nearly $1 billion arms deal could trade two South Korean 1,300-ton attack submarines for eight Indonesian-built CN 215/220 maritime patrol craft. The Koreans are pleased with the swap because it would help reopen the Daewoo submarine production line for further orders from Indonesia and other Asian countries. The offset works also for the state-owned Indonesian aircraft manufacturer P.T. Dirgantara that is to supply the patrol planes. Under a similar swap arrangement in 2003 South Korea sold seven KT-1 Wongbee basic trainers and spare parts to the Indonesian air force in exchange for eight CN-235s for its own air force. In another breakthrough into this market the South Korean locomotive manufacturer Rotem has an agreement with the state-owned Indonesian arms maker P.T. Pindad to jointly develop and produce six-wheel drive armored fighting vehicles.\textsuperscript{21}

The Difficulties of Managing Multiple Partnerships
A natural consequence of Indonesia’s “active and independent” foreign policy is an open door to any other country with a serious offer of friendship and a strategic partnership. In the post-independence years President Sukarno dealt with the United States, Britain, China and the Soviet Union according to his political mood swings. Uncle Sam was Bung Karno’s favorite whipping boy. But after General Suharto took over with the threat of Asian communism looming just beyond the South China Sea, the United States became Indonesia’s preferred partner and leading arms supplier. Washington summarily ended that relationship in the early 1990s to punish the Indonesian military for its actions in East Timor. Now, as Indonesia balances its concerns about home-grown terrorism and its standing in the Muslim and non-aligned communities, it can play the field again. Russia once again is a leading weapons supplier but other vendors like China, South Korea and Poland are competing for some of the business.

It is remarkable that the Indonesian Defense Department can manage its multiplicity of partnerships with such a small staff in its Directorate of Defense Strategy. The department is fortunate to have had a succession of intellectually well-prepared officers in charge of the directorate. Retired Major General Sudrajat, now the ambassador to China, worked with the British military mission to produce the department’s...
first Western-style defense white paper. He was followed by Major General Dadi Susanto, also a former Defense Attaché in Washington who helped the United States regain some standing with the TNI.

Major General Syarifuddin Tippe, the incumbent director-general, is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College and is a strong advocate of better military education, whose labors could widen the TNI’s intellectual horizons. Dephan’s operating philosophy appears to be driven by a prudent kind of pragmatism more than anything else. How each partner gets to play depends on the TNI’s needs and its ability to pay for them. None is allowed a have excessive influence on arms-buying decisions.

Summing this all up, it appears that for the near term Russia will remain Indonesia’s leading arms supplier, followed by the Netherlands on the strength of its corvette sales and technology-transfer cooperation with P.T. PAL. South Korea could catch up with the Dutch if its above-mentioned barter deals open yet more doors to this still-recovering arms market. Seoul’s military-to-military relations with Indonesia are also advancing on other fronts following a recent agreement between their air forces to exchange air staff college students and engage in joint training.22 Poland is another new vendor that sees major prospects in Indonesia. Although Indonesia cancelled its purchase of Skytruck transport aircraft, Poland has offered to extend its $75 million export credit line to enable Indonesia to purchase whatever goods and services it requires. The Poles are also discussing with the TNI the supply of Black Hawk helicopters produced at the Polish Mielec aircraft plant.23 The U.S. is not likely to reemerge as a major arms supplier to the TNI until Indonesia recovers its purchasing power.

The U.S. would be of better service to the Indonesians advising them against spending their resources on budget-busting showpiece weapons when their announced higher priorities are retraining and re-equipping their forces for both traditional and non-traditional missions. The U.S. should encourage other North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to follow Poland’s example in serving the Indonesian market. Most of these European suppliers can do so at far more attractive prices than what their U.S. competitors ask for. Even so, U.S. suppliers will likely keep an edge in certain niches like communications and electronics. The Indonesia until it recovers its purchasing power. However, the U.S. is already supplying components for some of the TNI’s new platforms, including the radar being mounted on its Dutch-supplied corvettes.24

Notes
1. The treaty, formally called the Australian-Indonesian Agreement on a Framework of Security Cooperation, was signed on November 13, 2006 on the Indonesian island of Lombok (which gave it its short name) and brought into force in February 2008. It is an amalgamation of agreements and memorandums of understanding entered into earlier, or to be concluded later, covering ten fields including trade, investments and interfaith dialogue.
2. The United States has tried with little success to get Indonesia to sign a status of forces agreement (SOFA), a boilerplate understanding it has with scores of other countries on how visiting or temporarily-stationed U.S. military personnel should be treated.

3. See Jamie Mackie, *Australia and Indonesia: Current Problems, Future Prospects*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2007, for an excellent account of how the two countries have alternated between near-hostility and euphoric embrace and why a relationship on the broadest possible basis is needed as added “ballast” to ensure that it “will not be blown off course by passing squalls.”

4. The number of TNI officers training in Australia from Patrick Walters, “Defence Beefs Up Ties with Jakarta,” in *The Australian*, March 28, 2008; the number of TNI officers in U.S. schools from an ODC briefing.


6. The Institute for International Education’s Open Doors census counts 7,338 Indonesians studying in the United States in the 2006–2007 school year. The figures on Australian and Indonesian students are from Kevin Rudd’s speech to the Asia Society Australasia in Sydney, Australia on June 4, 2008.

7. The treaty commits the parties to not “support or participate in activities by any person or entity which constitutes a threat to the stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity of the other Party, including by those who seek to use its territory for encouraging or committing such activities, including separatism, in the territory of the other Party.” But the treaty also recognizes Australia’s obligation to interpret this provision in the context of its own laws and democratic traditions.


11. Singapore’s acquisition of millions of tons of sand illegally mined from Riau beaches has long been a sore point between the two countries. In *Patriot* (March 2008), the official publication of the Indonesian armed forces (TNI), a retired army major general reports that the sand-mining threatens the existence of many small islands and nearly caused Nipah Island to sink under the waves. Some critics charge that the illegal sand trade could not take place without the connivance of Indonesian authorities.


17. Bronson Percival, the author of *The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century*, believes that China has two Southeast Asian policies: one for the relatively poor countries in China’s backyard like Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and another for the maritime nations that are richer and more democratic. China necessarily has to be more concerned about exceeding its welcome in these latter countries.

18. P.T. Pindad, one of several privatized former State enterprises, also produces much of the small arms and wheeled vehicles for the army.


Summary of Observations and Recommendations

The security relationship with Indonesia has measurably improved since the Bush administration waived congressional sanctions on the Indonesian armed forces in November 2005. The two countries have resumed a schedule of activities expected of a normal military relationship, including joint exercises and intelligence and personnel exchanges. The resumption of IMET funding has returned Indonesian officers to U.S. military schools, although not yet in the pre-sanctions numbers. For the first time in years there are U.S. officers enrolled in all Indonesian command and staff schools. The only major limitation to the expansion of this relationship has been the TNI’s capacity to respond to U.S. initiatives. Indonesia has reciprocated for the restoration of U.S. military assistance with stepped-up cooperation with the U.S. on counterterrorism and fighting transnational crime, and a vigorous return to participation in the international peacekeeping.¹

The Obama administration should seek to preserve these gains and build on them wherever possible. The U.S. is just one of Indonesia’s many strategic partners, but arguably the only truly indispensable one. By an unofficial count, Indonesia has already signed strategic cooperation agreements with China, South Korea, Poland, Germany, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The U.S. has ceded the position of being Indonesia’s leading arms supplier to Russia, and is not likely to be a major factor in this market any time soon. Australia, no longer just America’s “deputy sheriff” in the region, is offering nearly three times more foreign assistance to Indonesia than the U.S. has. After Russia, the Netherlands, South Korea and Poland are the leading arms suppliers to Indonesia. However, the U.S. has capabilities the other partners lack, and has more intensive and diversified interaction with the Indonesian armed forces than any other country. To
be effective the U.S. does not necessarily need a high-profile comprehensive security agreement such as the Lombok Treaty that Australia has signed with Indonesia. The relationship is best left to operate quietly, on the basis of mutual consent, practical need and the availability of resources.

**Further security reforms can be attained only at Indonesia’s own pace.** The TNI’s earlier reforms—withdrawning from politics and separating itself from the police—required only its willingness to change. The two major structural reforms yet to be done—the disinvestment of the TNI business enterprises and determining the future of its army territorial commands—require a level of fiscal resources the country still lacks and government-wide reforms affecting other agencies. How the armed forces and the police are subordinated to the cabinet is a decision only the president and parliament can make. The government is a coalition of many, often competing, interests and it can move ahead on difficult issues such as these only through the traditional Indonesian ways of socialization and compromise. Security reforms do not command as much public interest as fuel subsidies and food prices so the hard decisions are likely to be deferred until after the 2009 presidential election.

**The TNI is still highly respected and politically influential but its dominance is being challenged by the Indonesian National Police.** The challenge for the Indonesian government is to allot these two institutions their proper share of responsibilities and resources and make them work cooperatively instead of harmfully competing for power and community support. U.S. assistance programs must take into account this sharing of responsibilities between the TNI and the police and the participation of other civilian agencies with security-related missions, including a newly-authorized sea and coast guard.

**The TNI has yet to be held fully accountable for its past human rights abuses.** The final report of the Indonesia-Timor Leste Commission for Truth and Friendship blamed many individuals and institutions for the 1999 violence in East Timor but attributed most of the blame to Indonesia-backed militia forces, the TNI, and some civilian governmental agencies. The report and its conclusions were accepted by both governments—the first time that Indonesia has acknowledged blame. The Commission’s conclusions are only partly satisfying because the body lacked authority to prosecute offenders. But it seemed to meet the desire of political elites in both countries by focusing on future relations rather than vengeance and punishment. President Yudhoyono may have expressed the sentiment best when he said, “We cannot move forward and reach our dreams if we always focus our attention on the past.”

The U.S., for its part, has lost some credibility on human rights because of certain controversial aspects of its global war against terrorism. But with mutual understand-
ing and good will the U.S. and Indonesia can still continue a productive dialogue on respecting these universal rights in all aspects of their security relationship.

It is important for the U.S. to move beyond recriminations for tragedies in the past, which imply lack of trust in a democratic government’s policies, and follow the example of East Timor and Indonesia by focusing on the future of this important bilateral security relationship.

In any event, the Indonesian justice system should not allow the institutionalized practice of impunity to continue. There are encouraging signs that the TNI is prepared to hold its personnel accountable for misconduct, for example the prison sentences handed out to marines responsible for shooting civilians. The National Human Rights Commission still has the authority to shed light on past human rights abuses; for example it has reopened an inquiry into the Talangsari Incident in Lampung Province. But it needs better support from parliament and a strong sign of commitment from the president to become more effective.

Changing Views About Security. Traditional concerns about armed invasion or separatist violence has ebbed, and justifiably so. “In much of Asia, the guns have been relatively silent—including my country where peace now reigns in Aceh,” writes President Yudhoyono.\(^3\) What are now more worrisome to the country are non-traditional threats, particularly of an economic and humanitarian nature. These kinds of threats, more relevantly, are generic for Southeast Asia as a whole. These include, in Singapore Ambassador-at-large Tommy Koh’s enumeration, “Avian Flu. HIV/AIDS, malaria and other threats to public health, as well as…combating drugs and human trafficking, maritime piracy, natural disaster and humanitarian emergencies…and food (in) security.”\(^4\)

The TNI has adapted to this shift in priorities by deferring major weapons purchases and tasking all its service branches to assist the government in handling civil emergencies. The U.S. in response has begun to redirect some of its assistance accordingly, the tri-border initiative being a notable example. The new U.S. administration should examine the possibility of repackaging some of its programs to take into account these non-traditional concerns, the capabilities and limitations of Indonesia’s security institutions, and how U.S. programs can complement or be complemented by those of other security partners.

The U.S. should consider writing programs to assist missions rather than just specific Indonesian agencies. This would give both the U.S. and the Indonesian governments the flexibility to allocate resources to an appropriate mix of military, police and other civilian personnel available to handle non-traditional security concerns. This approach works
best when the success of the mission is the predominant objective. It can also avoid the appearance of the U.S. favoring one agency over another, and puts the responsibility for assigning tasks and resources on the Indonesian government. It can also open a window for contributions to the same mission from other foreign donors. The U.S. might consider supporting missions in the following manner:

**International peacekeeping.** Indonesia has returned to U.N. peacekeeping operations with pride and determination after an interregnum that began with the 1997 financial problems that swept Southeast Asia. With a second battalion task force in Lebanon and smaller increments in several other U.N. operations, Indonesia has signaled its intention to provide both military and police forces for future peacekeeping operations. But the TNI is behind in training, equipment, and doctrinal capabilities and needs a strong input of professional military education, newer equipment, and international socialization to be better prepared for the rigors of peacekeeping, especially with the likelihood of more intense peacemaking requirements in the future.

**Disaster risk management.** Both the armed forces and the police have taken on this mission as one of high priority. The ICTAP program is training regional police units in disaster management procedures but U.S. statutory restrictions prevent the extension of the same training to the TNI. The U.S. has done little so far to assist the National Disaster Management Agency, which presumably will have to coordinate the actions of all the other public agencies responding to a civil emergency. If this situation persists the U.S. can offer a broad, flexible, multi-user package of assistance to the Indonesian government if it is assured that a proper chain of command is in place and the funds can provide the necessary capacity-building for the agencies involved. The assistance should have the collateral benefit of improving the salaries and welfare benefits of the personnel in these agencies.

**Maritime security.** This is a difficult area for the United States or any other donor to work in because of the multiplicity of Indonesian agencies claiming jurisdiction in the maritime space. While the mission is generally of common concern, the U.S. and Indonesia have different priorities in how it should be undertaken. For the U.S. the most important objectives are defeating terrorists and drug runners; for Indonesia illegal fishing, sea robberies and smuggling are foremost.

The U.S. could assist the Indonesian government in formulating an action plan to improve maritime security with the offer of assistance in capacity-building as an incentive. The plan should aim at strengthening the administrative capacity of the Maritime Security Coordinating Board and clarifying the roles of the Indonesian navy, the marine police and the newly-created sea and coast guard. Although assistance should be made available to all these agencies, the U.S. should make a special effort to regain the navy’s trust because its help would be needed most in a military or civil contingency in these waters. Some consideration should be given to reviving an Excess Defense Articles
program for the navy, or extending technical assistance to its boat-building program at
the state-owned P.T. PAL shipyard. Assistance to the marine police should be continued
because it helps in the counter-terrorism and drug interdiction missions.

Natural resources protection. As in the other missions above, there are multiple agen-
cies claiming this as part of their official responsibilities, including the army, the navy
and the maritime and fisheries department. The Indonesian government should be
left to decide which of these agencies should be at the head of the line for capacity-
building support. This mission is primarily of a domestic nature but one aspect of it—illegal logging—has international ramifications and has drawn the attention and
support of U.S. environmental groups. A U.S. program strengthening enforcement
of laws and regulations against illegal logging could mitigate the country’s economic
losses as well improve the capabilities of its law enforcement services. It also is likely to
gain the support of U.S. environmental advocacy groups and their supporters in Con-
gress. Both the army and the police are potential recipients of U.S. assistance for this
mission; to avoid the appearance of favoring one service over the other or antagonizing
human rights groups, the disposition of these funds should be left to the discretion of
the Indonesian government.

The study supports proposals in the foreign affairs community to expand the State Department’s
nation-building and democracy-promotion resources, as these assets could be put to good use in
still-developing partnerships like what the U.S. has with Indonesia.5 The fiscal burden created
by the current global financial crisis could severely affect the ability of the Obama
administration to increase foreign assistance. The programs cited above do not neces-
sarily need a lot more aid money to be successful. But they would need more mission-dedicated, language-capable people able to work closely with their Indonesian
counterparts in fields where security and economic concerns intersect. The Country
Team can be augmented by other federal agencies whose competences are relevant to
U.S. assistance in these areas. For instance, the Department of Homeland Security,
which is already working on immigration issues, can also help provide training in cus-
toms and border control operations. A larger Coast Guard contingent is also needed
for these programs.

The U.S. should expand IMET-funded education and training and administer a vigorous “soldier-to-
soldier” program of in-country training and U.S. hosted visits and exchanges. The new concerns
about non-traditional security adds a dimension to the paramount need for more pro-
fessional military education, an area where the U.S. is well-poised to assist. Indonesia’s
IMET allocation should be increased from less than $1 million to $1.5 million or more, and
closer to par with that for the Philippines. The need to make up for a missing generation
of Indonesian IMET alumni alone can justify the increase.
Addressing the Irritants. U.S. policy-makers should consider revising legislation or procedures that unfairly prejudice the ability of qualified TNI officers to participate in U.S. programs. One particularly irksome problem is the unnecessarily rigorous vetting of police and TNI candidates for IMET grants and other U.S.-sponsored training and education programs.

The wording of the applicable law (called the “Leahy Amendment,” named after its primary sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont) has had the effect of punishing units involved in human rights violations in East Timor a decade ago. Focused on “units” rather than “individuals,” the law is being interpreted in a way as to effectively ban from U.S. education and training any person who has been assigned to a unit accused of human rights abuses, even though that person had not been assigned to the unit when the alleged offenses took place. By some accounts current procedures disqualify all candidates assigned to the three TNI special operations units, as well as a sprinkling of other tactical units in the army, and Police Mobile Brigade police officers, even though the majority of personnel assigned to those units have not been accused of human rights violations.

If a unit has eliminated any residual permissive culture toward human rights violations, and does not have in senior command positions officers accused of prior human rights violations, then candidates for U.S. education and training from that unit should be rejected only if it there is strong evidence the officers themselves had been culpable of human rights offenses. All of these commands are elite units in which the majority of its serving personnel have served honorably and professionally. The TNI in particular has focused its human rights training at the unit level, and has taken many steps to effect reforms in its tactical units. In fact, training younger officers now assigned to commands with a past record of abuses could go a long way in inculcating a new, moderate sense of proper behavior and help to reverse abusive practices and methods of the past. Australia, the U.K., and other western democracies have resumed training and education programs with Indonesia’s special operations units. So should the U.S.

There should be closer coordination between the executive and legislative branches on Indonesia policy. The congressional authorizing and appropriating committees should allow legislation likely to be objected to by the executive branch to be debated in open hearings. In return the State Department and the Defense Department should keep legislators regularly informed about the progress of the Indonesian programs. Congressional members and staff should visit Indonesia to be fully cognizant of the objectives and effect of legislation affecting this relationship. The two departments should make it a practice to testify jointly and at an appropriately high level so that the Executive Branch would be able to speak on these matters with one voice. Except for the occasional instances cited above, U.S. policy towards Indonesia has generally enjoyed broad support from both the executive and legislative branches. There should be no
reason why the security relationship cannot be conducted on the same basis if there is full transparency in the process and policy-makers learn to trust each other and agree on the overall objective of helping Indonesia become a modernizing, irreversibly democratic, economically secure friend of the United States.

Notes

1. In his statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 11, 2008, U.S. PACOM commander Admiral Timothy Keating also expressed appreciation for Indonesia’s “greater...leadership” in theatre security cooperation, citing its agreement to co-host the 2008 Pacific Armies Management Seminar and the Chiefs of Defense Conference.


5. In addition to Defense Secretary Gates’s call for a more robust State Department nation-building capacity, cited in Chapter 7, three former directors of the U.S. Agency for International Development Agency argue strongly for the restoration of that agency’s autonomy, its elevation to cabinet level, and enough resources for it to again be a major player in the development field. See J. Brian Atwood, M. Peter McPherson, and Andrew Natsios, “Arrested Development,” Foreign Affairs, November-December 2008.
About the Authors

John B. Haseman
Colonel Haseman retired from the U.S. Army in 1995 after a military career that spanned more than 30 years. He spent 18 years in Asia, including 10 years in Indonesia, with three assignments between 1978 and 1994; his final assignment was U.S. Defense and Army Attaché from 1990 to 1994. Colonel Haseman’s earlier Asian experience included assignments in Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, and Burma. He is the author of *The Thai Resistance Movement During the Second World War* (Chiangmai: Silkworm Press); co-author (with Angel Rabasa) of *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation), and co-author (with Eduardo Lachica) of *Toward a Stronger U.S.-Indonesia Security Relationship* (Washington DC: United States-Indonesia Society); and he has published more than 250 book chapters, journal, and magazine articles on Southeast Asian affairs.

Eduardo Lachica
Mr. Lachica is a writer/researcher on Southeast Asian security affairs. His current research is on the overlapping security concerns of Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia. He is the author of a working paper, “Examining the Role of Foreign Assistance in Security Sector Reforms: The Indonesian Case,” published by the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies of Singapore, and the coauthor with John Haseman of “Toward a Stronger U.S.-Indonesia Security Relationship,” published by the United States-Indonesia Society in 2005. He had a 25-year career as an editor and reporter for Dow Jones & Co. publications. He was a diplomatic and international trader reporter for *The Wall Street Journal* and before that a Tokyo-based correspondent for *The Wall Street Journal Asia*. He continues to contribute articles to those publications.